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HOW-TO NOTE:

A Framework to Assess Administrative Decentralization

Local governments need to be endowed with administrative autonomy to be able to respond to local needs effectively. The purpose of this note is to clarify components of a well-designed administrative decentralization system and to assist task teams and stakeholders to assess administrative decentralization effort in any given country. There are two main components of an administrative decentralization system (a) discretion allowed to the local government to direct the business of the local government and (b) mechanisms to hold the local government accountable for appropriate use of this discretion.

Local governments¹ need to be endowed with administrative autonomy in order to be able to respond to local needs effectively. The World Bank (2008) identifies three broad powers as being crucial for local governments to be administratively autonomous: (a) to make, change and enforce regulatory decisions, (b) to govern a procurement system and (c) to manage human resources including recruitment and performance management. The objective of this note is to present a framework² that allows us to evaluate the components of an administrative decentralization system in order to ascertain if the design of the system is able to fulfil its goals.³ According to this framework, the *discretion* allowed to local governments to perform fundamental functions must be checked through various mechanisms of *accountability*. Two types of accountability are essential features of an effective decentralization system: public accountability, where local officials are

held accountable by other elected or non-elected public officials, and social accountability where, public officials are answerable directly to the citizens. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of these relationships.

The objective of this note is to explain the importance of each of these components. The note also illustrates how these components should be put into practice. Challenges and good practices in implementations in various developing countries are highlighted. Detailed checklists (Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4 in the annex) are provided that can serve as tools in evaluating the decentralization reforms in any country. Uganda, Philippines, India (Kerala state) and Rwanda are used as examples to elucidate the use of the checklists.⁴ The note also includes a blank questionnaire which the reader can complete for any country under review (Tables A5, A6, A7 and A8 in the annex)


¹ In this note, local governments comprise local council, the local executive and other committees established by the council or executive. Local council refers to local legislative assembly while local executive refers to the administrative unit of the local government including the bureaucracy that performs the functions prescribed by the local government.

² The framework is adapted from World Bank (2008).

³ This note is part of the series of notes on decentralization. Other notes in the series define the framework for fiscal and political decentralization.

⁴ The choice of countries is based on the variety of decentralization structures found in these countries.

Figure 1: Accountability Relationships for Effective Decentralization



1. Discretion

Administrative discretion has three components: ability to regulate, discretion over procurement of goods and services, and management of human resources.

1.1. Ability to regulate

As part of administrative autonomy, local governments need a minimum set of powers and capacities to initiate local laws and regulations on issues affecting their jurisdiction. In theory it is argued that the local governments are more effective regulators because they are better able to ascertain and aggregate their constituents' preferences than regional or central governments. This improves allocative efficiency. In a well-designed administrative decentralized system, regulatory discretion of the local government extends to the following areas: local economic development, land use planning and management, zoning, and some aspects of public safety, public health, social protection, education, and environmental protection (World Bank, 2008). Our review of

local governments in the case study countries suggests that local governments in Rwanda, Philippines and Kerala have regulatory discretion in most areas that were mentioned above. On the other hand, local governments in Uganda are more restricted in their ability to regulate. However, it should be noted that in certain sectors, for example health, greater regulatory authority should be maintained at the central level. See Box 1 for more explanation.

In addition to the ability to regulate, local governments also need the authority to sanction non-compliance to ensure enforcement of these regulations, for example through administrative penalty. Administrative penalty is applied through a locally issued ordinance and administered by a local governing body, such as a local council or a special committee. In the case study countries, however, we observe that none of the local governments have the authority to sanction non-compliance except Rwanda. In addition to the inability of the local government to ensure enforcement, the need for local governments to adhere to certain minimum

Box 1. Health: regulatory discretion to the local or the central government?

Some services, for example, public health, do not present a very good case for decentralization of regulatory and service provision authority to the local level. Specifically, the regulatory authority should be decentralized cautiously for services that have the following two characteristics. First are services for which the non-excludable externalities (or spill-over effects) are spread over a large area (larger than the local government jurisdiction). The theoretical argument of internalization of externalities through decentralization is weak. The local government would ignore the larger externality effects of these services while deciding the quantity of these services to be provided at the margin. Therefore, if service provision and policy making authority is left completely to the local government, the government will under-provide these services while over-providing the services that are excludable and more visible. In the health sector, for example, it is argued that decentralization leads to over-allocation of resources for curative health and under allocation for preventive health services (World Bank, 2009).

Second, if the provision of a service requires extensive technical expertise and knowledge, it should be regulated at the central level. For example, health case studies reviewed in ESW (2010) have argued that local preferences may not always conform to well-established and effective public health practices. Similarly, local governments may not have required expertise, for example skilled staff, to ensure adequate quality of health services.

standards set by the national government can also indirectly restrict the discretion of the local government. Therefore, the benefits of prescribing minimum standards to ensure quality of the service provision should be weighed against the loss of local government's discretion.

1.2. Discretion to Procure and Administer Services

In addition to the regulatory authority, local government also needs discretion to procure goods and services from the private sector or other entities to ensure efficient service delivery to citizens. Procurement contracts can take many forms including service or management contracts, leases, concessions, joint ventures, and full or partial ownership. The procurement process can be divided into the following phases: specifying goods and services to be procured, designing the contract, selecting suppliers, appraising technical and financial qualification of the bidders, managing the bid process, finalizing the bid process and contract management. Decentralization laws should provide clear guidance on the roles of different branches and levels of government in all of the above mentioned steps of procurement processes. In a well-designed administrative

decentralization system, local governments should have discretion in all these stages.

The review of study countries shows that local governments in the Philippines and Kerala have the authority to engage in all kinds of procurement contracts. On the other hand, local governments in Uganda and Rwanda only have partial authority to enter into procurement contracts with private or other entities. Regarding the comparative participation of local councils, local executives and the central executive in the procurement process, we observe that in Kerala and the Philippines, local councils are fully empowered to carry out the procurement processes without the involvement of central or local executive. On the other hand, in Uganda, the local executive is completely in charge of the procurement process while the local council does not play a substantial role. One phase of procurement in which the central executive almost always participates is the appraisal of the technical and financial qualifications of the bidders. The rationale for government participation in this particular phase of the procurement, its challenges and possible ways of including citizens in the process are discussed in Box 2.

Box 2. Central government intervention in technical appraisals and execution of projects

Central government or central and provincial bureaucracy almost always participate in the appraisal of the technical and financial qualifications of the bidders. The intervention is justifiable as a variety of expertise is required for different projects and it is very difficult for the local government to acquire such varied specialized expertise. For example, acquiring medical equipment for local health centers requires the services of a health professional while acquiring materials for road construction requires the services of a civil engineer. The participation of higher levels of government ensures that the crucial skill needs are met. This necessity, however, compromises the ability of the local government to act according to the preferences of its constituents and requires innovative approaches that involve citizens in the process despite its technical nature.

Kerala presents an example of an innovative structure that retains community participation while fulfilling the requirement of technical expertise. In Kerala, procurement is mostly carried out by beneficiary committees along with experts belonging to a Voluntary Technical Corps (VTC), a body of volunteer experts created to appraise projects and plans of local bodies. VTC is organized at the level of each local government and has a non-official as its chairperson. Panchayat secretary or officer from the town-planning department is the convener of the VTC. The beneficiaries of the development project are called for a gram sabha meeting where the project is explained to them. They are encouraged to form a 10-15 member committee to execute the procurement process for the project on the basis of the design and the estimates prepared by the panchayat and approved by the VTC. Whenever beneficiary committee volunteers are willing to undertake a project, they are given preference over contractors (World Bank 2004). However, experience suggests that the government engineers may not cooperate with beneficiary committees especially when they are not supported by the VTC or elected representatives. This reduces the effectiveness of citizen participation.

1.3. Discretion to manage human resources

Human resources form a crucial link in bringing government closer to people by aligning public sector activities and decisions with popular preferences. Local government discretion over human resources and employment policies should ideally cover pay policy autonomy (setting overall wage rates as well as local hardship and remote allowances), budget transparency (paying staff from one's own budget), budget and establishment control (controlling staff numbers and authority to remove surplus staff), recruitment autonomy (recognition as the formal employer), career management control (vertical and horizontal mobility, including transfers to other units within the local government system), and performance management (directing and supervising activities and tasks, conducting evaluations, and exercising the ability to discipline and fire).

However, decentralization of the human resource management is a complex process.

Local governments rarely have discretion in management of personnel working within their purview. In some countries, such as Pakistan, a majority of the personnel that performs local government functions continues to be hired by the central or provincial government. Local governments, on the other hand, are allowed to hire additional staff on a contract basis. In other countries, such as Burkina Faso, functionaries are transferred to the local government but operational control is retained by the central government. These practices create different types of personnel working simultaneously under local government jurisdiction. Failure of the legal framework to clearly define the responsibilities and accountability channels of different types of personnel compounds confusion and reduces efficiency. Many countries, such as Guinea, also face the problem of insufficient staff. Box 3 explains the challenges of increasing the discretion of local government in managing human resources.

2. Accountability

Accountability is not an automatic outcome of increased discretion of local governments. Specific mechanisms should be designed to ensure that citizens and higher officials are able and willing to hold local governments accountable for their discretion. The notion of administrative accountability can be divided into public accountability and social accountability.

2.1. Public Accountability

The public sector generally relies on four mechanisms to improve administrative accountability. These mechanisms are accountability structures within bureaucratic hierarchies, specially designed independent bodies, administrative courts, and performance based financing.

Accountability structures in the bureaucratic hierarchy imply that the local government staff is accountable to higher administrative officers, public audit officers, supervisors, and legislative bodies. These entities may instigate

investigations of the use of administrative discretion by lower level bureaucrats. These methods are important as a first step to uncover information about misadministration by local governments.

Accountability through *specially designed independent bodies* emerged as a mechanism in response to increased complexities of administrative processes and new government challenges that require specific expertise. Examples of these bodies include independent auditors (external auditors) who scrutinize the use of public funds for signs of misuse, ombudsmen who hear citizens' complaints about local governments' regulatory decisions and actions, or theme-specific bodies (such as the anti-corruption commissions, environmental review boards, or commissions for sustainable development) that address compliance issues with sector-based standards set by the national government.

Administrative courts with local expertise address local conflicts that may arise between local government and citizens from the potential

Box 3. Challenges of decentralizing human resource management

One of the major arguments in favor of retaining the management of human resources at the central government is the need to enforce national minimum standards for the qualifications of staff which for some services, like health and education, are particularly important. The public choice literature elucidates additional reasons for the reluctance of central governments to devolve authority in the management of human resources. The literature identifies the potential redistribution of power that results from devolving human resource policies to the local government as a crucial reason. Granting administrative autonomy to local governments in recruitment and management of staff means reallocation of jobs and consequently power, geographically and institutionally. Therefore bureaucracies, the power holders in the status quo prior to decentralization, tend to resist reforms as they stand to lose prestige. This resistance is particularly marked in situations where bureaucracies maintain strong links with the central executive and possess political allegiances. In addition to these considerations, personnel that are being devolved to the local level are also usually concerned about their job security and prospects for career enhancement in a local government. Human resource management at the local level limits inter-regional mobility, sometimes reduces the pay scale, and can affect working conditions of the staff.

Other than resistance from bureaucracy, the central government may also want to retain control over financial flows and human resources to the local government for political reasons. Central authorities may see decentralization as an opportunity to appoint a dependable and proven individual who will "tow the party line" and design and implement reforms according to national political interests rather than local ones. This encourages devolution rather than decentralization in management of human resources. Moreover, jobs are an efficient medium for distribution of patronage. For example, the ruling party in Ethiopia plays a major role in the recruitment and management of local staff to the extent that local government cabinet members and administrators are selected from party lists (World Bank 2009).

misuse of local governments' regulatory and administrative discretion. They ensure compliance with national laws, regulations, and standards. In order to be able to ensure accountability of the local government, a court system should also have the authority to issue binding decisions on legal compliance by local governments. In France, for example, administrative tribunals are the court of first instance with "full jurisdiction" over disputes related to local government actions. Administrative courts have been set up in Kerala and Rwanda. However, they are not accessible to the citizens.

Performance based financing is another mechanism by which central or regional government can hold local governments accountable. According to this mechanism, central or provincial governments make the financing of specific local government project dependent on fulfilment of certain pre-determined criteria. For example, in Chile, funding to local health systems is not automatic and is distributed by regional health services after their evaluation. Similarly, in Uganda, under the Local Development Grant program, only the local governments that meet certain minimum governance criteria (for example adequate financial management capacity) can access funds for capital development projects. The top twenty percent of the districts in terms of (administrative) performance receive a twenty percent increase in funds for the next budget year, while poor performers are penalized by twenty percent for the next year's budget. There are indications that Uganda's local development grant mechanism, and similar mechanisms like it around the world, have met with significant success and has improved planning, financial management, accountability and transparency in development projects (World Bank 2010).

2.2. Social Accountability

Social administrative accountability includes monitoring the quality of public services and procurement processes. Some mechanisms for instituting social accountability are as follows: information provision to citizens, citizen

oversight councils, and user groups of local services.

Providing information to citizens: Making information available to the public is a pre-requisite of any social accountability initiative. The decentralization laws of all the case study countries require local governments to disseminate information regarding service delivery processes. Uganda and Rwanda, for example, introduced report cards in selected districts. These report cards provide communities information about the status of service delivery in their own district relative to other districts and national government standards. Community meetings are also a common mechanism to publicize and disseminate information on local performance. Media have also become a significant channel for information dissemination. Complementary to the dissemination of information is the availability of formal structures for registering grievances and feedback. Kerala, Philippines and Rwanda provide formal structures for registering citizen grievances while no such provisions are present in Uganda.

Citizen oversight of procurement processes: Procurement processes provide a potent opportunity for corruption of local governments. Citizen involvement in the process, therefore, can be helpful in mitigating this risk. Citizen groups in many countries have devised different methods to oversee the procurement process. For example, in the Philippines, the Local Government Code requires the establishment of special bodies in which accredited nongovernmental and community-based organizations have a role in the pre-qualification, bid, and award of local contracts. In Argentina, the Municipality of Morón, assisted by the local chapter of Transparency International, introduced two mechanisms to monitor the contracting of the waste collection service which had been widely criticized for alleged corruption during the previous administration (Yilmaz, Beris and Serrano-Berthet 2008). Also see Box 2 which illustrates the citizen oversight mechanism for procurement in Kerala.

Citizens' user groups: Community-managed user groups oversee the delivery of specific services in order to enable citizens to interact more effectively with the local government administration for service provision. Usually these are multi-stakeholder councils formed by different combinations of users, civil society organizations, government, and private sector representatives. Some examples of user group committees are school management committees, water user groups and health facility boards. Complementary to the user groups is the citizen charter -- a pact between the community and service providers that spells out expectations and roles, allowing the citizens to demand accountability. The charters specify the expected standards of the services, identify who is responsible, and outline the procedures for the redress of complaints. An example of a comprehensive charter is the Citizens' Charter in the Municipality of Mumbai, India. Rwanda has also established an innovative accountability mechanism. It is outlined in Box 4.

3. Conclusion

Administrative decentralization entails that local government possesses the discretion to make,

change and enforce laws that pertain to local goods and services, to enter into different kinds of contracts with the private sector and other entities to procure goods and services necessary for local governance, and finally, to manage human resources that are employed to perform the function of local governance. This discretion, however, should be matched with the accountability mechanisms to allow higher levels of government as well as the citizens to hold the local government responsible for its use of this discretion. Our review suggests that the local governments in all of our case study countries have reasonable discretion in procuring goods and services. However, they are severely restricted in other areas of governance.

Local governments in most of our case study countries have discretion to legislate in the areas pertaining to the provision of local goods and services but they lack sanction power. This diminishes their ability to enforce laws. Similarly, local governments do not have sufficient discretion to manage staff primarily because a majority of the staff working under local government jurisdiction continue to be

Box 4. An innovation in administrative social accountability

Rwanda has instituted a system of monitoring and evaluation based on the custom of Imihigo. Traditionally imihigo was a public pledge made in front of local leaders to perform a brave act or other public spirited accomplishment. Since 2006, all district mayors have entered into imihigos, which are formalized as a performance contract proclaimed publicly and signed between the district mayor and the President of Rwanda. In this contract, the former commits to carry out the measures outlined in his annual development plan, and the latter to support the district with the requisite financial, technical and human resources to facilitate the achievement of these goals. At the same time, the mayor signs another performance contract with lower levels of government with the same objective as a guarantee for downward accountability.

The government has also put in place a number of processes and mechanisms to ensure that targets outlined in Imihigo are achieved. First, on a monthly basis, the district leadership and their chief technicians hold Imihigo assessment meetings and agree on corrective actions for activities that are off track. Second, every three months, the district executive committee presents a progress report to the district council. After its approval, it is presented to the public on public accountability day. Third, provincial leadership, on a quarterly basis, assesses physical and documentary progress of district Imihigo and ranks the district according to performance criteria previously agreed upon. These are then made public in the presence of central government officials led by the Prime Minister. Finally, once a year, during a national forum called the National Dialogue Meeting, presided over by the President of the Republic of Rwanda, mayors present the Imihigo performance report to the nation. Generally speaking, Imihigo constitutes an efficient accountability mechanism and an incentive for local government leaders to implement the decentralization policies and to meet local and national development targets. It has also entrenched the spirit of competition in Rwandan communities where each local government seeks to perform better than its neighbors on targeted development activities, leading to better overall results.

hired at the central or provincial level. Decentralization leads to geographical and institutional redistribution of power which negatively affects the career enhancement opportunities of the staff that are to be devolved to the local level. Therefore, it is not surprising that bureaucracies tend to resist decentralization reforms.

Decentralization laws in most of our study countries also do not adequately incorporate accountability even for the functions for which local governments have discretion. Administrative courts, the most important instrument of accountability, are either absent or are not accessible to large portions of the population. Social accountability mechanisms such as information dissemination to the community and monitoring of public service delivery and procurement through user groups and other monitoring committees, while successful in Rwanda and Kerela, are not well-developed in other countries.

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Annex: Checklists for Administrative Discretion and Accountability

Table A1: Legislative jurisdiction and legislative authority – country examples

	India (Kerala)	Philippines	Rwanda	Uganda
Does local government have authority to legislate in the following areas?				
public safety	none	complete	complete	partial
land zoning	complete	complete	complete	complete
land acquisition	complete		complete	partial
land conservancy	complete	complete	complete	partial
land assignment and use	complete	complete	complete	complete
building permits	complete	complete	complete	complete
building and construction regulation	complete	complete	complete	complete
social protection	complete	none	complete	partial
environmental protection	partial	complete	complete	partial
cultural and entertainment activities	complete	complete	complete	complete
local tourism			none	partial
crime prevention	none	partial	complete	partial
fire-fighting services	complete	partial	complete	complete
billboards and the display of advertisements in public places	complete	complete		complete
cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria	complete	complete	complete	complete
cleaning	complete	complete	complete	complete
facilitates for the accommodation, care and burial of animals			complete	
local sport facilities			complete	complete
markets	complete	complete	complete	complete
traffic and parking	complete	complete	complete	complete
crisis management e.g. following flood, earthquake, storms	partial			partial
maintenance of public property	complete	complete	complete	complete
regulation of local businesses			none	
• barbers			none	
• local restaurants and other food consumption	complete	complete	none	complete
• retail		complete	none	complete
• animal husbandry and livestock	complete	complete	complete	complete
• agriculture		complete	partial	complete

Note: Legislative authority is partial if there is an ex-ante involvement of executive or higher levels of government (for example, if local council cannot make laws without consultation with the bureaucracy). However, only if ex post intervention is observed (for example, the authority of the executive to over-ride local council's decisions) then de jure legislative authority is totally in control of the local government.

Table A2: Discretion over procurement – country examples

Do local governments have discretion to enter into following procurement contracts?				
Types of Contracts	India (Kerala)	Philippines	Rwanda	Uganda
service contracts	complete	complete	complete	partial
management contracts	complete	complete	complete	partial
lease	complete	complete		partial
concessions	complete	complete		partial
joint venture leases	complete	complete		partial
full or partial ownership	complete	complete		partial
Who participates in the following phases of procurement process?				
identifying needs, specification of the goods and services	local council	local council	local council, community	local executive
appraising options of bidders	local council	local council	local council, community	local executive
design and specification of the contract	local council	local council	local council, community	local executive
supplier selection	local council	local council	local council, community	local executive
technical and financial qualification of bidders	local council, community	local council	local council, community	local executive
bid process management, evaluation of bids	local council	local council	local council, community	local executive
bid finalization process	local council	local council	local council, community	local executive
contract management	local council	local council	local council, community	local executive

Table A3: Discretion for the management of human resources – country examples

Do local governments have discretion in the following aspects of management of human resources?				
Budget Payroll	India (Kerala)	Philippines	Rwanda	Uganda
authority to dismiss surplus staff	complete	complete		partial
determine the wage envelop	partial	partial		none
Establishment Control				
controlling overall staff numbers	partial	complete		partial
controlling staff numbers in individual local offices and facilities	partial	complete		partial
Recruitment				
recognized as a formal employer	partial	partial	complete	partial
authority to hire	partial	complete	complete	partial
independent merit-based recruitment mechanism	partial	partial	complete	partial
Career Management				
promotion	partial	complete		partial
horizontal mobility within the local government	partial	partial		none
transfers within local government	partial	partial		none
Performance Management				
direct and supervise activities and tasks	partial	partial	complete	partial
conduct evaluations	partial	partial		partial
offer financial rewards	none	partial		partial
discipline and fire underperforming staff	complete	partial	complete	partial
pay policy	none	partial		none
set overall wage rates	none	partial		none
set local incentives, salary top-ups	none	partial		none

Table A4: Administrative accountability approaches – country examples

	India (Kerala)	Philippines	Rwanda	Uganda
Who performs the audit of the following?				
ex-post audit of accounts	provincial, national		local executive, independent	local, provincial, or
ex post audit of individual government projects	provincial, national		local executive, independent	local, provincial, or
ex ante audit and evaluation of the government's budget proposal	local council			local council
ex ante audit and evaluation of individual government projects	local council			local council
right of the auditor to issue opinions and recommendations on government				local council
right of the auditor to advocate alternative propositions				
At what level of the government are the following accountability bodies managed?				
anti-corruption	regional, local	not prescribed		
environment	regional, local	local or central government		local or central government
sustainable development	regional, local	central government		local or central government
disciplinary committee for the oversight of the conduct of local officials	regional	central government		local or central government
service delivery oversight	local	local or central government	local ; community	local or central government
monitoring committee for day-to-day business	local	local		local or central government
Social accountability: information provision and citizen participation				
Are there provisions in the code for information availability?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Is there any structured community participation in procurement monitoring?	No	No	No	Yes
Is there any structured community participation in service provision	No	No	No	Yes
Is there any formal structure for registering grievances and feedback?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Table A5: Legislative jurisdiction and legislative authority

	Country
Does local government have the discretion to legislate in the following areas?	Discretion of the local government <i>Options: Complete, Partial, None</i>
public safety	
land zoning	
land acquisition	
land conservancy	
land assignment and use	
building permits	
building and construction regulation	
social protection	
environmental protection	
cultural and entertainment activities	
local tourism	
crime prevention	
fire-fighting services	
billboards and display of advertisements in public places	
cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria	
cleaning	
facilitates for the accommodation, care and burial of animals	
local sport facilities	
markets	
traffic and parking	
crisis management e.g. following flood, earthquake, storms	
maintenance of public property	
regulation of local businesses	
• barbers	
• local restaurants and other food consumption	
• retail	
• animal husbandry and livestock	
• agriculture	

Note: Legislative authority is partial if there is an ex-ante involvement of executive or higher levels of government (for example, if local council cannot make laws without consultation with the bureaucracy). However, only if ex post intervention is observed (for example, the authority of the executive to over-ride local council's decisions) then de jure legislative authority is totally in control of the local government.

Table A6: Discretion over procurement

Does local government have discretion to enter into following procurement contracts?	
Types of Contracts	Discretion of the local government <i>Options: Complete, Partial, None</i>
service contracts	
management contracts	
lease	
concessions	
joint venture leases	
full or partial ownership	
Who participates in the following phases of procurement process? <i>Options: Local council, community, local executive, central or provincial governments</i>	
identifying needs/ specification of the goods and services	
appraising options of bidders	
design and specification of the contract	
supplier selection	
technical and financial qualification of bidders	
bid process management/evaluation of bids	
bid finalization process	
contract management	

A.7. Discretion over management of human resources

Does local government have discretion in the following aspects of human resource management?	
Budget Payroll	Discretion of the local government <i>Options: Complete, Partial, None</i>
authority to dismiss surplus staff	
determine the wage envelop	
establishment control	
controlling overall staff numbers	
controlling staff numbers in individual local offices and facilities	
Recruitment <i>Options: Complete, Partial, None</i>	
recognized as a formal employer	
authority to hire	
independent merit-based recruitment mechanism	
Career Management <i>Options: Complete, Partial, None</i>	
promotion	
horizontal mobility within the local government	
transfers within local government	
Performance Management <i>Options: Complete, Partial, None</i>	
direct and supervise activities and tasks	
conduct evaluations	
offer financial rewards	
discipline and fire underperforming staff	
Pay Policy <i>Options: Complete, Partial, None</i>	
set overall wage rates	
set local incentives/salary top-ups	

Table A8. Administrative accountability approaches

Who performs the following audits?	
<i>Options: Local executive, local council, independent auditors, provincial/national executive</i>	
ex-post audit of accounts	
ex post audit of individual government projects	
ex ante audit and evaluation of the government's budget proposal	
ex ante audit and evaluation of individual government projects	
right of the auditor to issue opinions and recommendations on government propositions (acceptance/rejection)	
Right of the auditor to advocate alternative propositions	
At what level of the government are the following accountability bodies managed?	
<i>Options : regional government, local government, central government or community</i>	
anti-corruption (7)	
environment (8)	
sustainable development (9)	
disciplinary committee for the oversight of the conduct of local officials (10)	
service delivery oversight (11)	
monitoring committee for day-to-day business (12)	
Social Accountability: Information provision and citizen participation	
<i>Options: Yes, No</i>	
Are there provisions in the code for information dissemination to the citizens?	
Is there any structured participation of the community in procurement monitoring?	
Is there any structured participation of the community in service provision monitoring, e.g. through user groups?	
Is there any formal structure for registering grievances and feedback?	

This note by prepared by Ghazia Aslam, Serdar Yilmaz and Asli Gurkan, as part of How-to Notes and Case-study learning series, is derived from SDV's Economic and Sector Work Report (2009) on local governance and accountability. Empirical examples in the note are from World Bank (2009).The series is an attempt by the Governance and Accountability Team of the Social Development Department (SDV) to provide guidance on select approaches to improve governance and accountability in World Bank operations. The authors would like to thank Jamie Boex and Helene Grandvoinet for their valuable comments. For questions and comments please contact ESW team members: Ghazia Aslam at gaslam@worldbank.org, Serdar Yilmaz at syilmaz@worldbank.org and Asli Gurkan at agurkan@worldbank.org.