

Inclusive Local Governance for Poverty Reduction: A Review of Policies and Practices

Andrés Mejía Acosta
Research Fellow
Institute of Development Studies

With the valuable research assistance of
Julia Clark
Institute of Development Studies

In cooperation with Pascal Arnold/Sarah Byrne/Pascal Fendrich (Intercooperation)

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1. Introduction

This review looks at how and when do donor policies and initiatives for social inclusion in local governance processes and institutions really work to improve the lives of the poor. The overview responds to a specific mandate commissioned to Intercooperation (IC) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and it seeks to review and organise a vast array of existing literature and empirical evidence documenting innovative experiences in social inclusion in local governance carried forward by SDC and other donors (Sida, DFID). The goal is to identify good practices (whenever possible) and capitalize on the relevant lessons that could be extrapolated to different contexts. The conceptual and methodological tools derived from this study will be presented and discussed at a F2F workshop of the network to be held in Sarajevo in March 2011.

The first part of this review surveys and analyses donor strategies' to promote greater social inclusion. It focuses on the existing assumptions about which actors, rules and mechanisms contribute to effective social inclusion, and looks for cited evidences of success. This is done by looking at white papers, policies and guidelines as well as relevant programme documents produced with a focus on three of the most influential donors on this field: SDC, Sida and DFID. The second part offers a systemised overview of innovative approaches, methodologies and tools regarding social inclusion in local governance, with special attention to the question of how these concepts work "on the ground". This will be done through a selective desk review of country cases that have been classified and documented by IDS through extensive empirical research in the past 10 years.

2. Donor Policies on Social Inclusion: a critical desk review

This section gives an overview of existing approaches and methodologies developed by cooperation agencies regarding social inclusion in local governance among development partners. It focuses on the work of three influential donors in this regard, DFID, Sida and SDC, and attempts to draw comparisons between them based on a desk review of their policy papers, policy guidelines and other relevant documents.

The review of donor approaches to social inclusion reveals two important gaps. First, there is much confusion as to whether social inclusion efforts are means to an end (poverty reduction) or these are an end in themselves. This is an important distinction to make as it determines the expected role that social inclusion work is intended to play in policy design, interventions and evaluations. While all agencies would ascertain the obvious impact of social inclusion efforts on reducing poverty reduction, DFID's policy programming appears intended to maximize or improve social inclusion policies, whereas SDC and SIDA seem to focus on strengthening the social inclusion component of their decentralization, governance economic development programmes.

A more important and closely related issue is the lack of clarity regarding the role of social inclusion in the policy process, and whether donor's intent is to maximize social inclusion *in the formulation, and design of policy programmes* (through participatory techniques for example, a la SIDA, SDC), or whether the focus is to maximize social inclusion of the beneficiaries of policy interventions (water provision, health care, etc a la DFID). It may be tempting to assume that efforts to include all citizens in policy formulation will result in citizens directly benefiting from policy implementation, but this linkage is often not supported by country evidence. Further political economy analysis is needed to understand the conditions under which inclusive policy formulation results in broader coverage in service provision. These distinctions are discussed in greater detail at the end of this section.

2.1. *The British Department for International Development (DFID)*

Policy Overview

DFID's official position on social inclusion was first articulated by its opposite term, in a 2005 policy paper entitled 'Reducing poverty by tackling social exclusion'. The organisation developed this policy in response to growing recognition that exclusion of groups and individuals, particularly in South Asia, was undermining its poverty-reduction programming (DFID, 2010: 1). Since then, DFID has worked to mainstream social inclusion/exclusion across various areas of its development work, and in 2007-2008, conducted an evaluation of its policy. Although the 2010 evaluation highlighted some successes, the results suggest that there have been several administrative challenges to embedding the policy within the organisation, which explains its slow adoption (DFID, 2007: preface).

Definition

In the 2005 policy statement, social exclusion was defined as

...a process by which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged because they are discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation, caste, descent, gender, age, disability, HIV status, migrant status or where they live. Discrimination occurs in public institutions, such as the legal system or education and health services, as well as social institutions like the household (DFID, 2005: 3).

Furthermore, DFID recognises that social exclusion is a "dynamic, multifaceted process" that is intertwined with other socio-political and political economy concerns (DFID, 2010: 1-4).

Philosophy

According to DFID, it is important to tackle the problem of social exclusion because: a) it prevents people from exercising their rights and opportunities, and b) it hinders poverty reduction by leading to higher rates of poverty among marginalised groups and reducing the productive capacity of the whole society (DFID, 2005: 5). Because it prevents the realisation of rights and exacerbates poverty, social exclusion also affects societies' ability to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and can lead to conflict and violence (DFID, 2005: 6-8).

Local Governance Focus

DFID does not specifically highlight social inclusion with respect to local governance and decentralisation, which are treated as a different set of policy priorities. Rather, DFID articulates its intention to mainstream social inclusion across all levels of its programming in the 2005 policy and in subsequent materials (2007, 2010).

Programming

In their 2005 policy statement, DFID elaborated various ways in which public policy and development programming can tackle social exclusion, including

- Creating legal, regulatory and policy frameworks that promote social inclusion
- Ensuring that socially excluded groups benefit from public expenditure as much as other groups
- Improving economic opportunities and access to services for excluded groups
- Promoting their political participation in society, and their capacity to organise and mobilise themselves
- Increasing accountability to protect citizens' basic human rights
- Tackling prejudice and changing behaviour (DFID, 2005: 1).

Civil society can contribute to reducing social exclusion by increasing demands for accountability and demanding that citizens are protected by the rule of law, influence policymaking and contribute to delivering state services, and tackling prejudice and changing behaviour (DFID, 2005: 13). Donors, in turn, can reduce social exclusion by ensuring that their own programmes are aware of exclusionary practices, developing an understanding of the ways in which social exclusion mechanisms work in each country, helping to reflect and disseminate good lessons and practices across countries and regions; and promoting policy discussions with partner governments (DFID, 2005: 16).

To this purpose, DFID outlined ten policy commitments to tackle social exclusion at all levels of operation:

- Analyse the impact of exclusion on poverty reduction on all country programmes, in order to decide on priorities for work by region, country and sector in our CAPs and regional DDPs
- Promote exchanges of best practice between national and regional organisations
- Work with other UK government departments & Development Partners to include analysis of exclusion as a cause of conflict and insecurity in our approaches and responses to conflict prevention and reduction
- Identify opportunities to address social exclusion in fragile states
- Strengthening collection and analysis of statistics
- Work with the World Bank and regional development banks, UN agencies, EC and other donors to make development work better for excluded groups. To include continuing substantial financial and technical support to strengthen their capability to take forward work in this area
- Increasing inclusiveness of our own human resources practices and strengthen the diversity in our workforce
- Commissioning new research to ensure that adequate attention is paid to exclusion, inequality and rights in all our research
- Broaden and deepen our engagement with civil society to strengthen the contribution it can make to tackling exclusion
- To be accountable for implementation of the policy set out in this paper by evaluating progress in 2007-2008 (2005: 1-2)

One example of a DFID initiative that addresses social inclusion is a programme called **Ethiopia's Protection of Basic Services Phase II**. This programme (funded at US\$540k), included a "Social Inclusion and Gender Annex" in the memorandum of understanding and incorporated social accountability pilots into its design, with the intention of improving more effective, efficient, responsive and accountable public service delivery for marginalised groups (particularly women) (DFID, 2010: 4). Another example is the **DFID Community Support Programme (CSP) in Nepal**, which supports excluded and conflict-affected groups by helping to address their immediate livelihood needs through funding schools, irrigation systems, drinking water facilities, income-generating activities and skills development training. This programme merges social inclusion measures with improvements to public services and economic growth.


Methodology

Social Exclusion Conceptual Framework

Fundamentally, DFID views the consequences of social inclusion as a ripple effect. The following chart illustrates DFID's conceptual framework, which begins by analysing which groups and individuals are socially excluded and how. It then recognises that prejudice and discrimination are transmitted outward through formal and informal institutions and behaviours to produce exclusionary social, political and economic outcomes that lead to poverty. Thus, social exclusion is both an outcome and a process, often compounded by multiple layers of discrimination (DFID, 2007: 5).

The framework proposes that DFID, as an organisation can have a positive impact on outcomes for the excluded by focusing on four areas of activity: corporate systems and performance, policy and international, learning, and regional and country programming.

Figure 1. Social Exclusion Conceptual Framework




(DFID, 2007: 6)

The Gender and Social Exclusion Analytical Tool (GSEA)

Based on the conceptual framework, DFID has developed a **Gender and Social Exclusion analytical tool (GSEA)** for DFID country offices to use as they prepare their Country Governance Analysis and engage in the country planning process. The GSEA looks at qualitative and quantitative data (ideally including consultations with excluded groups) to determine:

- Who is excluded
- What are the processes, impacts and implications of gender equality and social exclusion
- What are the impacts continued exclusion on poverty reduction and the MGDs, and
- What are the implications for DFID’s country programme (DFID, 2009: 3).

The GSEA analysis is conducted using a set of framework questions that determine on how social exclusion occurs within three spheres—society, the market and the state—and how they interact to compound and reinforce exclusion through individual and institutional relationships (see figure on the following page).



(DFID, 2009: 11)

Challenges

Despite a very analytical approach to reducing social exclusion, DFID acknowledges that organisational awareness of and commitment to its Social Exclusion Policy has been very low, and has not been adopted in many areas (DFID, 2010: 2). For example, although DFID has promoted use of the GSEA, it has been used in seven African countries and it only remains mandatory in South Asia (DFID, 2010: 3).

Some of the various challenges that have limited widespread incorporation of DFID's social exclusion policy into all of its work include the facts that:

- The concept of social exclusion is broadly defined and understood differently by various areas or the organisation
- Understanding and realities of social exclusion vary considerably by country context
- The plan is ambitious and its commitments are not yet fully disseminated or understood within the organisation
- There are multiple dimensions of exclusion which can be difficult to “untangle”
- *A decentralised organisational structure* has made it difficult to “look at the big picture” and gain clarity on who is responsibility for enforcing social exclusion policy (DFID, 2007: ix-x)

DFID has also experienced related challenges to monitoring the adoption of social inclusion policy, such as the fact that expenses and programming related to social exclusion are not yet systematically tracked.

To address these challenges, DFID is working to better disseminate and embed social exclusion policy in its planning and materials, further clarify the term itself and incorporating social exclusion indicators and frameworks into its evaluation methods.

2.2. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Policy Overview

Sida does not have an explicit articulated policy on social inclusion/exclusion. However, the organisation incorporates this theme across its five focus areas: 1) democracy, equality and human rights, and 2) to economic development, 3) knowledge health and social development, 4) sustainable development, and 5) human security. Social inclusion concerns are specially developed in programming in the first two areas. It has also developed certain methodologies that

relate to a need for enhanced social inclusion, including conducting power analyses and developing some questions to evaluate social inclusion outcomes.

Definition

In general, when Sida refers to 'social inclusion', it loosely means the extent of outreach to citizens, and in particular to weaker or more marginalized groups in society (Mikkelsen, 2008: 12). The extent of outreach can be interpreted from multiple angles, depending on the context, but in general means: '1) right to inclusion to access benefits, 2) concern over equity in the distribution of benefits and 3) ensuring sustainability of project benefits' (Mikkelsen, 2008: 44).

Philosophy

Sida's mission is 'To help create conditions that will enable poor people to improve the quality of their lives' (Sida website). In serving this objective, Sida follows two approaches that relate to social inclusion objectives. The first is a rights-based approach that focuses on the agency of the poor as rights holders. The second approach is to emphasise the need for development cooperation work to be directed by the perspectives, needs, interests and circumstances of poor people themselves (Sida, 2007: 4). As a result, much of the organisation's programming particularly related to democracy and economic growth, targets marginalised populations.

Local Governance Focus

Sida does not have an explicit policy on social inclusion with relation to general, national or local governments. Its policies (see above) which relate to social inclusion are general and, like DFIF, do not have a specific focus on local (or national) government. However, there are few instances where its work focuses on addressing social inclusion issues at the local level.

One example is its funding of **Women's Village Activities in Višegrad, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Eastern Republika Srpska (RS)**, which are implemented with the partnership of a large intermediary NGO (The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, KtK), and led by a local women's association called "Most" ("Bridge"). "Most" is a self-organised association of socially, ethnically and religiously diverse women who work for women's rights and gender equality in the area. With the support of Sida and KtK, the women of "Most" carry out a variety of activities in villages and towns "with the aim of informing other women in towns and villages about their rights and about gender equality and issues" and encourage them to become involved in decision-making in their local communities (Powell, 2008: 7).

Programming

Sida's programming related to social inclusion generally falls under its programming for two areas of focus: 1) democracy, equality and human rights, and 2) economic development.

Democracy, equality and human rights

Over 80% of Sida's official development assistance budget goes to supporting programmes and projects to promote democracy, equality and human rights. In this area, Sida focuses on four governance principles:—participation, non-discrimination, accountability and transparency (Engblom et al., 2008: 32)—and emphasises the importance of freedom from discrimination as a basic right and a tool to fight poverty (Sida website). As such, many of its efforts in this area include projects related with a strong social inclusion component, such as:

- Social protection for adults and children in Tajikistan.
- Setting up an ombudsman for the indigenous population in Guatemala, as part of an overall effort to improve the rights of women and indigenous populations.

- Supporting Roma's rights in Kosovo, which includes breaking the double discrimination of female children.
- Promoting children's rights within the legal sector in Laos.

Overall, the target is to contribute towards a democratic culture with greater freedom and opportunities for poor people, men and children to participate in processes and demand responsibility for decisions that affect them' (Sida website). Another way that Sida looks to fight poverty and exclusion through democracy promotion is by strengthening civil society organisations, because they have the potential to help empower poor people by helping to secure their immediate service needs and building their capacity organise around rights issues and exercise those rights (Sida, 2007: 5-6). In many cases, Sida specifically targets partner civil society organisations that are 'less powerful' than more established community leaders, such as rural womens' groups (Powell, 2008: 22). As discussed earlier, there is *no explicit focus* on local governance in their program documents.

Economic Development

In addition to incorporating themes related to social inclusion in its democracy programming, Sida also focuses on inclusionary practices within its private sector development (PSD) activities. Sida views PSD as vital for contributing to poverty reduction, growth and social inclusion (although it does not use those words), because PSD can facilitate

- direct inclusion of the poor in economic activities, contributing to their employment, income and productivity, and to reducing their vulnerability
- economic growth as the means of generating resources in society and enhancing productivity, employment and income, and
- Redistribution, so that the resources generated in society from growth are invested meaningfully for the poor, especially in human resource development (Sida, 2004: 5).

It also seeks to achieve PSD in a way that is inclusive and participatory, and focuses on gender and on women's economic empowerment, specifically seeking to include more women in market activity and increase women's freedom of choice (Sida, 2004: 5-6).

Methodology

Power Analysis

Sida links the concept of poverty with the concept of powerlessness, and thus finds it important to analyse power realities in a given context. As part of its analyses, it asks questions that also relate to levels and degrees of social inclusion and participation, such as:

- 'How is formal and informal power distributed in society? (between central/local level, urban/rural, migrants/locals, elite groups/people in general, majorities/minorities/ indigenous groups, modern/traditional institutions, secular institutions or organisations/ religious ones, private/public, classes/races/ethnicities/gender/ages/within families)'
- 'What types of hidden dimensions of power exist, especially but not only, relating to gender?'
- 'How do belief systems and cultural practices legitimise and reinforce material power structures?'
- 'Which groups tend to be un-prioritised? Widows, disabled people, orphans, people affected by HIV/AIDS, people in conflict with the law, people with different sexual orientations, indigenous peoples?'
- 'To what extent are the human rights of the poor to be non-poor embedded in legal instruments?'

- What are ‘The institutional channels and arenas for effectively voicing these concerns (elections, hearings, litigation, participatory policy-making processes, lobbying, media)’? (Sida, 2006: 15-6)

Measuring and Evaluating Inclusion, Exclusion and Participation

To evaluate the effectiveness of programmes/projects that have a goal of increasing inclusion and participation, Sida asks questions such as the following:

- Were there ‘Programme-induced changes in participation and interaction?’
- Was there an ‘Application of participatory methods in planning and implementation?’ If so, ‘with what effect on outcomes?’
- Was there ‘Inclusion and exclusion of specific groups?’ or ‘Neglected areas of support?’ (Mikkelsen, 2008: 59)

Sida uses various methods and tools to gather and analyse this data, including:

- Stakeholder analysis – power structures, gender and age disaggregated information
- Review of documents and interviews with key stakeholders
- Beneficiary/target group perceptions – including participatory institutional assessment diagrams, change assessment and scoring tool (CAST), most significant change (MSC) and other participatory tools (Mikkelsen, 2008: 59)

Sida has also embraced more participatory methods of evaluating the success of empowerment/inclusion initiatives. For example, it documented and capitalised on the experiences of a donor consortium-funded Social Movement in a village in Bangladesh that developed a method of measuring empowerment based on the qualitative reports of its members themselves. Both the data and indicators used to evaluate empowerment in this case were based on accounts of the project activities and impacts from the beneficiaries themselves. Outside of the village, the results were subjected to numerical analyses that produced quantitative data robust enough to satisfy results-based management reporting requirements (Jupp, 2010).

Challenges

Without a defined social inclusion policy or framework, Sida has not conducted a review to determine the efficacy and challenges of implementing or mainstreaming social inclusion strategies. Most of their methodology for conducting power analysis does not appear to be directly linked to policy actions along the lines of DFID policy documents. And finally, similar to DFID, there are no explicit mentions to social inclusion in local governance, but rather the focus lies on participatory methodologies (a bottom up approach), regardless of territorial distributions. In this sense, participatory methods to engage with and reduce social exclusion take place at the local, regional, national, urban and rural areas.

2.3. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

Policy History

Although SDC does not have an articulated or explicit policy on social inclusion/exclusion, strands of this theme run across a variety of Swiss cooperation policy and programming. The prioritisation of social inclusion in local governance can be seen as elements of SDC’s policies and work on governance (particularly decentralisation and local governance), human rights, empowerment and gender.

Definition

SDC does not appear to have a standardised or common definition of social inclusion across its policy or programming documents. However, one of SDC's key principles is the importance of fighting structural inequalities and unequal power relations, and promoting equal involvement in the governance of public affairs (SDC, 2003: 4). Another articulated theme is *non-discrimination*, which means that no group may be excluded from power or access to resources. Although access to power is only one characteristic of social inclusion, it can perhaps be considered that equality, non-discrimination and participation might be a main focus of an eventual SDC policy on social inclusion.

Philosophy

SDC's outlook on social inclusion is largely derived from its use of a **Human-Rights-Based Approach (HRBA)**. This approach is used for implementing **governance**¹ and **gender** as transversal (or cross-cutting) themes across all of its programme areas. SDC has anchored both its HRBA and its governance work in the principles of participation, accountability, transparency, and non-discrimination (SDC, 2007b: 8). We can see themes reminiscent of social inclusion in the latter two principles in particular:

- Participation: implies that all population segments need to be connected to the political and social processes that affect them. This means that public forums exist where different groups can express dissenting opinions and personal interests, and where these viewpoints are treated as serious input in the decision-making process
- Non-discrimination: means that no group may be excluded from power and resources. This implies that proactive public integration policies for excluded or marginalised groups need to be implemented. Non-discrimination policies have to be applied for the expressed purpose of reducing inequalities between men and women, urban and rural populations, and between different ethnic groups (SDC, 2007b: 12).

It is evident that social inclusion, equality and participation are also key themes in SDC's philosophy on gender, which emphasises empowerment of disadvantaged groups, opportunities for women and men to increase their decision-making power, participation in governance structures, the danger of excluding women from social spheres like work and the home, and the need for women to be included in the development process (SDC, 2007b: 8).

Local Governance Focus

In its governance programming, SDC works on the five principles—accountability, transparency, efficiency, non-discrimination and participation—at the global, national, local and institutional levels (SDC, 2007b: 12). It has been implementing projects in local governance and decentralisation for over 25 years, and around 2/3 of its programmes include support to local governance and/or decentralisation (SDC 2007a: 3). SDC's decentralisation and local governance work in particular has a strong connection with the social inclusion theme, as 'A process of decentralisation that best serves poverty reduction is one that combines the strategies of political empowerment, resource mobilisation and enhanced service delivery in a coherent and balanced mix' (SDC, 2007a: 14). In the context of decentralisation and a HRBA, SDC prioritises enhancing the effectiveness of local service delivery so that it is provided without discrimination of any kind (SDC, 2007a: 15).

One example of this is SDC's initiative to **support local communities to claim their rights in Peru** by supporting a "Defensoria". Teams from the Defensoria, created in 1998, travel to remote regions of Peru to train and support local communities in claiming their rights and holding local

¹ Governance is one of SDC's 13 priority themes adopted in its 'Strategy 2010'. Both governance and gender are 'transversal themes' that are intended to be mainstreamed and incorporated in each of the other themes and programme sectors.

officials accountable, and also in helping local officials to fulfil their roles. The programme has achieved prestige among local communities, increased local information requests and complaints, improved awareness of responsibilities and increased community capacity to influence policy change, particularly in education and health (SDC, 2007c: 23).

Programming

Using the HRBA, SDC works to further goals related to social inclusion as it works to implement governance and gender programming that will:

- **Integrate human rights in its multidimensional conception of poverty elimination.** Discrimination and exclusion contribute to poverty, preventing marginalised groups from accessing rights, economic resources and opportunities, markets, and public services, and excluding them from power and decision making
- **Further human dignity of poor and marginalised groups.** Combating economic, social and political exclusion of marginalised groups will draw on the human rights standards and principles set out in the international human rights framework
- **Promote empowerment of the powerless and their active participation in the development process.** Beneficiaries act as active citizens and responsible rights- holders, realising their rights without discrimination (SDC, 2006: 11)

Within empowerment, SDC focuses on projects (like the example from Peru above) that 'rights-holders' realise their rights and 'duty-bearers' meet their human rights obligations:

- **Rights-holders:** Human rights translate basic needs into rights and responsibilities. This changes the status of beneficiaries of development assistance; they become rights-holders who know their rights and are aware of their responsibilities. According to particular priorities of the poor and marginalised groups, SDC will promote their access to political decision making, to public services and justice as well as to economic resources and opportunities.
- **Duty-bearers:** Under the human rights framework, states are primarily responsible for implementing human rights. Various state authorities (parliaments, governments, tribunals) at central and decentralised level have complex duties with a view to realising human rights. The private sector (and citizens in general) can also be involved in these responsibilities, particularly where the private sector is acting on behalf of the state or where the national legal framework concretises [sic] the state obligation to protect vulnerable groups from abuse (SDC, 2006: 15).

Methodology

SDC has developed a series of questions to assess how well a given programme, cooperation strategies or project adheres to its five governance principles (SDC, 2007b: 13). A number of these questions effectively help SDC gauge the degree to which social inclusion will be promoted (although the term 'social inclusion' is not used). Relevant questions that SDC asks for projects at the local level include

- *Accountability:*
 - What kind of access do marginalised groups have to justice systems (formal, informal, traditional and religious)?
- *Transparency:*
 - Is the local population knowledgeable about the community development plan?
 - Is the local government's budget created and spent equitably?

- Does the local government have the capacity to present information clearly and reach marginalised segments of the population?
- Do SDC's programmes have a positive impact on the access of the poor to natural resources (water, land, forests)?
- *Non-Discrimination:*
 - Are the most marginalised (poorest, women) able to access and analyse the information needed to participate?
- *Participation:*
 - How well do elected or community representatives really represent marginalised groups?
 - What obstacles (travel, lack of security, malnutrition, etc.) might prevent marginalised groups from participating? How have/can they be overcome? (SDC, 2007b: 17-9)

An example of this methodology in practice is a project to build **suspension bridges in Nepal**² that was funded through an SDC programme. As part of this project, the community formed a user committee to develop the work-plan to build a suspension bridge, including the location, and the level of financial contribution required by community members. Using the principles of non-discrimination, SDC mandated that at least 30 percent of the user committee members must from lower castes and be women. This requirement has been scaled up and is now a requirement in Nepal's national strategy.

Challenges

SDC identifies certain risks and challenges to governance and human rights work that involves marginalised and vulnerable populations:

In many discriminatory environments that lack fair distribution and accountability, poorer members of society may be most preoccupied with basic economic survival, and may not place as much importance on issues like social exclusion (SDC, 2007a: 11).

Donor interventions, by supporting certain actors in an attempt to include marginalised populations, often contribute to changes in political economy and power relations between actors. Because these changes can lead to conflict, it is important to conduct a power analysis before implementation to be aware of the landscape and to foster dialogue and conflict resolution as part of the programmes (SDC, 2007b: 22).

There are trade-offs between the five governance principles in that a strategy to target one might hinder the others. This is particularly the case between the efficiency principle and the principles of non-discrimination and participation (SDC, 2007b: 13).

These challenges suggests that, in order to avoid problems or unintended consequences with social inclusion programming, donor should take the time to conduct a thorough analysis of the goals, trade-offs and potential social and political ramifications before committing to a particular initiative.

2.4. Comparing Donor Approaches to Social Inclusion

Comparing different donor approaches to addressing social inclusion in local governance is a rather challenging task when each cooperation agency (DFID, Sida and SDC) has different visions of social issues, different articulations of models of change –when they exist- and therefore diverse policy guidelines to influence that change. The task of documenting these approaches themselves

² SDC (2006) 'Trail Bridges in Nepal: Partnership Results', Asia Brief of East Asia Division, summarised in SDC, 2007b.

has illustrated how different these agencies operate around the issue as there is no comparable set of policy (white) papers on the issues or operational guidelines to country offices to influence social inclusion approaches. Thus, this section reflects on some common elements for analysis and useful distinctions found in a diversity of cited documents.

- **Definition.** Of the three agencies, only DFID has an articulated an explicit policy to promote social inclusion (explicitly, to avoid social exclusion). Both Sida and SDC have adopted related policies and perspectives in their programming that include a rights-based approach to development, but have not elaborated a specific organisational policy on social inclusion. All agencies have engaged with right based approaches emphasizing on principles of equality, exercising rights and non-discrimination in different policy arenas.
- **Programmatic articulation.** Given the overarching nature of “social inclusion” approaches, the three agencies have tried to feature a policy component in their operational programmes (democracy and human rights, economic development, decentralization, etc), so that social inclusion is not a policy programme *as such* but rather appears as an implicit or explicit focus across multiple programmes.
- **Model of change.** Common among all three donors is an explicit link and interaction between persistent exclusion and poverty. With the exception of DFID however, no other agency has articulated an explicit analytical understanding of 1) what factors lead to social (exclusion) outcomes, 2) how does social exclusion manifests itself in adverse social and economic outcomes, and 3) what are the possible lines of work to change that (see Figure 1). In principle, this framework gives the agency and implementing partners some clarity to programme, deploy and evaluate the impact of policy interventions in the field.
- **Territorial focus.** Two of the three surveyed agencies (DFID and Sida) have incorporated social inclusion approaches across all government levels regardless of territorial distributions, including the local, regional, national, urban and rural areas. Only SDC has manifested an express interest in focusing on social inclusion in local governance. The purpose of this strategy is to limit policy interventions to a specific territorial unit, but there is limited empirical evidence to assess whether a decentralized approach may produce unintended negative effects if the resulting programme interventions are disconnected from other levels of policy interventions. In the case of DFID, they argue that adopting a decentralised organisational focus may make it difficult to look at “big picture” issues and gain clarity on who is responsibility for enforcing social exclusion policy (DFID, 2007: ix-x).
- **Methodologies and toolboxes.** Of the three agencies, only DFID has developed overarching methods and tools such as GSEA that could be used to analyze social inclusion efforts at the local level. SIDA has focused on participatory methodologies which could be applied to analyzing local governance settings. Finally most of SDC methodology for conducting power analysis does not appear to be directly linked to promoting social inclusion outcomes but they focus on processes instead.
- **Evaluation.** All three agencies have challenges with articulating evaluation strategies for their social inclusion work. Without a defined social inclusion policy or framework, Sida has not conducted a review to determine the efficacy and challenges of implementing or mainstreaming social inclusion strategies. SDC confronts a similar situation: although there are clear links between the goals of decentralisation and those of social inclusion, the lack of an articulated social inclusion policy makes it difficult to evaluate SDC’s social inclusion practices in local contexts. DFID’s social exclusion policy is now five years old, and despite having a clearly articulated strategy there are administrative factors that explain only marginal success. The large size of the organisation, lack of internal policy accountability, and the vague and context-specific nature of social exclusion itself has made it difficult for DFID to ensure that the policy takes hold across all its operations. This is an important

lesson for any decentralised donor agency, and suggests the need for a more concrete implementation plan to operationalise any specific policy commitment to social inclusion.

3. Experiences on Social Inclusion in local governance processes: What works on the ground?

This section explores how government and civil society initiatives to promote social inclusion and poverty reduction in local governance processes actually “work on the ground”. The selected case studies are not funded by or directly inspired by the policy priorities and principles of the main donors discussed in the previous section. Rather, this analytical desk review of case studies reflect research lessons, policy interventions and advocacy efforts documented by IDS researchers and associates for the past 10 years. In this sense, they offer a “parallel perspective” on social inclusion initiatives in local governance processes.

3.1. A Comparative Overview: selection criteria

This desk review reports on 11 country initiatives where projects: a) sought to promote in a direct or indirect manner, social inclusion outcomes to improve living conditions of the poorest, and b) the scope of work focused on the local level or had direct implications over local level processes. Regarding the first condition, selected cases refer to the provision of basic social services of which the poorest groups in society are most deprived or discriminated against (housing, water, micro credit, migration). It also refers to initiatives that actively promote the inclusion of marginal actors in the decision making process through surveillance and accountability initiatives (scorecards, watchdog groups). The second dimension refers to the territorial scope of these initiatives, which is ideally aimed at local –mostly rural- governance processes. In practice however, it is difficult and undesired to separate these local dynamics from broader processes at the national level or sub urban areas, so these overlaps are highlighted whenever relevant. In addition, we have tried to select cases that appear to use innovative mechanisms to promote social inclusion, or that offer examples of how the interaction of different factors (agency, institutional, structural) can lead to improved social inclusion outcomes. The analysis and comparison of contributing factors to success will produce lessons and policy recommendations to be discussed at the F2F event in Sarajevo in March 2011.

The following pages organise the information along six categories: the scope of initiatives, the main stakeholders and actors involved in carrying these out, the organisation and institutional structure in which these initiatives take place, the structural constraints, the existence of social inclusion outcomes and future challenges for the implementation and success of social inclusion initiatives. Each criterion is developed according to the variation presented by the cases.

3.2. Scope of Initiatives

The range of selected initiatives includes examples of collective efforts to provide social services for the improvement of people’s livelihoods at the local level. These initiatives include efforts to improve municipal housing, networks to support migrant workers, lines of micro credit for very poor people, land tenure schemes, improvement of water provision and participatory budgeting to name a few. Some initiatives tend to mobilise citizens to demand an effective provision of services from their local governments, while others seek empower citizens for the self provision of these. Generally, the initiatives involve not just one but rather *a collection of multiple strategies* for the provision of services in a way that actions are *complementary of each other and sequential in time*.

One way of classifying the scope of initiatives is to distinguish those that seek to enhance social inclusion *during policy formulation and monitoring*, from those that promote social inclusion *in accessing public services*. In the first group, initiatives seek to strengthen citizens’ ability to

participate, formulate and monitor the effective delivery of government services, such as the creation of “Project management committees” in Peru to ensure the success in the execution of public works projects, including direct supervision of the project, controlling expenditure, co-management of construction, and informing the public of progress. The other group seeks to directly maximize service provision, for example, by improving housing conditions in Brazil, India or Pakistan. These initiatives may involve a combination of participation and mobilisation of key beneficiaries to “urbanize slums” (through the provision of water, electricity, sewage, paving), regularise land titles and take steps towards building new housing. As previously discussed, it is useful to treat these groups separately because improved social inclusion during policy formulation may not necessarily lead to improved social inclusion during service delivery.

An innovative scheme within the first subgroup is the adoption of Water Service Scorecards in South Africa as a tool to analyse water-related problems, measure provision quality and hold local governments accountable for the provision of water, especially to those most in need. The scheme capacitated citizens to become certified “trainers and facilitators” that conducted participatory assessments in villages, gauging the communities’ needs and goals related to water by using a ‘learning by doing’ method that involved rights education, community and water mapping, exploring the health of under-fives and sanitation issues. Following the assessment, the communities completed Water Services Scorecards that combined qualitative with quantitative indicators, and developed a joint assessment and action plan to improve delivery of water services (see appendix, case b). Overall, the scheme was useful to mobilise the community and develop a validated measure of (poor) progress. As illustrated by the case study (see appendix, case b), the inclusion of stakeholders in policy formulation was not able to deliver better services given the weight of other structural constraints outside project interventions.

An example of a new social inclusion scheme for improved service delivery is the creation of an “Ultra Poor Program (UPP)” by the Swayam Krishi Sangam (SKS) microfinance institution (MFI) to target extremely poor households in Andhra Pradesh, India. This is especially innovative because it seeks to gradually give excluded or underserved households access to government programmes and mainstream microfinance loans they would normally not have access to. The scheme provides beneficiaries with an asset that can provide both short- and long- term income (e.g., a pregnant cow which can provide milk in the short- term and offspring in the long- term), or 2) provides a long-term asset (e.g., land), while encouraging the beneficiary to continue daily wage labour to ensure short-term income. The programme hopes to reduce people’s dependence on programme benefits and the need for stipends to offset income loss by treating assets as an income boost rather than an income replacement (see appendix, case d).

3.3. Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The review of selected initiatives suggests that stakeholders can attain a more inclusive provision of services when they articulate efforts through *horizontal networks* rather than asking central governments to provide local services through traditional *vertical lines of authority*. Rather, the existence of horizontal networks refers to the articulation of government and non government efforts working across different policy priorities (see Brazil example below) or different stages of the policy process (see Peru example).

The initiative on Participatory governance in Peru shows that citizens created “management committees” comprised of four rotating members elected by the community for each investment project approved during participatory budgeting. In principle, management committees promote the inclusion of different stakeholders that would otherwise not be involved in the decision making process. The committee then signs a cooperation agreement with the community and the district capital government, to assume responsibility over project supervision, expenditure control, construction co-management, and public relations (appendix a). Other cases illustrate the formation of networks of citizens, civil society and government actors in the provision of services. In China for example, the Social Support Network seeks to secure rights and social security for

rural to urban migrant workers, and it is made of different groups including the Sichuan Women's Federation, the Sichuan Academy of Science, other NGOs like the Chengdu Women's Federation, Sichuan University, private service providers, grassroots organisers and volunteers, migrant workers themselves, and officials from the Chengdu Education, Health, Legal and Civil Affairs Bureaus. While the increase in network membership may increase the leverage and legitimacy of network activities, it may also lead to a more difficult articulation of preferences around simple policy choices.

Perhaps one of the most effective local government–civil society partnerships around the inclusive provision of services is illustrated by the creation of Urban housing policies in Diadema, Sao Paulo, Brazil. The scheme is a policy response to the urgent needs of families living without water, sewage, paving, electricity, healthcare, schools and other urban services, and also to create new, safe, and affordable housing solutions. The housing schemes are usually initiated by municipal government leaders and administrators generally associated with the Government Labor party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* – PT). However, the programme conceptualisation, design and implementation relied heavily on social movements, community actors and resident associations. This combination of state and social actors provided the scheme with important social legitimacy, while it ensured the political incentives for municipal officials to work in the provision of creative and useful housing solutions. It is also a useful example of a program that is both inclusive at the policy formulation and at the delivery stage of the process. One key factor to this success was the fact that social stakeholders mobilised to demand an effective and inclusive provision of services, *but service delivery was also instrumental to advance the long term interests* of political stakeholders who sought re-election.

3.4. Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

An important dimension of “success” of social inclusion initiatives in local governance processes is the existence of *legal provisions* to protect fundamental rights and prevent discrimination in the provision of services. This is the case of China for example, where the activities of the rural migrants Network was supported by a number policy documents intended to protect rural migrant workers' rights and welfare and to promote labour migration, including a 'Notice on Employment Administration and Service Works for Farm Workers in Urban Areas' (2003) and 'Opinions on Solving Several Problems of Rural Migrant Workers' (2006). Another relevant example is the experience from Brazil, where the Diadema housing policy had been enabled by various national legal institutions, including the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which specified the social function of urban property and the right to decent housing, Federal Law 11124/2004, which established the National System and Fund for Housing of Social Interest, and the aforementioned Grant for the Real Right of Use (CDRU).

A closely related factor is the existence of *effective organisational capacity* to uphold those rights and implement the strategies, especially when taking into account the role of political organizations. The comparison between South Africa and Brazil shows an interesting contrast regarding the incentives that politicians have to engage in long term processes of reform. In South Africa, the presence of splits within the local political leadership and divisions within the African National Congress (ANC) affected the long term calculation of local politicians, who would show less interest or place responsibility back on the district government, and tended to invest limited available resources on immediate priorities or selective beneficiaries rather than long-term objectives. Subsequently, the high rates of political turnover for local municipal authorities threatened the long term survival of the initiative as the commitment to social inclusion initiatives had to be renegotiated with new incumbents.

By contrast, the strength of the governing Labour Party (PT) in Brazil has been a defining characteristic of local government success in Diadema. Since winning election in 1982, PT administrations were re-elected in 1988 and 1992, before backing the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) in 1996. After four years of the PSB scaling back social policy initiatives, the PT was again

elected in 2000, 2004, and 2008. When the current term expires in 2012, the PT will have served 26 years in government, the longest it has ruled any Brazilian city. The long term political prospects of key stakeholders contributed to the long term prospects of the strategy. Although it is empirically difficult to determine whether social inclusion achievements played a decisive role in the electoral victories of the government party, frequent electoral victories in a competitive democracy can be interpreted as a sign of government success.

3.5. Structural Environment

A third factor for success, in addition to the nature of individual incentives of local party leaders and organisational capacity has been the critical role played by the structural environment in which the initiative takes place. The analysis of structural factors is necessary to identify long term opportunities and constraints that exceed the scope of project interventions, for example, whether a political regime is democratic or not, whether countries have benefited from natural resource revenues or not, etc. Potentially, a solid initiative to promote greater social inclusion in local governance could have the appropriate mix of incentives and institutional capacity, but be embedded within an authoritarian setting that undermines the scope and inclusiveness of the strategy. This is the case for many of the examples cited in Pakistan or China where social dynamics have been influenced by military and authoritarian traditions that limit citizens' participation in centralised and non democratic regimes.

The cases of social inclusion analysed in Brazil, India or South Africa take place in relatively competitive and open democracies, so that the political environment itself offers greater opportunities for the participation and articulation of new voices or at least there are no explicit sanctions preventing citizens' participation. In the case of Brazil for example, the inclusiveness of Diadema's social policies were enhanced by Brazil's decentralised institutions enshrined in the constitution since the eighties, which provide municipalities with substantial administrative and legislative autonomy from state and federal government. This reform allowed local governments to advance and promote social inclusiveness initiatives in a more proactive manner. A case of partial success is represented by Uganda, where democratisation and decentralisation are still new political processes that have not taken root in all levels of the policy process: decentralisation took place in the nineties but a multiparty system was first introduced in 2005, and competitive elections first took place in 2006. The success of some social inclusion initiatives such as 'Pressure From Below' to improve service provision, increased citizen awareness of rights and mobilisation capacity were partly explained due to its community-based organisation. Yet, the lack of sufficient funding for project operations, the mixed political mandate of local government officials, and the lack of formal recognition to the grassroots 'Pressure From Below' initiative prevented the further growth and expansion of citizens' strategies to alleviate the infrastructure and living conditions available to the poor (see appendix i.).

3.6. Social Inclusion Outcomes

Establishing the "success" of social inclusion in local governance and decentralisation support projects is both a methodological and empirical challenge, and an even greater challenge to determine whether these projects effectively determined a reduction in poverty. Nevertheless, the selected revision of cases allows us to illustrate some of the factors contributing to a successful articulation of project initiatives.

The emerging message from this critical review is that effective social inclusion outcomes do not take place as isolated effects of policy statements. Rather, they feature a combination of positive individual incentives, adequate institutional and organisational capacities, and facilitating favourable structural factors.

1. Individual incentives of stakeholders are necessary to ensure commitment and success of social inclusion efforts at the local level; if for example local elected officials are directly responsible for service delivery vis-à-vis those citizens who elected them, they are more likely to respond positively if their own political advancement is linked to effective government.
2. Strengthening institutions and organizational capacity is also critical to ensure success of social inclusion efforts. If municipal governments for example lack access to sufficient financial resources or don't have the administrative prerogatives to implement projects, that is likely to have a direct negative effect on the success of local governments.
3. Structural factors like the type of regime or the extent of decentralisation are also critical for success, albeit they are not directly related or affected by project interventions. The relevant question then is to what degree social inclusion efforts at the local level can produce meaningful change within those structural constraints.

Consistent with the narrative presented so far, Brazil is an example of successful social inclusion outcomes that meets all three conditions: the success in urban housing policies in Diadema is explained by the continued leadership and proactive nature of the PT party, and the high levels of community mobilisation and involvement in all stages of project implementation. Secondly, the case features an expanded capacity of both the municipal government and community organisations to improve housing conditions. Thirdly, Brazil offers favourable institutional and legal arrangements, including decentralised institutions crafted in the 1988 Constitution (see appendix, case k.). The participatory, urbanisation, regularisation and housing developing strategies initiated by Diadema's municipal government over the past few decades have resulted in marked improvements in housing conditions, access to services, and welfare. Among other examples, urbanisation efforts in some areas led to declines in disease rates, improvement in services not included in the scheme (such as health care and public safety), a drop in infant mortality from 83 to 15 per thousand from 1985 to 2004, and increase in school attendance. Under AEIS 1, resident associations negotiated the purchase of over 300,000 square metres of land, to provide housing for 2,842 families. As more housing is supplied under this provision, the growth of slums and illegal settlements has slowed, particularly in key areas of environmental risk. Providing legal addresses has also contributed to an increase in for dignity residents and made it easier to apply for jobs and access other official services. In addition to improvement on project specific goals, there are broader governance and service delivery gains including the proliferation of community organisations and associations, opening democratic spaces for dialogue, and convening groups and social movements that had previously been excluded from policy processes. For example, the involvement of the housing nucleuses in the urbanisation process increased rights awareness, undermined clientelistic relationships based on favours, generated a feeling of belonging and a desire to care for new, legalised spaces (see appendix, case k).

Many other cases illustrate examples of partial success. The case of the "Pressure From Below" initiative in Uganda positively influenced service delivery in some instances, including renovation of hazardous school buildings, grading of bad roads, replacing street lights, and improving sanitary conditions by controlling fish-waste dumping, and has contributed to an increase citizen awareness of rights. It has helped foster community linkages with CSOs (e.g., local NGOs now use Pressure From Below representatives as resources for community information) and increased their ability to mobilise communities with regard to development programmes. However, its lack of financial resources negatively affected its ability to effectively advocate and engage with citizens, decreased its legitimacy as an actor, and limited its ability to scale up. Additionally, "Pressure From Below's" lack of integration into formal participatory spaces means that it is in the position only to react to policy rather than shaping it (see appendix, case i.).

3.7. Lessons and Future Challenges

The selection of cases analysed thus far, has helped illustrate some critical factors for successful interventions, effective delivery of services, and long run sustainability of social inclusion initiatives. This section summarizes those challenges.

1. **The scope of policy interventions: from formulation to delivery.** Section II highlighted an important difference between social inclusion initiatives that sought to maximize the participation of citizens during the *formulation, and design of policy programmes* as opposed to those that sought to maximize the inclusion of a greater *number of beneficiaries*. While there is ample space for improvement in both cases, it appears that there are more “success stories” that have improved inclusive participation but the **actual** impact of formulation unto inclusive service delivery is a more difficult impact to establish. Certainly, inclusionary techniques such as joint management committees or participatory budgets can maximize the chances of citizens having an effective voice in decision making, but effective policy implementation often depends on promoting individual incentives of elected politicians, strengthening institutions and organizations to that effect, and to working with and around structural constraints as illustrated by the cases.
2. **Building effective delivery networks.** Some initiatives suggest that lasting improvements in more inclusive local governance and service delivery will be observed when there is greater coordination between different government agencies or service sectors (Peru) *as well as* within territorial levels of government (South Africa). Also, the cases illustrate the need for combining social mobilisation and participation, with the existence of effective legal instruments to enable social inclusion and the protection of individual rights (India and Pakistan). The Diadema experience for example shows that a combination of broadly participative initiatives which require community mobilisation can have a significant impact on protecting and improving the residential security of slum dwellers. This type of rights-based or transformative social protection approach can be successful with limited resources, but requires networks of actors and champions with high capacity for organisation and mobilisation.
3. **Ensuring sustainability over time.** While the comparison of donor approaches do not explicitly address the issue of sustainability of social inclusion initiatives over time, the empirical review of cases illustrates the critical importance that political parties and organizations can play to guarantee an intrinsic and sustained commitment to promoting social inclusion initiatives when these advance their own electoral careers (re election). Another dimension that increases the sustainability of initiatives is when project interventions are constructed in a holistic manner to maximise benefits and diversify risks; for example, by linking land title regularisation with urbanisation of slums to avoid the risk of institutionalising poor living conditions.

These lessons will be further elaborated and translated into concrete policy recommendations to assist development partners participating at the F2F meeting in Sarajevo, adapt and develop their own efforts to promote social inclusion efforts in local governance.

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5. Appendix 1: Case Studies

5.1. Peru – Participatory Governance in Anta Province

Overview

In the province of Anta, Peru, local authorities together with grassroots and community organisations have created and implemented governance measures—including participatory decision-making, budgeting and co-management of public services—to increase the social and political participation of marginalised small farmers and other rural groups. The initiatives, which began informally in the Limatambo district and were later incorporated more formally into provincial administration, have successfully increased the participation of excluded groups and improved service delivery.

Initiative Summary and background

Following decades of political violence and dictatorship, decentralisation and a renewed emphasis on local government in Peru over the past decade have paved the way for local governments to experiment with participatory and inclusive governance. In the Limatambo district of Anta province, participatory measures began in the 1990s with informal community meetings and assemblies organised by the municipal government to decide spending priorities and report on accounts. These evolved into ‘communal neighbourhood boards’ and an ‘authorities coordination committee’. Communal neighbourhood boards—comprised of six rotating members, half men, half women—were a space for 1) reporting financial accounts so the community could supervise local financial management, 2) collective decision-making and determining priorities for investment and development programmes, and 3) exercising equality of participation and breaking down traditions of social exclusion, particularly of rural groups and women. The authorities coordination committee—comprised of the district and state officials, CSOs and other community organisations—was created as a coordination mechanism for the application of state-level policy in the district related to five areas: agriculture production, road infrastructure, tourism, basic services, and health and education.

In 2002, these measures were scaled-up to formalise community-based participation at the provincial level. This created spaces for discussion at all levels of government (from the district capital to the neighbourhood level) and committed 100 percent of the investment budget to be allocated through participatory processes. One of the innovative approaches pioneered in the capital district was the creation of management committees. A committee—comprised of four rotating members elected by the community—is created for each individual investment project approved during participatory budgeting. The committee signs a cooperation agreement with the community and the district capital government, and is responsible for direct supervision of the project, controlling expenditure, co-management of construction, and informing the public of progress.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

In Limatambo, the municipal government led by Mayor Wilber Rozas created participatory mechanisms as part of its political platform of openness and inclusion, and in response to lobbying and community mobilisation by the District Peasant Federation of Limatambo (FEDICAL). Representatives from state and local bureaucracy and other CSO/NGO actors, including farmer’s associations, political organisations, neighbourhood associations, NGOs and other grassroots organisations, were involved in implementation, particularly through the authorities’ coordination committee. Strong and continual government support was key to the scale-up of participation at the Anta province level, when Rozas was elected head of the provincial government in 2002.

Rozas is a particularly influential actor, and he and his left-wing Popular Peasant Unit (UPP) party were instrumental in spearheading the participatory changes in Anta.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

The potential for community-based participatory mechanisms in Anta province is largely a product of the country's high level of decentralisation and emphasis on sub-national government (regions, provinces, and districts). Peru legalised citizen consultation in Laws 26300 and 27972, which refer to participation in the budgeting process and require local government's to survey citizens to determine and prioritise community project, respectively. However, national legislation has set a relatively low bar for participation: on average only 10 percent of an investment budget is subject to citizen control, and even then 'modifications' to spending decisions made through participatory processed can be altered. Rozas and his left-wing Popular Peasant Unit (UPP) party built upon these laws to shift the balance of power away from traditional elites bolstered by a patronage system to the historically marginalised peasants. They implemented more sweeping measures than the legislation specified, allocating 100 percent of investment spending to participatory processed and also requiring that representatives adopt collective spending priorities.

Structural Environment

Peru's highly decentralised democracy is the aftermath of its history of internal violent conflict (1980-1992) and authoritarian rule (1992-2001). The resulting political organisation and economy emphasises diversity and the power of sub-national government, restricts national influences and tends towards personal leadership networks rather than centralised politics. Although this is beneficial for the strength of local government, the absence of strong national political parties makes it hard to build national programmes or long-term consensus. For this reason, the state has difficulty reaching the poorest, most isolated areas.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

Overall, Anta's innovations have increased the participation of previously-excluded groups, augmented the legitimacy of community investments and transparency of expenditure, and improved service delivery. In the capital district, for example, participatory processes led to an Integral Solid Waste Management Plan to address the problem of disposing garbage (which was traditionally thrown in the river or a dump located in a peasant community), which included community consultations and training. Participation and co-management has also led to community-driven solutions to agriculture, transportation and water and drainage systems, along with institutional development. Furthermore, they have increased community and civic dialogue, stimulating productive, pluralist debates—an important progress given Peru's social fragmentation and historic violence. There are several key factors to these successes. The first is the existence of sustained government leadership and important champions (Rozas), which helped reach rural, excluded communities that are not reached by national-level programming. Second was strong citizen mobilisation, coupled with legal participatory frameworks and the wider context of decentralisation. Finally, communities and government were able to prioritise their needs and focus resources accordingly.

Still, there have been challenges. The rotation of the management committees are often subject to traditional processes that may favour elites. Furthermore, the committees sometimes have difficulty gaining legitimacy in the face of established or elected authorities—particularly when the members are Women or Quechua speakers. During project management, conflicts have arisen between community members and professionals contracted or part of NGOs that are brought on to assist with implementation.

Lessons and Future Challenges

These challenges point to the future need to increase efforts at communication between partners. Peru's high level of decentralisation and lack of national political parties also points to the need for collaboration between local governments to integrate their actions and projects more effectively.

5.2. South Africa - Citizen Voice Project in Mbizana, Eastern Cape

Overview

In response to the lack of sufficient water and sanitation services for the rural and urban poor in Mbizana (OR Tambo District, Eastern Cape Province), the Citizen Voice Project sought to educate and empower communities about their rights, using Water Service Scorecards as a tool to analyse water-related problems, measure provision quality and hold local governments accountable. The initiative achieved success in community assessment, capacity building and empowerment. However, due largely to weak inter-level government communication and coordination, service delivery improvements, such as new facilities or improved water flow and quality, have been virtually non-existent, and residents have become disillusioned.

Initiative Summary and Background

The Citizen Voice Project sought to mobilise, inform and empower local communities in order to improve water service delivery throughout the Wards—a local government division—of Mbizana municipality. To do so, it sought to build the capacity of local citizens through a 'cascade' strategy. First, trainees were selected from nominations submitted by traditional authorities and civil society—a measure to build relationships and the support of these authorities—trained, and accredited through the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) to give them official recognition of their skills. Starting in their own villages, these 'trainers', or 'development practitioners' then trained 'facilitators', or 'practitioners' on community assessments. Together, the trainers and facilitators went to new villages and conducted participatory assessments, gauging the communities' needs and goals related to water by using a 'learning by doing' method that involved rights education, community and water mapping, exploring the health of under-fives and sanitation issues. They also distributed materials regarding rights and water services to 'active citizens', who would serve as community resources.

Following the mobilisation and assessment, the communities met—as part of the Ward Forums, where the Ward Councillors and officials were to be present—to complete Water Services Scorecards. The scorecard was numerical and standardised around national indicators, while being flexible enough to capture diverse community realities and voices. It included an assessment of water services and a village action plan on engaging local officials and representatives to improve delivery. Overall, the assessments showed extremely poor levels of water service delivery. For the rural poor, the highest score was three (out of 10) for communication; for the urban slum areas, it was a six for hygiene facilities at schools. In all cases, significant retooling of and investment in public works and services was needed to improve water delivery.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The project was conceived and implemented by a research group from the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa's statutory research body, and the Bizana Community Legal Resource Centre (BCLRC), a local CSO. BCLRC was instrumental in the project particularly in facilitating discussing with local government and traditional leaders and helping to select candidates for training. As a result of the project, BCLRC gained strength and credibility. Although local government was not involved in community mobilisation or education, ward councillors and municipal officials were enthusiastic about the project and its training and mobilisation components in particular. Trainers were organised by Ward, and Ward Councillors reported regularly on their

activities and progress to the municipal council. Traditional leaders and Ward Councillors—often seen by the community as more stable and dependable than municipal officials—were also active in the project and saw it as an opportunity to tackle local priorities and issues.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

The project took place as the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) was developing a water service delivery regulatory system. Although DWAF's policy process largely excluded rural groups, the regulation reframed the rights of people as citizens rather than consumers, and established municipal objectives and indicators for water systems. This provided the framework for the Citizen Voice Project's mobilisation and was incorporated into the scorecards. Given this context, political support for the project was high, and the local municipality and Ward Councillors all signalled their support. The local municipality experienced high rates of turnover, however, and newer officials would often show less interest or place responsibility back on the district government. Additionally, splits within the local political leadership and divisions within the African National Congress (ANC), combined with the tendency of officials to focus limited available resources on immediate priorities rather than long-term objectives, threatened the initiative's strategy of incremental, 'cascading' progress. In the end, the municipal and district governments (the district government is both the water authority and service provider) lacked the resources, capacity and political pressure to effectively provide services or address citizen concerns.

Structural Environment

South Africa's democracy incorporates the principles of active citizenry and a responsive government, and has a legal framework which stipulates the right to participate, particularly with regard to Ward Committees and local planning. However, a large divide remains between the powerful wealthy minority and oft-excluded poor citizens. In the past decade, many poor people have expressed disenchantment with official participatory processes as a method of inclusion and have instead adopted more direct forms of action, such as protests, marches and demonstrations, in order to secure better services. The Citizen Voice Project was a product of a renewed trend toward informal citizen action to achieve accountability.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

The Citizen Voice Project was able to capture deficiencies in water service provision and related issues, which served both as a reflective tool and a baseline for future action. The project empowered marginalised individuals (particularly youth and women), increased citizen voice, understanding of rights, knowledge of local government and ability to engage with officials, and capacity for mobilisation. By purposefully selecting trainees who were not community leaders to begin with, the project was also highly inclusive and expanded leadership capabilities. It was also successful in helping people understand their communities and effectively set priorities. Finally, it facilitated links and new relationships between officials and traditional leaders and citizens, and created new roles and responsibilities, particularly in rural contexts.

Unfortunately, there has been little improvement services in these communities; most still have no piped water or improved sanitation. This failure is due in large part to lack of government capacity and commitment. Some officials valued the reports but were uncertain how to respond; or were deployed to other areas. Others viewed the reports as an attack. Beyond these issues, a fundamental obstacle to the initiative was the poor relationship and communication between the local and district municipalities, which may have been exacerbated by the project's showcasing of local needs and failures to address them. Without a formal coordination system or any official responsibility, the Ward Councillors and local municipality devolved the responsibility for addressing the concerns raised by the Citizen Voice Project upwards to the district municipality. Political conflict of this nature was beyond the project's scope and capabilities.

Lessons and Future Challenges

Going forward, trainers believe that project execution should continue and expand, maintaining grassroots agitation, until the district has responded and services have improved. However, real, lasting improvements in service delivery will be difficult until changes in inter-government coordination or political incentives to deliver services improve.

5.3. China – Support for Migrant Workers in Chengdu, Sichuan

Overview

In Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, local organisations in partnership with the government, media, private sector service providers, and others created a Social Support Network to secure rights and social security for rural to urban migrant workers, who often lack means of participation and access publicly-funded services. Through facilitating communication and cooperation among diverse partners, the Network succeeded in supporting migrant workers, improving their livelihoods and advancing their inclusion in public life.

Initiative Summary and Background

The Social Support Network for Rural Migrant Workers (2002-2007) built upon the success of outreach activities for women migrant workers in the 1990s. It sought to create a network of organisations, associations and individuals that could engage with the government and the private sector to promote inclusive policies and anti-poverty measures for rural migrant workers, particularly women. Funded by UNESCO and with financial and technical resources from Network participants, the project promoted government and public awareness of workers' rights and interests through activism and ad-campaigns, facilitated dialogue meetings with local officials, provided citizen and government training, and created help-lines and other resources.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The Network was led by the Sichuan Women's Federation and Sichuan Academy of Science, although it was implemented with the cooperation, input and assistance of other NGOs like the Chengdu Women's Federation, Sichuan University, private service providers, grassroots organisers and volunteers, migrant workers themselves, and officials from the Chengdu Education, Health, Legal and Civil Affairs Bureaus.

NGOs in China are a recent phenomenon, and they can only operate with government approval. Furthermore, organisations like the Women's Federation and Academy of Sciences are official institutions (although not line departments), which does not meet the 'Tocquevillean' concept of civil society. In this case, however, the NGOs involved in the project enjoyed relative autonomy in both advocacy and facilitating services. At the same time, their government connections endowed them with power and authority. Non-state affiliated CSOs also played an important role in advocacy and protection but had less government influence.

The government at all levels was an important partner in executing project services. During the project implementation, local and regional governments—stimulated by the central government—began to address farm workers' rights and interests and promote anti-poverty and anti-exclusion measures, including service delivery. They also supported the initiative by mobilising and allocating resources to support migrants through labour rights protection, vocational training, education, healthcare and housing.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

Historically, rural migrant workers have had difficulty participating in public life and exercising their rights because local urban governments have lacked full responsibility for them. However, the central government has created a number of policy documents since 2000 intended to protect rural migrant workers' rights and welfare and to promote labour migration, including a 'Notice on Employment Administration and Service Works for Farm Workers in Urban Areas' (2003) and 'Opinions on Solving Several Problems of Rural Migrant Workers' (2006). These advances worked in tandem with the Network.

Although the Chinese system is highly centralised, with the national government setting policies that are sent down to regional and local governments for implementation, there have been steps towards some decentralisation, including the governments' recent reform of the financial system which has allowed some local governments increased financial autonomy. This may also have implications for the ability of local governments to fully address the needs of rural migrant workers.

Structural Environment

The need for the Network was largely a product of the Chinese government system. After 1949, capital was centrally allocated and distributed, with limited mobility of resources (including labour) between regions. Most resources were allocated to urban districts, and urban and rural populations were entitled to different social welfare and security schemes. Individuals were not entitled to receive publicly-funded benefits—education, healthcare, social insurance, housing for the elderly, etc.—outside of the location of their household registration. Those services that the government does require but that fall outside the jurisdiction of the local government—for example, nine years of compulsory education for children and legal services to the disadvantaged—are then filled by private for-profit service providers, with little incentive to provide quality services. By creating a network to bring together government, community organisations and private companies, the project sought to address this structural exclusion of rural migrant workers from their citizenship rights.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

In the context of a highly centralised government, the Network brought together actors to provide and improve services and access to entitlements for rural migrant workers. For example, through partnerships with private for-profit primary schools, the project Network worked to provide schools specifically for migrants' children. It also engaged with labour contracting companies, job centres, lawyers and other private entities to provide job training and legal support to which they are entitled but lack effective channels and mechanisms to participate and claim these rights. Attitudes toward migrants have also begun to change thanks to media campaigns casting their plight in terms of a need for equality and citizenry, and the Network has also been successful in coordinating and amplifying the voice of rural migrant workers—particularly women and children—who previously had few spaces for participation or established channels for claiming their rights.

The biggest key to the success of these initiatives has been the coordinated cooperation between the government and the community, along with media and private actors, largely made possible by the semi-autonomous NGOs that were able to both advocate and engage with the government and official media through established channels. This relationship helped to create a dynamic where advocacy sanctioned by the government also stimulated policy changes during project implementation—something which might not have been possible with 'pure' civil society or private entities.

Lessons and Future Challenges

There is room for improvement, however, as migrants still face unequal participation and service delivery compared to their urban counterparts. At the local level in particular, migrant workers'

concerns often take a back seat to other problems, which suggests the ongoing need for state-level intervention.

5.4. India – Ultra Poor Program in Telangana, Andhra Pradesh

Overview

The Ultra Poor Program (UPP) was created by the Swayam Krishi Sangam (SKS) microfinance institution (MFI) to target extremely poor households in Andhra Pradesh that are excluded or underserved by government programmes and mainstream microfinance loans. The UPP provides beneficiaries with productive assets, support, cash stipends, a savings scheme and health services for a period of 18 months. With this safety net, the ultra poor are then able to 'graduate' out of cycle of extreme poverty and either enter a traditional microfinance programme or continue to build and diversify their savings and assets to increase security. The project achieved a high success rate in the immediate term while simultaneously demonstrating that additional entrepreneurial education and guidance after graduation from the programme may be necessary for continued long-term success.

Initiative Summary

The Ultra Poor Program (UPP) ran from October 2007 to June 2009 and it served 426 women in The Telangana Region of Andhra Pradesh state. The programme was one of nine 'global graduation' pilot programs based on methodology used by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in its successful Targeting Ultra Poor (TUP) programme, which was intended to benefit the extremely poor household traditionally excluded from government poverty-alleviation schemes and traditional microcredit programmes. This exclusion can occur when government programmes fail to recognise the myriad factors contributing to poverty as well as its cyclical nature, or when local corruption and a lack of knowledge of entitlements prevents access by the ultra poor. Microfinance programmes, while targeting women specifically, often neglect extremely poor women due to group exclusion (moderate poor do not accept extreme poor into credit groups), self-exclusion (caused by rigid repayment structures and an emphasis on borrowing), or the fact that the extremely poor often lack the entrepreneurial skills and pre-existing assets needed to succeed at micro enterprises.

With the UPP, Swayam Krishi Sangam (SKS) built upon the work of BRAC and adopted a strategy of empowerment through ensuring that beneficiaries had productive assets, asset protection, means of income generation, financial independence and increased awareness of government resources, and improved social behaviour and health. Thus, the programme took a service delivery approach, which included both protective and promotional elements. The UPP provided beneficiaries with 18 months of support, including providing them with productive assets, stipends, personalised field assistance, a savings scheme, health and financial assistance and education.

The UPP began with a targeting method designed to identify the most vulnerable poor while maintaining the simplicity, objectivity and verifiability of inclusion criteria to ensure standardisation and the ability to scale the programme. The criteria adopted were the opposite of those used to select microcredit recipients, including looking for beneficiaries who were sole earners, and who lacked credit and productive assets. SKS also included localised perceptions of poverty in their indicators based on wealth-ranking exercises conducted in the community, which fostered support and better reflected contextualised of poverty.

An important deviation from BRAC methods is SKS's provision of assets and stipends. Most of the graduation pilots provided beneficiaries with two assets, one to provide both short- term income and another for long- term growth and savings, and provided regular cash stipends to boost

consumption and offset the losses associated with developing the assets instead of engaging in daily wage labour. The UPP takes a different approach, and either 1) provides the beneficiaries with an asset that can provide both short- and long- term income (e.g., a pregnant cow which can provide milk in the short- term and offspring in the long- term), or 2) provides a long-term asset (e.g., land), while encouraging the beneficiary to continue daily wage labour to ensure short-term income. Treating assets as an income boost rather than an income replacement was intended to 1) reduce dependence on programme benefits and the need for stipends to offset income loss, and 2) be more cost effective, since only one, rather than two assets are provided. Coupled with this is the UPP policy of only providing stipends upon request if beneficiaries are unable to make weekly costs, and providing them only to build up assets (e.g., buying animal fodder) rather than for consumption. The goal of this method is to decrease dependency on cash stipends which may lead to resentment at the end of the 18 month period.

The assets provided to members came with an education package as well as support, guidance and frequent contact from UPP 'field assistants' (FAs), who act as one-on-one counsellors, educators and monitors for the beneficiaries through regimented and structured weekly meetings, household visits and classroom trainings. Training topics included finance topics, entrepreneurial strategy, and how to utilise specific assets. Furthermore, the FAs worked individually with beneficiaries to identify viable assets and develop future plans and goals. Lastly, the UPP included components to ensure the immediate health and stability of their members during the programme. A health director was hired to circumvent a failure and lack of availability of government services to the extreme poor, and beneficiaries were encouraged to create and maintain emergency cash savings and food stockpiles in case of unforeseen emergencies.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The SKS 'global graduation' pilot programme was initiated by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) and the Ford Foundation, based on the BRAC initiative in Bangladesh, however the UPP was designed and executed by SKS itself.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

At the time the pilot began, SKS had been operating as a successful MFI for 12 years. It became a partner in the graduation pilot programme because, through evaluating its own programmes, SKS realised that the poorest community members were not benefiting from its micro-loans. Because the UPP and microfinance lending were SKS's only two products, the organisation was able to focus its efforts and target beneficiaries easily using contrasting inclusion criteria for each programme.

Regional and local governments were not involved with the UPP, and as previously stated the programme developed in part to fill the protection gaps left by the government. However, the Telangana government did provide a daily wage labour scheme which complemented the UPP by helping to guarantee alternative sources of daily income for beneficiaries

Social Inclusion Outcomes

According to SKS, 405 (95 percent) of the 426 women who completed the 18 month programme met the criteria for being eligible to 'graduate' out of extreme poverty: having multiple sources of income; savings of at least 800 rupees; adequate food, shelter and clothing; a least one month's supply of rice, and awareness and ability to access government services (including pro-poor benefits). They also had the ability to maintain or expand their livelihood either by increasing their savings and assets, or entering a mainstream microfinance programme or government self-help group. Through FA support and financial education, beneficiaries have been able to better articulate financial and livelihood goals and plan for the future. Furthermore, an evaluation of SKS's programme indicates that, although members are spending any stipends on assets rather than

consumption, many have simultaneously increased their expenditure on food, indicating and increase in overall income based on the productive assets.

While the high graduation rate is commendable, 21 beneficiaries did not meet the graduation criteria. These women often share common characteristics, including a personal or family member's health crisis, the loss of a household income earner, a high proportion of dependents to earners, environmental shocks that affected agriculture, or a lack of personal agency or motivation. Additionally, the UPP's method of targeting beneficiaries and measuring performance based on snapshots in time fails to capture the fact that the extremely poor often oscillate in and out of poverty due to various personal and environmental shocks (e.g., sickness, dowry expenses, flooding, drought, etc.). Thus, it is possible that SKS did not include certain needy individuals, or graduated women who may not, in the future, be able to sustain their livelihoods. Furthermore, although the UPP provides women the option of borrowing against their group interest free or directs them to government self-help groups, it appears to lack a robust component to help members properly manage their debt. Still, the graduation rate, which showed a majority of members with some safety nets and a level of sustainable livelihood, indicates the improvement that can be achieved after 18 months of programming, even if these conditions are not permanent.

Multiple factors have contributed to the UPP's general success. First and foremost is the design of the programme, notably the simple and partially locally-derived inclusion criteria, the service delivery design emphasising asset-building, training and field assistance, and the customisation of assets and services appropriate to each beneficiary and the project local. The FAs have been identified as one of the strongest aspects of the project design, and beneficiaries credit them with playing a key role in support and in shaping their livelihood visions and goals. SKS's capacity in terms of longevity and reputation in the community, limited programme focus and the support from CGAP/Ford was also beneficial. Finally, the wage labour scheme available in Telangana complemented the benefits of the UPP and may have allowed for the success of the programme's lack of regular cash stipends.

Lessons and Future Challenges

The UPP has challenged the conventional wisdom that beneficiaries need to receive frequent monetary assistance in order to increase their consumption levels, and shows that a focus on asset building can indirectly boost consumption while avoiding dependency. However, this lesson may be limited in scope given that the government daily wage labour scheme in Telangana likely also contributed to increased consumption, and these achievements might not be replicable where employment and income opportunities are more scarce. Still, the programme confirms an important lesson from BRAC's experience: that it is important for beneficiaries to have assets that will provide both short- and long-term income. However, it shows that this can be achieved in a more cost-effective way that promotes self-sufficiency by either providing one asset that achieves both purposes or by encouraging beneficiaries to continue daily wage labour separate from the programme.

The UPP has also highlighted the fact that targeting the ultra poor is made difficult by the fact that individuals oscillate in and out of poverty. A focus on increasing services to new beneficiaries rather than returning to the old areas to help the 'newly poor' will continue to exclude some families. This is a consistent problem with development initiatives that target the poor rather than having beneficiaries apply to be part of the programme.

In their plans to the UPP, the organisation acknowledges that it will need government involvement in order to reach its maximum potential, as the state has a greater ability to reach larger groups of the extremely poor. However, the precise targeting and individual attention and customisation that characterises the UPP and SKS's approach is largely absent from government pro-poor approaches or capabilities. This suggests a partnership between SKS and the state could be complimentary and beneficial. In new contexts, SKS will need to continue its contextualised

approach to poverty and viable assets, and where there is no daily wage labour scheme, it will need to re-conceptualise its approach for providing assets and stipends to ensure that consumption levels are maintained.

5.5. China – Old Age Protection in Rural Areas

Overview

The experiences of three rural villages in China give insight into existing local arrangements that provide support for the elderly in the context of decreasing family resources and inadequate state provision. In two of the three villages, social inclusion for the elderly improved as communities were able to generate and fairly distribute resources for old age support, increase independence, and improve family relationships. These successes were made possible in large part by strong community leadership and commitment, by linking old age protection with economic and community development and by empowering the elderly through inclusion in development activities. In the third village, protection was achieved only on an individual basis due mainly to lack of community mobilisation and government involvement.

Initiative Summary

Insurance coverage for the elderly is geographically uneven in China, with the urban elderly receiving a great majority of benefits. National social insurance schemes are insufficient, and thus support for rural elderly and their inclusion in social and productive life depends largely on local government and/or grassroots efforts. The old age protection practices of three rural villages in different Chinese provinces, referred to as JX, DZT and ZZ (Pei and Tang, 2010), provide a variety of lessons for social inclusion.

JX: Over the past 30 years, JX village has earned substantial income from its collectively-owned manufacturing enterprises, a part of which community leaders have used to create a collective welfare system to supplement and ensure security for the elderly. Benefits were small at first, but increased with economic growth based on a prioritisation of fair wealth distribution. Protection measures cover all residents 55 years or older and include pensions of 300-600 yuan, free medical care at the village clinic, reimbursements for hospital visits, furnished retirement apartments, subsidies and opportunities for paid work (e.g., as gardeners, street cleaners or cafeteria helpers).

DZT: Protection for the elderly in DZT began as a self-organised effort by the elderly who wanted to create resources for welfare and independence while contributing to economic growth. In 1992, the Association for Old Persons (AOP, the local senior organisation) created a wholesale vegetable market which, in 16 years, provided over 16,000 jobs for the community, including for the elderly, and generated substantial profit. With the success of the market, the AOP started 13 additional collectively-owned businesses that employ the elderly, including vegetable storage, oil supply, inns and restaurants, and technical demonstrations for fruit and vegetable growers. They also provide workfare programmes for aged residents who were involved in gardening, freshwater aquaculture and courtyard production. By 2008, revenue from these businesses allowed the AOP to contribute 5 million Yuan to a village collective fund that paid for welfare programmes to benefit the elderly poor, including medical insurance, subsidies, and old-age school, and a senior centre.

ZZ: Located in a relatively underdeveloped agricultural region, ZZ has not had any organised or comprehensive measures for old age protection. Efforts to improve economic independence and living autonomy have largely been on an individual basis. Beginning in the 1980s, elderly residents encouraged by local policy, began to relocate from the village centre to the beach of the Yellow River about three miles away, where they built modest houses and cultivated small plots of land. The beach land was more productive and increased their income, and many residents stayed for

over two decades. This arrangement allowed them to live independently in their own houses, while surrounded by a community of neighbours. Only around one third of the elderly moved to the beach; those that remained in the village tended to have less income from agriculture and were less independent.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The efforts to set up the welfare system in JX were driven by community leaders, and the budget for their benefits is managed by a village committee. In DZT, the AOP was responsible both for initiating the businesses and budgeting the welfare measures made possible by their income; however they also collaborated with the local government to provide some benefits (e.g. a nursing home). In ZZ, there was no organised community effort, and individuals relocated themselves without the assistance of the community's AOP.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

The JX community had a high capacity to provide for its own citizens welfare because, unlike neighbouring villages, it had maintained collective, rather than privatised, resources. Its financial capacity increased with economic growth, and with the continued commitment of a village leader determined to ensure 'wealth for all'. Institutionally, the ability of the JX community to provide for residents was enhanced by a local government pension programme started in 1992, which provided a small but stable income that complemented village funds. In DZT, old age protection was self-initiated and managed by the grassroots AOP. Because of the successful vegetable market and other businesses, the AOP grew its financial capacity and legitimacy, enabling it to contribute to community and economic development and support poor elderly residents without the assistance of local government. In ZZ, the local AOP and government lacked the resources and/or will to organise community-wide protection for the elderly, requiring individuals to improve their livelihoods without assistance.

In recognition of the need to provide greater income protection for rural elderly, beginning in 2009 the Chinese central government piloted a publicly-funded national pension scheme to provide a monthly income of 55 Yuan to rural residents over 60 years old. However, it is too early to evaluate how this scheme will interact with local village initiatives.

Structural Environment

In JX village, a culture of collective life and a long-standing historical commitment to take care of the elderly allowed village leaders to prioritise pensions beginning in the 1980s, even when village resources were limited. A similar ethic exists in DZT, where the contributions of the elderly as economic actors has been recognised and promoted. Conversely, in ZZ, there are no shared values or history of fair distribution or protection of the elderly.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

The old age protection schemes in JX have guaranteed livelihood security to all elderly village members: almost all live independently, have stable and multiple sources of income and generally participate in paid labour. Success was facilitated by the village's communal reserves from economic development, historical commitment to the elderly and distribution of wealth, and the coordination between government and community pensions. In DZT, senior livelihood had also increased: most live independently, have a small number of stable income sources, and generally participate in paid labour. Furthermore, as with JX the financial empowerment and independent living arrangements of aged residents in DZT have changed the power balance in favour of the elderly and promoted more positive interactions between generations. The strong capacity and legitimacy of the AOP, the inclusion of the elderly as economic actors and community values of fair distribution and support for the elderly are the main contributing factor to this success. Old age

protection has been least comprehensive in ZZ village: only some elderly residents live independently, most have only a few unstable sources of income, and most participate in paid agricultural labour. The lack of community mobilisation, village or local government capacity and a culture or champions of fair distribution and protection have led only to individual successes in improving livelihoods in ZZ.

Lessons and Future Challenges

These cases show that successful old age protection is linked to overall rural community development and the inclusion of the elderly in productive activities. In JX, pensions were included as part of the community development plans even when resources were scarce, and growth provided further welfare resources; in DZT, measures that included the elderly as economic actors also generated the money needed to provide greater safety nets; in ZZ, a lack of protection for the elderly co-exists with a lack of community mobilisation and development. Thus, the government should work to further link state-led efforts at social protection for the elderly to wider rural community development: rather than being a burden, the elderly can make valuable contributions to the community and improve social inclusion for themselves and others. Furthermore, there are benefits to integrating community and local initiatives to provide for the elderly, as seen in the cases of JX (i.e., complementary pensions) and DZT (i.e., cooperation to provide services).

These cases also highlight the importance of organised, grassroots mobilisation and trusted leadership in promoting old age protection, both of which were present in JX and DZT. However, in the case of ZZ, even in the absence of an organised movement, many individuals were able to secure modest livelihoods for themselves; if coordinated, the entrepreneurial spirit of these residents could grow into a force for community development.

Finally, while the availability of resources naturally affects the capacity of communities to provide inclusion measures for the elderly, these cases show that fair distribution of resources is the deciding factor. In JX, protection measures started before large profits existed, and in DZT, the AOP worked to empower the elderly through employment before it had welfare resources. At the same time, there are limitations to social inclusion measures when there is no institutional basis for old age provision, and the extension of projections relies on informal commitments or charismatic leadership.

5.6. China – Housing Measures for Rural-Urban Migrants

Overview

Under the Chinese housing registration system, rural workers who migrate to cities for the short- or long-term are normally excluded from public housing and often have difficulty finding and maintaining affordable accommodation. To address this inequality and provide greater housing security for migrant workers, local governments have adopted different strategies with varying degrees of success. In some cases, the failure of inclusion strategies was due to a lack of understanding and recognition of the unique needs of migrants. In others, it was a result of limited local government involvement and commitment in the absence of a clear institutional framework.

Initiative Summary

Housing security is a persistent problem for rural-urban migrants (henceforth 'migrants') in China, because they lack household registration (hukou) in their destination cities and are thus almost completely excluded from government-subsidised housing. As a result, most migrants unable to pay high prices to purchase commercial housing, rent private housing or stay in dormitories

provided by employers. Often, rental or dormitory accommodations are small, of poor condition and lack utilities, kitchens or bathrooms.

To improve housing options for migrant workers, local and provincial governments across China³ have adopted various strategies that can be grouped three categories: inclusive, independent and hybrid. 'Inclusive' strategies attempted to include migrants who meet certain conditions (e.g. having permanent jobs and 'excellent' work records) into the existing urban housing security system and providing access to public and subsidised housing. Inclusive strategies are led by the local government. 'Independent' strategies develop specific housing policies to address the needs of rural-urban migrants, including setting up low- or free-rent buildings for migrants and their families that are subject to building, sanitation and environmental standards, and creating regulations to improve the management and services of rental housing for migrants. Independent strategies are employer-led with the cooperation of local authorities. 'Hybrid' strategies are similar to independent strategies in that low- or free-rent housing is provided for migrants within industrial parks; however these initiatives are funded by government housing monies and are marginally led by local authorities with the cooperation of employers.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The framework for strategies to provide inclusive housing for rural-urban migrants is set by the national government; however, specific measures are chosen and implemented by various levels of provincial and local government. The inclusive strategy is led and implemented by local government. In contrast, the independent and hybrid strategies involve high levels of participation from employers (particularly in independent initiatives), although the hybrid approach involves public funds and larger role for the local authorities.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

The capacity—policy commitment and financial resources—of local governments to provide for migrants varies throughout the country, and so inclusion strategies have been implemented unevenly. In many cases, the local governments of migrant destination cities did not make migrant housing a priority, and instead saw it as an afterthought to their housing policies for urban residents. For example, in Fuzhou, researchers were told by government officials that 'providing housing security to rural-urban migrants is not their duty' (Lin & Zhu, 2010: 15). This outlook is particularly prevalent within local governments that implemented independent or hybrid approaches, which rely heavily on employers, and is made possible by the fact that providing housing to all migrants is not compulsory.

The Chinese government has begun to address the problems for migrant workers caused by the hukou system, and since 2005 has made migrant housing a priority of the ministry of construction. In 2007, the central government stipulated for the first time that provincial and local governments should incorporate long-term migrants' housing issues into urban planning, and that in some cases rural-urban migrant workers could join public housing schemes. Local and provincial government initiatives (inclusive, independent and hybrid) have been based on these directives. Legally, however, primary responsibility for housing still rests largely with employers and migrants themselves.

Structural Environment

Migrant workers' housing needs are unique and differ from those of urban residents, however there has been a persistent society-wide lack of recognition of these differences. It is often assumed that, without the hukou system, migrants would want to settle in their destination cities, and

³ The article by Lin and Zhu (2010) includes field research in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province, however its discussion of local government strategies is more general and includes unspecified communities across China.

therefore the solution is simply to include them in urban benefit schemes (à la the inclusive schemes). However, surveys of Fuzhou migrants suggest that many intend to return to their hometowns or remain mobile in the foreseeable future, and that migration patterns are not just based on hukou, but also on other factors such as employment needs, migrants' skills and characteristics, employment and living conditions at home and at their destination, and household income. This mobility along with unstable employment and low income suggest the need for migrants to have a variety of affordable housing options to suit both short- and long- term workers with different residency plans and needs.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

While inclusive, independent and hybrid efforts to address the housing needs of rural-urban migrants represent an improvement in inclusive service delivery, they are insufficient. In most cases, housing provision is still mainly the responsibility of employers or migrants themselves. The inclusive approach, where the state is most involved, has provided accommodation for only a small percentage of migrants, due to requirements that beneficiaries meet certain conditions, and the failure to understand and address the diverse needs of migrants. Successes of independent strategies are limited to some marginal improvements of employer-provided accommodation; and hybrid approaches have only succeeded in benefiting migrants who live in industrial parks. In these two cases, uneven provision is due mostly to limited local government responsibility which means that local inclusion of migrants depends greatly on the commitment of incumbent political leaders and the availability of finances.

Lessons and Future Challenges

This case suggests that meeting the needs of migrants and ensuring that they are included in social protection measures requires 1) strong central government coordination, and 2) the establishment and implementation of legal and institutional frameworks to protect rights and enable migrants to relocate while retaining their benefits. Government needs to increase its understanding of the diverse and unique needs of migrants. This study suggests that policymakers should provide a range of options for different types of migrants: those who want to settle in urban areas may be served by policies similar to those targeting urban residents; those who wish to return home are most in need of low-cost temporary housing; and those who wish to remain mobile have needs in between the two other groups.

Importantly, this case points out the fact that 'social inclusion' may not always be achieved simply by extending existing rights and benefits to previously marginalised groups (such as rural-urban migrants); but rather that 'inclusion' or protection may look different depending on a group's distinct needs and characteristics. At the same time, it is necessary to have a clear legal and institutional framework to define rights and government responsibilities at each level.

5.7. Pakistan – Sindh Village Development and Housing Scheme

Overview

The provincial government of Sindh, Pakistan, initiated the Sindh Village Development and Housing Scheme (SGAHS) in order to improve the conditions of village housing and the tenancy status of marginalised, landless residents. Through the scheme, thousands of villages have been regularised and the tenure status of many marginalised groups have improved. This case shows the potential of government schemes to increase protection through rights and empowerment (transformative social protection), while cautioning that such measure require prior collective action, which can exclude the most marginalised if the beneficiaries do not have the resources to mobilise effectively.

Initiative Summary

The rural areas of Sindh province are characterised by underdevelopment, high levels of poverty and unequal land ownership based on share-cropping systems that have remained somewhat intact despite land reforms and ownership turnover. Powerful landlords exercise influence based largely on their control of land and canal-based irrigation systems, to the exclusion of the landless, while the landless are excluded.

The Sindh provincial government introduced SGAHS in 1987 to address these inequalities by enhancing the tenancy status of poor and landless residents—particularly marginalised groups and castes—and improving the physical condition of villages (defined as groups of at least ten houses located reasonable distances apart and at least five kilometres from the city centre). The scheme was based on two assumptions: 1) that entire villages had insecure property rights to their land, and 2) regularising tenancy rights needed to proceed or accompany the physical development of the village. To regularise, SGAHS required a group of village residents to make a formal regularisation application—including an authenticated survey map, a list of households, population, written consent of landowner if private land, a ‘no-objection certificate’ from the landowning government department and copies of the applicants’ national ID cards, along with other proof of continuous residence. This required significant organisation and coordination. If public, the land could be leased to the village, upon successful application and an administrative survey. If private, the land could be acquired from the owners and leased it to the residents (until 1996, when private-public land conversion was suspended due to corruption allegations). Once villages were regularised, the government funded structural improvements.

According to Gazdar and Mallah (2010: 43), the design of SGAHS qualifies as a ‘transformative social protection intervention’⁴—one that enables citizens to realise their rights through processes of active engagement in addition to (or without) passive safety nets, achieved either through affirmative action policies or encouraging collective action—because of its focus on asset transfers to marginalised groups, requirement of mobilisation, and aim of protecting beneficiaries from residential security and other associated forms of insecurity and vulnerability.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

SGAHS was initiated and executed by the Sindh provincial government; however, it required village communities to mobilise in order to take advantage of the scheme. In some cases, local NGOs or CSOs helped residents organise to complete their applications and access SGAHS.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

Beyond SGAHS, few other local government institutions have been productive in helping landless resident increase their housing rights and security. Related laws include those that exist to protect tenants from extreme human rights violations—such as the 1951 Tenancy Act and 1992 Bonded Labour Abolition Act.

Structural Environment

There are certain historical and cultural factors relevant to SGAHS. Firstly, SGAHS was implemented under the leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo during the transition to civilian rule from the military dictatorship of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. In the aftermath of violence and unrest, SGAHS and other initiatives under Junejo were seen as compromises to ameliorate

⁴ See: Devereux, Stephen and Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel (2004) *Transformative Social Protection*, IDS Working Paper 232, Brighton: IDS; Kabeer, Naila (2005) ‘Introduction’, in Naila Kabeer (ed.), *The Search for Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions in an Interconnected World*, New York: Zed Books Limited; Kabeer, Naila (2002) *Citizenship and the Boundaries of the Acknowledged Community: Identity, Affiliation and Exclusion*, IDS Working Paper 171, Brighton: IDS.

angry citizens while breaking with the progressive policies of the PPP—the Populist Party overthrown by Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 that had drawn attention to class inequities and passed marginally pro-landless, pro-tenant legislation. Secondly, many Sindh communities are regulated by local social structures that interacted with SGAHS. In some cases, SGAHS subverted customary arrangements (such as the mohaga privilege which favours incumbent property owners). In others, the language of SGAHS was interpreted in terms of local caste and kinship group differences and conflicts. When groups mobilised, it was often along patriarchal lines, as opposed to cross-cutting alliances.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

The government estimates that the SGAHS scheme has benefited over 4 million people by regularising 11,000+ villages and allotting leases to 700,000+ households. Fieldwork by Gazdar and Mallah (2010) shows nuanced results for transformative social protection. In some cases, landlords exercised restraint and previously marginalised groups appear to have advanced to intermediate social standing: in Mori village, Bheel (a marginalised scheduled Hindu caste) families that were included in regularisation experienced improvements in housing conditions, children's education, jobs and political enfranchisement, while those families that were not included remained marginalised. In other instances, landlords' power was unrestrained, and marginalised communities remained vulnerable with no improvements in tenancy security. For example, in Omar Wassan and Uzman Zardari villages, landlords were powerful enough to ignore SGAHS and prevent excluded groups from accessing the scheme despite its success in neighbouring villages, and despite the facts that the residents of Omar Wassan were legally entitled to protection since they were living on public land, and Uzman Zardari had an active NGO nearby. These failures were due to the groups' lack of capacity to mobilise and act collectively which was a requirement of the scheme, along with the absence of additional legal rights and institutions to support the rights and inclusion of the poor landless.

Lessons and Future Challenges

This case shows that, even in contexts of political and societal violence with great inequality, initiatives specifically targeted at the marginalised can improve social protection by triggering positive political responses or acting as focal points for existing mobilisations. Change, however, is not easy or without substantial political and fiscal costs: weak property rights among the poor means that dominant groups have prior stakes on land, even state-owned areas that are difficult and costly to upset.

Strategies like SGAHS help upwardly mobile groups' access rights but may neglect the most vulnerable, whereas passive social protection measures such as cash transfers will likely reach the most marginalised but not be part of larger mobilisation. Thus, a comprehensive social protection strategy requires both types of programmes.

5.8. India – Slum Networking Programme in Ahmedabad

Overview

The Slum Networking Programme (SNP) in Ahmedabad, India, sought to improve tenure status and social inclusion of slum dwellers by extending basic services and empowering communities. Through small-scale public action, the SNP was able to improve the de facto (quasi-legal) status of slum dwellers and thereby increase their social protection, paving the way for possible future increases in de jure (legal) tenure through the extension of formal property rights.

Initiative Summary

In 1990, approximately 41 percent of Ahmedabad's residents lived in slums, and a Gujarat state's policy of non-intervention left residents to improve living conditions on their own. Some were able to marginally increase their tenure status through their own efforts, primarily through duration of stay in the slums. However, in the 1990s the Ahmedabad municipal government began to take a more active role.

Recognising the need to provide security for slum dwellers, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC, a local government authority) adopted three slum development programmes: 1) a scheme where the AMC contributed 90 percent of the costs of a household's water connection and toilet construction, 2) the creation of a 'No Objection Certificate' (NOC) given by the AMC to allow individual water supply and sewerage connections in slums, and 3) the Slum Networking programme (SNP).

The goal of the SNP was to improve tenure status and quality of life of landless slum-dwellers through both promotional and transformative social protection measures. The first component of the initiative was promotional, and included improving living conditions and reducing deprivation by securing a ten-year 'no eviction guarantee' and extending basic services (including household water and sewage connections and individual toilets, and community roads and paving, storm water drainage, street lighting and tree plantation). The second component of the project sought to assist transformative social protection and empowerment by facilitating community development and social infrastructure through forming neighbourhood, women's and youth groups with the active involvement of NGOs. Rather than 'leapfrogging' the development of rights and extending full property tenure to non-legal residents, the SNP took an incremental approach with the intention of moving residents along a continuum of security, from 'insecure' to some level of de facto security.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The SNP was developed and implemented by local government (AMC), however the empowerment and mobilisation component of the scheme required the active participation and engagement of residents and NGOs.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

While state-level government was largely absent from these measures, the local AMC was able to develop and manage the SNP on its own. Ahmedabad has a history of strong volunteer organisations, and there were several large and established NGOs already operating in Ahmedabad at the time the SNP began. Some had been working with slum communities since 1997, and were well positioned to assist with the SNP.

According to law, slums are either included or excluded from local government services and development programmes based on their status, as either 'notified' ('regularised') or 'non-notified' ('non-regularised'). 'Notified' or 'regularised' status is de facto or quasi-legal and entitles residents to some service eligibility. Since the state of Gujarat does not have a regularisation scheme, residents of non-notified slums in Ahmedabad rely on the SNP for services.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

The SNP has extended strong de facto tenure security in 60 slums, covering about 13,000 households, an improvement over the AMCs first two slum development programmes. Tenure security directly impacts or correlates with other quality of life indicators, such as investments in improving shelter conditions, improved service delivery (e.g. 90 percent of strong de facto tenure households have individual water supply from the AMC, compared with 19 percent of those with insecure tenure), literacy rates, increased casual employment among men, and increases in income.

The success of the SNP in improving tenure security for Ahmedabad slum dwellers is influenced by multiple factors, the greatest of which was the design of the programme which focused on incremental measures rather than extending new rights immediately. Ahmedabad also benefited from a strong and capable local government (the AMC) and the presence of established and active NGOs, which together were committed and had the resources to both extend service and mobilise residents for collective action.

Lessons and Future Challenges

One of the main lessons from the case of Ahmedabad is that programmes which extend land titles or de jure tenure status to slum dwellers will normally not be successful unless other rights are present in order for the poor to retain them. Furthermore, conferring property titles opens slum land to the private property market, allowing purchases which may displace the poor from urban areas. Working first to extend de facto security will increase the poor's inclusion and allow for transformative social protection that will increase their autonomy and capacity to take advantage of and build upon these rights. Useful instruments to achieve strong informal security include external agency intervention, land documentation, administrative instruments, entitlement extension, extension of basic services, and the duration of residents' stay. Programming should avoid creating land reservations in master planning, which weakens de facto tenure status. Finally, increasing de facto tenure and quality of life for slum dwellers are linked and positively correlated. To achieve these results requires a combination of factors, rather than a single public action.

5.9. Uganda – Pressure from Below Initiative in Jinja

Overview

In the Walukuba-Masese division of Jinja municipality, grassroots citizen mobilisation started a 'Pressure From Below' campaign aimed at increasing the empowerment and participation of poor citizens in the formation strategies to help alleviate the area's poor infrastructure and living conditions. The initiative has been able to achieve a number of service improvements, increase citizen awareness of rights and capacity to mobilise. The community-based, informal nature of Pressure From Below has been a major factor in the campaign's success. At the same time, its lack of funding, political mandate and avenues for formal participation have prevented the growth and expansion of the movement.

Initiative Summary

Walukuba-Masese is characterised by extreme poverty and vulnerability, dilapidated housing estates and slum expansion, and or basic urban services—particularly a lack of adequate water and sanitation systems and health services—which have led to high rates of disease and malnutrition. The Division's council leaders have taken steps to improve conditions: working within the national poverty eradication framework, facilitating expenditure transparency and community awareness, and promoting the inclusion of diverse political, community and private sector actors in participatory planning and budgeting process. However, these measures have been insufficient to fully tackle poverty and vulnerability in Walukuba-Masese.

The Pressure From Below initiative grew out citizen desire to improve government transparency, responsiveness and accountability and to question the Division's traditional policymaking paradigm. It began with the goals of 1) raising community awareness in Walukuba-Masese regarding resident needs, issues, rights and duties, 2) increasing citizens' social and political participation as well as responsibility 3) building the community's capacity for advocacy and lobbying, and 4) strengthening the capacity of both formal and information organisations in the Division.

For any identified advocacy issue (e.g., improving health service delivery) Pressure From Below's adopts the following strategy to engage with the community, officials and other Division actors: 1) recruiting representatives from the Division's villages who were responsible for collecting public information and concerns regarding the advocacy issue, mobilising communities and guiding individuals who are interested in setting up new initiatives, 2) holding weekly meetings for the representatives and Pressure From Below's executive committee to analyse the issues emerging in different villages, 3) holding an 'People's Manifesto Day' where citizens present testimonies of past successful initiatives and issues that need better government response, 4) collaborating with other community organisations to develop a common position on the advocacy issue, 5) in some cases, working to publicise weak service delivery in local radio stations and national newspapers, 6) negotiating meetings with the government officials (councillors, bureaucrats and/or Ministers) related to the advocacy issues, and 7) educating the community about their rights and options for participation, often using music, dance and theatre.

A defining characteristic of Pressure From Below is that it works to build relationships between communities, local CSOs, larger policy networks and politicians, so that all stakeholders can tackle problems together.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

Pressure From Below started as a grassroots community movement. However, it received substantial support from various local NGOs. In particular, FABIO (First African Bicycle Information Organization) and DENIVA (a national network of NGOs and community-based organisations) have provided training to Pressure From Below organisers on methods of citizen education, participatory planning processes, social control and budget monitoring. The initiative has also actively engaged with local and municipal government officials' service delivery professionals throughout the advocacy and accountability process.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

Although it received support in the form of training, Pressure from Below suffered from a lack of funding, which has decreased their capacity scale up their operations, or to extensively document and record activities and petitions, and to disseminate this information. Because of its grassroots nature, the initiative is non-hierarchical, decentralised, and lacks formal registration status. As a result, it does not access formal participation spaces that are reserved for officially registered community organisations, such as NGOs. Still, Pressure From Below has worked to collaborate with councillors in order to move their agenda through official channels. The goal of the initiative has not been to jeopardise the role of the local council, and many councillors have welcome its advocacy and accountability activities, viewing them as opportunities for them to achieve positive outcomes. There are some officials, however, who question the invasion of Pressure From Below and question its legitimacy in demanding accountability.

Uganda has recently undergone well-institutionalised processes of decentralisation (primarily devolution) in order to increase citizen participation in decision-making processes, improve service delivery and fight poverty and exclusion. However, despite these reforms, there is still a high degree of poverty in Uganda, and a sense of powerlessness and voicelessness among citizens impedes collective action. In 1997, the government passes the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which provides a framework for public action related to poverty that is subject to a consultative process including national and local government, donors and civil society representatives.

Structural Environment

Democratisation and decentralisation are relatively new occurrences in Uganda: a multiparty system was first introduced in 2005, and competitive elections first took place in 2006. Therefore,

although the government uses participatory rhetoric, these institutions and the culture of democracy have not yet consolidated, and citizens lack the resources to effectively demand accountability and effective pro-poor policy change. Thus, civil society and social movements are required to help fill this gap and empower citizens to take advantage of democratic mechanisms. In addition, local power relations and processes of subordination have meant that the poor are largely excluded from decision-making and programming despite the existence of inclusionary institutions. These structural power relations and have been found to contribute to self-exclusion among the poor.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

The Pressure From Below movement has positively influenced service delivery in some instances, including renovation of hazardous school buildings, grading of bad roads, replacing street lights, and improving sanitary conditions by controlling fish-waste dumping, and has contributed to an increase citizen awareness of rights. It has helped foster community between CSOs (e.g., local NGOs now use Pressure From Below representatives as resources for community information) and increased their ability to mobilise communities with regard to development programmes.

Key to these positive achievements were Pressure From Below's (mostly) successful relationship building between community, non-governmental and official actors, its harnessing of existing support networks like DENIVA, and its strategy of agreeing on major advocacy issues through a participatory process and then framing a range of negotiable solutions. Notably, Pressure From Below's identity as an informal community initiative has both helped and hindered its success. Its grassroots nature has meant that the group's advocacy issues and campaigns tend to be specific and based on real, tangible problems experienced by community members. For example, an account of a woman forced to give birth on the roadside because of chronic absenteeism in the clinic led to an institutionalised arrangement for CSO participation in health services. Remaining informal also helped it to avoid the complex processes of registration and incorporation that can lead to bureaucratic and organisational conflicts. However, its lack of financial resources negatively affected its ability to effectively advocate and engage with citizens, decreased its legitimacy as an actor, and limited its ability to scale up. Additionally, Pressure From Below's lack of integration into formal participatory spaces means that it is in the position only to react to policy rather than shaping it.

Lessons and Future Challenges

The Pressure From Below movement shows that community-driven advocacy that is decentralised and non-hierarchical can be a successful component of increasing citizen mobilisation and demanding accountability in service delivery. Through participatory advocacy, citizens not only work to improve development outcomes, but gain the capacity and confidence to articulate their needs and influence local government. In a general sense, the experiences of Pressure From Below indicate the need for civic education and capacity building activities to accompany decentralisation, so that citizen, civil society and government actors understand their roles and can take advantage of participatory spaces.

In the future, the movement could benefit from additional capacity building support from established CSOs and NGOs. In addition to financial support, these organisations could provide Pressure From Below with an opportunity to indirectly interact with established participatory mechanisms by negotiating a common advocacy position with the movement, engaging in formal spaces, and then reporting back regularly to Pressure From Below on their progress. The initiative could also benefit from campaigns targeted at local government officials and civil society actors to raise awareness about the purpose and benefit of citizen participation, address questions of legitimacy, advocate for common positions.

5.10. India – Communitisation of Public Institutions in Nagaland

Overview

In response to conflict, inequality and poor service provision for vulnerable populations, the government of Nagaland state created a process called ‘Communitisation’ to directly involve communities in service delivery. Through Communitisation, significant authority to manage and improve key services were delegated to newly created village management committees, which operated under the influence of customary governance institutions. The initiative has helped to improve service delivery to excluded groups, strengthen community participation and rights awareness, and provide new channels for conflict resolution. While this case shows the potential for co-production to improve quality of life, Communitisation developed according to Nagaland’s unique history and institutions, and may not be replicable elsewhere.

Initiative Summary

The lack of historical economic development in Nagaland—precipitated by persistent violence and social unrest—has made public delivery of primary education, health, electricity, and water and sanitation services virtually non-functional. In order to both improve service delivery and reshape the local political and social landscape in favour of cooperation, the Nagaland government began to experiment with decentralisation and co-production of services.

The Communitisation process began in the Dimapur, Kohima and Mon districts (municipalities) in 2001, with a particular focus on improving conditions for the rural poor. Its strategy was to both decentralise responsibility and actively engage members of the local community in the management of service delivery. This process included transferring ownership of public resources and assets to new institutions for each of the key services—the Village Education Committee (VEC), Village Electricity Management Board (VEMB), Village Health Committee (VHC) and the Water and Sanitation Committee. It then empowered the community by delegating authority to these committees for the daily management and supervision of public services and as well as to improve assets and services. It also built the capacity of the community by providing training in the responsibilities and mechanics of committee operation. The motto of the Communitisation was the ‘three “T”s: Trust the user community; Train them to discharge their newfound responsibilities; and Transfer governmental powers and management of resources’ (Singh & Jha, 2009: 34).

The village management committees, a core innovation of Communitisation, have three important characteristics: 1) they are comprised of a variety of individuals with varying interests (including service professionals, members of customary governance structures, civil society actors and other citizens, 2) the membership selection process depends upon nomination by customary governance authorities (Village Councils and Development Boards), and 3) the scope of the committees’ authority enables significant local ownership, including independence in financial management.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

The project was initiated and created by the Nagaland state government, who delegated execution authority to the village committees themselves. Customary Local Village Councils also play a role in selecting committee membership and providing support.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

In 2002, the Nagaland state government (led by former Chief Secretary R.S. Pandey) passed legislation to support the Communitisation process. The strong support of state-level politicians continued throughout the formulation, institutionalisation and implementation of Communitisation.

The capacity of Nagaland to engage in this unique experiment was partially made possible under Article 371 of the Indian constitution, which allows the Nagaland to preserve its customary laws

and governance system, and the Nagaland Village and Area Council Act of 1978, which organised the local governance institutions of Village Councils and Village Development Boards. Village Councils nominate Development Boards using local customs, and the Boards are then charged with formulating development plans according to annual budget allocations. Both institutions are based on strong customary practices, which value consultation and consensus-building around collective concerns.

Structural Environment

When India won its independence in 1947, Nagaland was part of Assam state, and the following decades brought a violent secessionist movement that fomented or exacerbated social inequality and unrest. Although the state won its independence in 1963, conflict continued, even after a peace treaty was signed in 1975. Thus, successful attempts to eradicate poverty or improve service delivery necessarily hinge on overcoming deep-seeded societal cleavages and conflicts.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

The Communitisation process appears to have had positive affects on the quality of primary education, electricity management, health services and water management. Additionally, it has strengthened community participation by engaging citizens in planning and monitoring service delivery, allowing the poor and marginalised to influence services for the first time, and helping to reduce inequality. In particular, improvements in health and education quality and delivery have increased demand for services from all segments of society. General community awareness of rights, roles and responsibilities with regard to service provision have increased, prompting citizens to engage more directly with government officials. Improved transparency and accountability have also generated more trust in local representatives. In terms of social capital, Communitisation has helped to provide new channels for community members to resolve conflicts fairly and non-violently, and has facilitated greater sharing of resources and benefits.

A key factor in the success of Communitisation is the design of the project itself. First and foremost, it is the significant transfer of resources and scope of committee responsibilities, which allowed for real ownership and dramatically changed the power balance away from the official administration and back to communities. Additionally, the diverse membership of the village committees and their cross-cutting social interactions are likely to have increased pressure and mechanisms for accountability. Relatedly, the initiative benefited from the support and inclusion of legitimate, institutionalised of customary forms of governance (Village Councils), and the existence of state-government level champions (particularly Pandey). Finally, the urgency of past and continuing violence and exclusion catalysed the creation of the initiative and likely contributed the sustained support it received.

Lessons and Future Challenges

A key component of Communitisation is training so that citizens have the ability to participate in committees and demand accountability for services. However, even with training in official procedures, planning processes and accounting, low literacy levels in general may prevent the rural poor from participating. Furthermore, problems can arise if the responsibilities for new roles are not clarified sufficiently. The more responsibility is delegated to the community, the more capacity building and training will need to increase. Understanding, technical skills and cultural acceptance of initiatives of this scale can take a long time to build. Careful attention needs to be paid to the composition of responsible committee, and active transparency and accountability are needed to ensure that they are not co-opted by existing elites to the detriment of marginalised populations.

Although the experiences in Nagaland suggest that co-production can improve services, empower citizens, and reduce inequality, they may not be replicable elsewhere, as the legal framework for

Communitisation is a product of the state's distinctive political history, persistent conflict, constitutional arrangements, and its unique customary local governance institutions.

5.11. Brazil – Urban Housing Policies in Diadema, São Paulo

Overview

In the small, overpopulated municipality of Diadema, São Paulo, successive left-wing Worker's Party (PT) administrations have implemented a variety of measures to improve housing conditions and security for slum and low-income residents. This has included participatory consultation and budgeting processes, slum urbanisation scheme, land title regularisation, and zoning to create new housing developments. The longevity of the PT along with its ties to and organisation of community and social movements have contributed to the success of these programmes in improving housing infrastructure and security, access to services, and welfare.

Initiative Summary

As part of the industrial 'ABC' region of metropolitan São Paulo, Diadema experienced rapid industrialisation and labour migration beginning in the 1960s and accelerating through the 1970s and 80s. Rapid population increases in a context of poor urban infrastructure and public service produced informal settlements of low-income workers living in sub-human conditions. Spurred by low wages and poor working and living conditions, the ABC region was home to many trade union and social movements, including the left-wing Worker's Party (PT). In 1982, the PT won the Diadema municipal elections, and with the end of the military regime in 1985 and subsequent re-democratisation, they moved forward with a progressive agenda focused on citizen participation and addressing the specific needs of vulnerable populations.

One of the chief priorities of the PT was to improve municipal housing. Specifically, they sought to meet the urgent needs of families living without water, sewage, paving, electricity, healthcare, schools and other urban services, and also to create new, safe, and affordable housing solutions. Across successive PT administrations, the Diadema municipal government has pursued various strategies to this end, including creating spaces for citizen participation in urbanisation and housing policies, urbanising slums and improving the living conditions of low-income families, and providing access to urban land for the construction of popular housing.

Participation: Since the early 1990s, and government has involved associations and popular movements in housing policy formulation and implementation through participatory processes, including the Municipal Social Interest Housing Fund Management Council (FUMAPIS) and participatory budgeting (PB), among other meetings, conferences and forums. Created in 1990 from a committee of slum residents and associations fighting for adequate housing, FUMAPIS sets policy priorities and allocates housing budgets for the entire city. The council is comprised of five municipal administration representatives, five elected community members and one City Council member. To stand for election, community members must be part of a legally constituted association of residents. To encourage participation in FUMAPIS, the government organised a Legal Aid Service programme to organise these associations; however, the legal service also helped the community associations become involved in the urbanisation and land title regularisation of slums. In 1994, the government began to implement PB processes by organising open meetings by theme (e.g., housing, education, etc.) which brought together residents from across the city to discuss public investment priorities.

Slum urbanisation: Participatory processes also shaped efforts to urbanise slums in Diadema through improving water, sewage and electricity infrastructure. Extending services required citizens in each urban nucleus to first organise, elect resident committees, study the issues and engage in

deliberation to determine needs and solutions. The committees then facilitated communication and work between residents and municipal technical teams. Municipal administrators took a gradual approach to urbanisation, focusing on small improvements for the majority of residents rather than urbanising selected 'model' nucleuses. Since federal and state resources were not available for these projects, they were funded in partnership with the community under a system of mutual help (*mutirão*).

Land title regularisation: In conjunction with the urbanisation process, technical municipal managers introduced land title regularisation based on consultation with the housing movement. Land use legalisation was implemented using the Grant for the Real Right of Use (CDRU), which promoted the right of slum dwellers to the social use of public land, and a 1985 municipal law which changed the status of areas of common public use to the category of special use. This allowed CDRU titles to be issued to residents on a collective basis, with each resident receiving a title for a fraction of the public space. Since 1994, the scope of the CDRU has been increased to include other forms of regularisation. To take advantage of these institutions, slums first needed to be urbanised and to have resident committees or associations.

New housing: After years of working with communities to urbanise and regularise slums, the government turned its attention to the need for new housing and territorial planning. The municipal administration proposed a City Urban Development Plan that included two types of Special Areas of Social Interest (AEIS) land, in order to demarcate between vacant land formerly zoned as industrial areas that could be reserved to build new housing for the poorest resident (AEIS 1), and land already occupied by slums and illegal settlements that demanded urbanisation (AEIS 2). Families included in housing under AEIS 1 were those with income less than ten minimum salaries, no property owned, of fixed residence in the municipality and who were organised into legal associations. The measure allowed housing associations to negotiate the purchase of land and lots with their owners, with the city mediating negotiations. The local government was then responsible for creating infrastructure in the housing projects.

Principal Actors and Stakeholders

Although each of the above schemes was initiated by the PT-led municipal government leaders and administrators, programme conceptualisation, design and implementation relied heavily on social movements, community actors and resident associations. After re-election in 2001, the government also created agreements and partnerships with state-owned companies and banks to fund additional housing projects.

Organisational Capacity and Institutional Arrangements

The strength of the PT has been a defining characteristic of local government in Diadema. Since winning election in 1982, PT administrations were re-elected in 1988 and 1992, before backing the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) in 1996. After four years of the PSB scaling back social policy initiatives, the PT was again elected in 2000, 2004, and 2008. When the current term expires in 2012, the PT will have served 26 years in government, the longest it has ruled any Brazilian city.

In contrast to the strength and initiative of the local PT, state and federal government have provided few resources for housing or urbanisation schemes. However, policy in Diadema has been enabled by various national legal institutions, including the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which specified the social function of urban property and the right to decent housing, Federal Law 11124/2004, which established the National System and Fund for Housing of Social Interest, and the aforementioned Grant for the Real Right of Use (CDRU). Beyond these housing-specific laws, the work of the PT in all of its social initiatives has been highly influenced by Brazil's decentralised institutions enshrined in the constitution, which provide municipalities with substantial administrative and legislative autonomy from state and federal government.

Social Inclusion Outcomes

The participatory, urbanisation, regularisation and housing developing strategies initiated by Diadema's municipal government over the past few decades have resulted in marked improvements in housing conditions, access to services, and welfare. Among other examples, urbanisation efforts in some areas led to declines in disease rates, improvement in services not included in the scheme (such as health care and public safety), a drop in infant mortality from 83 to 15 per thousand from 1985 to 2004, and increase in school attendance. Under AEIS 1, resident associations negotiated the purchase of over 300,000 square metres of land, to provide housing for 2,842 families. As more housing is supplied under this provision, the growth of slums and illegal settlements has slowed, particularly in key areas of environmental risk. Providing legal addresses has also contributed to an increase in for dignity residents and made it easier to apply for jobs and access other official services.

Furthermore, FUMAPIS, participatory budgeting, urbanisation, regularisation and AEIS 1 engaged citizens in governance and service delivery, proliferated community organisations and associations, opened democratic spaces for dialogue, and brought together groups and social movements that had previously been excluded from policy processes. For example, the involvement of the housing nucleuses in the urbanisation process increased rights awareness, undermined clientelistic relationships based on favours, generated a feeling of belonging and a desire to care for new, legalised spaces.

Other gains have been more fleeting; for example, the reclamation of land previously intended for industrial use under AEIS 1 temporarily reduced the price of land for a time, however after a few years the demand for land by residents' associations drove the price up again. Another obstacle for the poorest residents is that property registration costs remain high, and as a result many do not have officially registered documents. In response to this issue, the municipal government has tried to help residents overcome bureaucratic obstacles and negotiate lower rates. In another example, early victories from urbanisation initiatives caused community leaders to move on to other issues, and some community associations have begun to dissolve or loose strength.

There have been several factors in the successes urban housing policies in Diadema. The first is the longevity and social agenda of the PT. A continued leadership role allowed the party to maintain and publicise its successes, so that it could continue to build upon them. Their particular view of and commitment to social protection went beyond being accountable for services, but rather was proactive and holistic, for example, viewing urbanisation The second is the high levels of community mobilisation and involvement in all stages of these initiatives made possible by the PT's philosophy of inclusion and creation of participatory spaces. Not only did the programmes provide opportunities to engage, they included capacity-building components such as the Legal Aid Service to ensure resident's ability to access these opportunities. Even in the face a PSB government that was no longer committed to housing issues (a factor that may have disabled initiatives in other contexts), popular protest prevented the complete dismantling of social protection and participation. Similarly, when the construction of housing on land purchased through the AEIS 1 was delayed, resident associations protested until funds for construction were released. The third is institutional and legal arrangements, including Brazil's decentralised institutions, the 1988 Constitution, and various housing protection measures passed at the city and national level have enabled and promoted the design of projects as well as the high capacity of both the municipal government and community organisations to improve housing conditions.

Lessons and Future Challenges

The Diadema experience shows that a combination of broadly participative initiatives which require community mobilisation can have a significant impact on protecting and improving the residential security of slum dwellers. This type of rights-based or transformative social protection approach can be successful with limited resources, but requires networks of actors and champions with high

capacity for organisation and mobilisation. Programmes should be constructed holistically to maximise benefits and avoid pitfalls; for example, by linking land title regularisation with urbanisation of slums to avoid the risk of institutionalising poor living conditions.

In the future, Diadema can work to build on its success and fix programme weaknesses by working to ensure continued resident capacity for mobilisation by recruiting and developing new leaders. Furthermore, it should work to promote continued community and political interest and commitment to this issue by linking housing protection to other social issues.