

STATE OF THE ART

HUMANITARIAN - DEVELOPMENT - PEACE NEXUS



LEARNING JOURNEY

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List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
EU	European Union
GA	General Assembly (UN)
GB	Grand Bargain
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
HC	UN-Humanitarian Coordinator
HD-N	Humanitarian Development Nexus
HDP-N	Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus
IASC	Inter-Agency Steering Committee
IDA	International Development Association
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Agency for Development
INCAF	International Network for Conflict and Fragility (OECD)
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
LJ	Learning Journey
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NAP	National Action Plan (for UN SCR 1325 on Women Peace and Security)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NWOW	New Way of Working
NYC	New York University
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund (UN)
PHRD	Peace and Human Rights Division (Former Human Security Division)
RC	UN-Resident Coordinator
SCR	Security Council Resolution (UN)
SomRep	Somalia Resilience Consortium
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SPF	State and Peacebuilding Fund (World Bank)
TF	Trust Fund
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank
WPS	Women Peace and Security

PREFACE

The State of the Art report marks the first delivery of the Learning Journey (LJ) of the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus (HDP-N). The objective of this report is to establish a snapshot of current definitions and practice, overall, the LJ collects and analyses existing good examples and institutional bottlenecks in order to come up with a consolidated definition of the HDP-N and an outline of a practicable common way forward¹. The report is solely based on a desk analysis of selected international studies and reports on nexus issues. The subsequent steps of the LJ process includes interviews with staff and institutional partners of FDFA, which will bring out concrete examples and experiences.

In this report the peace element is given priority and the main reference point is the DAC Recommendation on the HDP-N (main text of the Recommendation is found in Annex 1). This Recommendation currently constitutes State of the Art at the conceptual level for the international community. The DAC Recommendation is therefore also the *working definition* for the LJ process (see chapter 2), with SDC HD-N definition as the other reference point. It is important to note overall that the underlying premise for nexus engagement is that it is *a means to an end, and particularly relevant in fragile and conflict affected contexts*. This underscores the need to link theory to practice and to assess if and how nexus engagement contributes to better outcomes for affected populations.

The report is structured as follows: Chapter 1 presents the origins and evolvement of the HD-N (1.1) and the HDP-N concepts (1.3). As a ‘bridge’ to understand the conceptual steps towards the more comprehensive HDP-N approach, section 1.2. discusses peace concepts, as these are understood in relation to nexus approaches. Chapter 2 presents, with a broad pencil stroke, some key positions of main actors and the status of uptake among these actors including SDC/PHRD. Chapter 3 briefly introduces examples of themes/clusters, where actors see nexus approaches particularly relevant. Chapter 4 discusses process issues, and Chapter 5 presents some take-aways to be considered in the next part of the learning journey. The annexes include overviews of common nexus definitions (Annex 1), overviews of selected HD-N and HDP-N understandings in selected multilaterals and bilaterals (Annexes 2 and 3); glossary of nexus terminology (Annex 4), timeline of frameworks related to nexus (Annex 5) and finally a list of works cited (Annex 6).

The report has been written by Anne-Lise Klausen, back stopper in the HDP Learning Journey. Omissions, mistakes and opinions are those of the author.

Copenhagen, January 2021

¹ As outlined in the Terms of reference: “For the elaboration of the state of the art a two streams approach, including bi- and multilateral aspects, will be applied. The analysis will build upon existing experiences and update those in a comprehensive manner. It encompasses the state of the art for Switzerland (SDC, PHRD (formerly HSD), Swiss NGOs) as well as the state of the art of Switzerland’s bi- and multilateral partners”.

Summary²

Background – Many of the world’s most vulnerable people live in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The volume, cost and length of humanitarian assistance has increased dramatically. Currently conflicts drive 80 per cent of all humanitarian needs, and the burden of protracted crises is of such a scale that there is an urgent need to reconsider approaches to humanitarian situations. Efforts to link humanitarian aid to development cooperation are by no means new – dating back to the 1980s concept of the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) – but nexus approaches have evolved over time with the understanding that transitioning out of protracted conflicts requires moving back and forth between emergency, recovery and development phases in a more dynamic and iterative fashion.

The Double Nexus – Such approaches have gained more traction in recent years, with the **Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs) (2015) and the Secretary-General’s report for the **World Humanitarian Summit** (WHS), **Agenda for Humanity**, (2016), signalling key milestones in the renewed nexus focus. **The Humanitarian Development Nexus** (HD-N) was set as a key paradigm shift at the WHS in 2016 operationalised through the **New Way of Working** (NWOW) and the **Grand Bargain** – the latter bringing together especially humanitarian stakeholders for reforms of the humanitarian system’s modus operandi. Following the momentum of the WHS in 2016, multilateral organisations, bilateral donors, and civil society organisations have adopted nexus language and logic, making efforts to include HD-N in strategies.

From Conflict Resolution to Prevention – In parallel to the WHS, the SDGs, in particular Goal 16 and the General Assembly and the Security Council Resolutions on “sustaining peace”, laid the foundation for renewed focus on peacebuilding among member states. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres’ push for **reform to the UN peace and security architecture** – shifting focus from conflict response to prevention – enables the ‘peace’ aspect of nexus, by committing to a closer collaboration with other UN pillars currently also being reformed, and develop stronger alignment of peace and security, human rights, and development efforts.

The Triple Nexus – Against this backdrop (i.e., the SDGs, WHS, NWoW & UN Reform), the **DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus** (HDP-N) was adopted in February 2019. Borne out of an inclusive process among stakeholder communities, including with NGOs and fragile states governments, peacebuilding in the nexus ranges from political and prominently militaristic understandings to addressing local community level conflict dynamics. To make a distinction between such wide-ranging set of possible actors and engagement models, conflict and peace practitioners use a terminology of distinguishing between ‘*Peace Writ Large*’ and the ‘*peace writ little*.’ Activities that fall under a triple nexus umbrella would typically – but not necessarily - be focused on ‘peace writ little’ activities, which for example seek to deliver a peace dividend and build social cohesion. The DAC Recommendation on the HDP-N, also includes the NWOW principles (double nexus), presenting a real opportunity for the international community to develop, learn and share as a collective.

Uptake of HDP-N – The main view among international actors is that the nexus presents a paradigm shift which can achieve better outcomes for populations affected by crises and hold the global architecture and efforts accountable to this ultimate goal. Nexus discourses are gaining traction, not least because of the appealing logic and sense it makes to break down existing silos of division of actors and funds that come with current engagements modes. However, some actors remain cautious, raising concerns related to feasibility in practice of bridging humanitarian, development and peacebuilding aspects. A key concern from the humanitarian actors is also the risk of “doing harm” by watering down the neutrality and independence of the humanitarian sector, particularly in cases where a government is involved in a conflict. Similarly, peacebuilders are also concerned with becoming too closely associated with military stabilisation efforts.

² This report is solely based on a study of available documents, interviews have not been conducted at this point of the Learning Journey. Some of the studies used have looked at a number of country cases and generalised findings on this background, it is not clear from the cases to what extent the nexus examples include peacebuilding activities, although studies quite freely use the humanitarian-development-peace terminology.

- **Switzerland** – SDC has, as other donors, engaged in LLRD and nexus type approaches for a number of years. Efforts and to some degree frustrations around an institutional set-up that comes with barriers for nexus approaches led to the commissioning of an *Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation at the SDC*, with a view to assessing whether and how SDC’s institutional and operational approaches to link humanitarian assistance with development cooperation could be strengthened. The evaluation, which covered the period from 2013 to 2017, advised the SDC to enhance its institutional setup at HQ in order to institutionalise the nexus approach and make it less person and opportunity driven. A number of institutional factors complicate the nexus approach currently, such as different framework credits, different accountability mechanisms, different programme and project approval processes and separate reporting processes. The evaluation also pointed toward a need for a shared definition and noted that peacebuilding was a missing element. Since forth, SDC has adopted a HD definition and SDC guidelines for collaboration through Swiss NGOs now include HD-N as one of seven principles for engagement (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019). While SDC has taken a number of initiatives, establishing close linkages with the Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD) and their peace programmes and expertise is a next step. A considerable number of HD-N projects have been developed and are implemented based on SCO initiatives, and there are also examples of HDP-N initiatives³. Efforts to increase policy coherence through a nexus approach has also been included in the International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24.
- **(Other) Bilateral Donors** - Bilateral actors have been working on approaches with similarities to HD-N for several decades and have also spearheaded humanitarian reform (the Grand Bargain). In their own organisational delivery models, many bilaterals have for a number of years promoted ‘Whole of Government Approaches’ that can be seen as models to ensure internal coordination among government departments and agencies that play roles in different aspects of international engagement. Overall, in the last decade the bilateral community has shifted their focus towards fragile and conflict affected contexts and continue to develop approaches with a view to creating coherent engagements with an array of instruments. However, as with the multilaterals it remains a challenge to align the institutional set-ups, which often have departmental silos between humanitarian action, development cooperation, and peacebuilding, and some cases these also work out of different ministries.
- **Multilaterals** – A recent UN-commissioned review assessing progress of the New Way of Working found that humanitarian-development-peacebuilding linkages appear to be moving beyond analysis and planning and into practical, programmatic action building on shared objectives (New York University/CIC, 2019). Another study assessing four UN organisations, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNDP found that they promote nexus engagement, but that internal organisational ‘silos’ of development and humanitarian assistance present a key challenge to nexus implementation, requiring considerable internal processes to establish stronger coherence (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019). Organisational set-ups are said to be changing from “form to follow function”.
- **Civil society** – Mainly international NGOs (INGOs) have actively engaged in discourses and operationalisation of nexus approaches so far, although there is a wide range of local civil society actors engaged. Often, NGOs take individuals and crises-affected communities as a point of departure in their work (Thomas, 2019). Humanitarian NGOs mainly ‘subscribe’ to HD-nexus, but are more reluctant to include peace dimensions, especially the ‘P Large Writ’. Given that locally based NGOs in particular work as operators/implementers, they have limited say in changing to a nexus approach, because they seem to largely work on short term output based contracts.

Challenges & Opportunities

- **Thematic Areas (cross-cutting)** – nexus implementation advances in particular within specific themes or clusters. This includes for example resilience programming, durable solutions, and Women Peace and Security (WPS). The latter two are global agendas, where a nexus approach brings in multi-stakeholder engagement and thereby adds muscle to implementation and outcomes. Another theme not discussed in detail here is Disaster Risk Reduction. This report has not looked at specific sectors, but nexus approaches advance for example in education and food security.

³ These initiatives are part of the next phase of the LJ.

- ***Institutionalisation*** – Multilaterals appear to have a greater focus on the institutional aspects of the nexus, (push from Executive Boards) than the bilateral donors. Switzerland is one of the few bilaterals to have evaluated its institutional set-up for HD-N programming. However, countries which have integrated humanitarian action, development engagement and diplomacy (and related peacebuilding engagements) in their foreign ministries and at embassy level (integrated Embassies) seem to have more flexible mechanisms for nexus approaches because funding and staffing is less tied to one departmental function.
- ***Role of Government*** – Government involvement and leadership at different administrative levels is a critical enabler for sustainability, but there are also conflicting interests. Particularly for humanitarians, who traditionally work directly with communities, working with governments poses a challenge and risk in terms of being able to safeguard their independence and neutrality (humanitarian principles).
- ***Coordination*** – At global level, there are important coordination mechanisms particularly focused on the nexus, such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UN Joint Steering Committee (JSC). However, practitioners point towards organisational complexities of coordination and partnerships in implementation being underestimated, but nexus coordination is emerging in a number of contexts.
- ***Joint Analysis & Collective Outcomes*** – It is unclear to which extent joint analysis and collective outcomes are being institutionalised – studies covered in this report point in both directions. However, practitioners voice that there is a need for analytical frameworks that bring analysis towards an understanding of how and where nexus approaches are appropriate, and in this respect the type of nexus that is appropriate in a given context, paired with a theory of change in order to provide better outcomes.
- ***Financing*** – In terms of financing nexus, promising practices are emerging. For example, there is an increasing number of flexible and large financing mechanisms that can scale up nexus approaches, and pooled funds at country level show promise in financing activities related to post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction activities. Ongoing reforms of the humanitarian system call for multi-year financing, which is expected to increase efficiency and sustainability, yet this not happening at scale.
- ***Monitoring & Evaluation*** – Studies point to an urgent need to monitor nexus programmes and to apply indicators that span the nexus. Monitoring and evaluation internally in organisations and shared among stakeholders appear limited, but a joint monitoring function of the DAC Recommendation has been established.

1. Nexus evolution and discourses

This chapter introduces the international community rationale, evolution and current discourse of the HD-N concept (1.1), followed by a discussion of peace and related issues that dominate the discourse on nexus approaches (1.2). From these sections follow a presentation of the HDP-N, which takes its starting point in the DAC recommendation of February 2019 (1.3).

1.1 The Humanitarian Development Nexus (HD-N)

Many of the world's most vulnerable people live in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Currently conflicts drive 80% of all humanitarian needs, and the World Bank projects that two thirds of the global poor living could live in these contexts by 2030 (World Bank, 2020) which presents enormous challenges. The **magnitude of displaced populations** is also at a record high. As noted in UNHCR's annual Global Trends Report for 2018: "The global population of forcibly displaced increased by 2.3 million people in 2018. By the end of the year, almost 70.8 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations". Moreover, crises are increasingly protracted, with the average humanitarian crisis lasts more than nine years, and nearly three-quarters of people targeted to receive assistance in 2018 are in countries affected by humanitarian crisis for seven years or more (OCHA, 2019).

The recognition of the scale of need and the protracted nature of current crises has fostered new alliances and approaches. Official Development Assistance (ODA) figures indicate that the burden of protracted crises is of such a scale that there is an urgent need to reconsider approaches to humanitarian situations. Humanitarian emergency response and in-donor refugee costs now account for 1/5 of total ODA gross disbursements. According to the UN, the volume, cost and length of humanitarian assistance has increased dramatically and around 85 per cent of humanitarian financing addresses medium - or long-term crises (UN MPTF, 2019). The humanitarian-development (and peace) nexus is considered a key pathway for sustainable advances to individuals, communities and governance systems, meeting the SDGs, and not least to reduce costs of humanitarian aid.

Efforts to link humanitarian aid to development cooperation is not new, dating back to the 1980s concept of the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). This model was particularly focused on natural disasters, implying a **linear progression (continuum)** from emergency response to development cooperation. The realities of conflict contexts and other "complex" situations experienced in the 1990s challenged this linear approach. Aid and political actors recognised that transitioning out of protracted conflicts was a "contiguum" rather than a continuum, involving moving back and forth between emergency, recovery and development phases in a more dynamic and iterative fashion. Since 2010, and perhaps earlier, there has been a renewed focus on the "contiguum" approaches (both internationally and in SDC).

The SDGs (2015) and the Secretary-General's report for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), Agenda for Humanity, (2016) are key building blocks and milestones in the renewed nexus focus. The HD-N was set as a key paradigm shift at the WHS in 2016 in the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Humanity, operationalised through the New Way of Working (NWOW) and the Grand Bargain, the latter bringing together especially humanitarian stakeholders for reforms of the humanitarian system's modus operandi (see Annex 1). Multilateral organisations, bilateral donors and international NGOs have, following the momentum of the WHS, adopted HD-N nexus language and made efforts in their strategies and programmes to provide more coherent and complementary humanitarian and development engagements, especially in protracted fragile and conflict affected contexts. In parallel and following the WHS, the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR), and thereunder the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), process was launched in New York in September 2016 and adopted by the UN in December 2018. The GCR/CRRF frame nexus engagements specifically for displacement affected communities (UNHCR, u.d.). The European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Member States have also taken concrete steps at the policy level to operationalise their global commitment to the humanitarian-development nexus. This is guided by three key EU policies on the operationalisation of the nexus (related to resilience building, forced displacement and the nexus). In 2017 the EU also launched a nexus pilot initiative in six countries, recognising 'the linkages between sustainable development, humanitarian aid, and conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as well as the importance of diplomatic and political solutions to support peace and security' (Council of the European Union, 2017).

1.2 Peace in a nexus approach

The SDGs, in particular Goal 16 and subsequently the General Assembly and the Security Council Resolutions on “sustaining peace”, laid the foundation for renewed focus on peacebuilding among member states (United Nations, General Assembly Resolution of 70/262; and United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2282, Preamble), 2016). UNSG Guterres called for a ‘whole new approach’ at the beginning of his term in January 2017, announcing reform to the UN peace and security architecture, that shifts focus from conflict response to prevention (IISD, 2017). The UN reform has enabled the peace element in nexus approaches. Bringing together the UN peace and security capacities, the reform facilitates the integration of peacebuilding in order to *prevent violent conflict and its negative impacts; to contribute to its transformation and resolution; and to help build strong, inclusive and resilient societies that will deepen peace outcomes for generations to come*. Focused on effective conflict prevention as well as sustaining peace, the reform is bolstered by the Secretary-General’s call for a “surge in diplomacy for peace”. The reorganisation of the pillar also explicitly commits to closer collaboration with other UN pillars and ‘alignment between peace and security, human rights, and development’ and connect more deeply with the reformed Resident Coordinator system (UN.Reform.org, u.d.).

Further, as a joint effort to signal the need to take action on conflict prevention and ‘sustaining peace’, the UN and World Bank jointly produced the *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* study. As the first of its kind, the report considers and offers concrete recommendations on how development processes can be paired with diplomacy, mediation, security and other tools to prevent outbreak of violent conflict. It further presents the economic case for conflict prevention, which is that 1 USD invested in prevention saves 16 USD invested in humanitarian aid and peacekeeping efforts (World Bank-United Nations, 2018). The UN and World Bank also launched a joint pilot initiative on nexus approaches in seven country contexts (The World Bank, 2017); more recently the World Bank’s Strategy for Fragility and Conflict also emphasises peace building and conflict prevention (World Bank, 2020).

Peacebuilding as a concept ranges from political and military stabilisation understandings, to addressing local community level conflict dynamics and social cohesion. The peacebuilding constituency is therefore quite large and differentiated, and includes a range of political actors, diplomats, special envoys and law enforcement officials with UNSC or regional mandates – for example, AMISOM, in Somalia, or the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) combatting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (AU and EU, 2016).

To make a clearer distinction between the wide-ranging set of possible actors, engagement models, and advocacy roles, conflict and peace practitioners adopt the terminology of ‘Peace Writ Large’ and the ‘peace writ little’ (CDA, 2012). ‘Peace Writ Large’ refers to changes at the broader, societal level, where goals are often “lofty and ambitious” (Ibid). Development and humanitarian actors and activities that fall under a nexus umbrella would typically be more focused on ‘peace writ little’, which often seeks to deliver a local peace dividend, and activities in social cohesion and including conflict-sensitive approaches and Do-No-Harm principles in planning and implementation.

An interesting point relating to the way *peace* takes form in a nexus approach was posited at an EU high-level Round Table meeting (June 2018) on the HDP-N. It was found that if a nexus approach originates from a humanitarian or a development situation, it is the HD-N aspects that are likely to be dominant and peacebuilding plays a limited role and if included it is ‘peace writ little’. If a nexus approach originates from a stabilisation situation and peace establishment situation, it is likely that *peace* focuses on the ‘Peace Writ Large’. The *peace* distinctions above seem to have a broad consensus in the communities promoting the HDP-N, while complications, and at times resistance, arise if and when stabilisation involves military/security engagements in particular contexts (Chair conclusions (EU Round Table), June 2018).

The *peace* concept is at times seen to be interchangeably used or confused with ‘stabilisation’. Stabilisation remains a contested concept, lacking an internationally agreed and unambiguous definition. Stabilisation is most frequently associated with joined-up civilian/military efforts undertaken by external actors in conflict situations. It is at the centre of long-standing debates of the interlinkages between security and development, and in particular concerns over the securitisation of humanitarian assistance development, and the risk of over-militarising engagements in complex political situations. In political and scholarly debates and in practice, the term can be seen used in ways that overlap with other concepts such as conflict management, peacebuilding, statebuilding or counter-insurgency (Pedersen, Andersen, Bonnet, & Welham, 2019).

A study from Somalia brings out the confusion and its consequences.

“Since the establishment of the Somalia Transitional Government in 2004, and particularly since the formalisation of the Somalia Federal Government, the terms ‘stabilisation’, ‘statebuilding’ and ‘peacebuilding’ have been used by the UN and donors as interchangeable or highly interdependent terms. While security and stabilisation are necessary conditions and are viewed as priorities in Somalia, peacebuilding, as a socially oriented, bottom-up and relational praxis, features much less prominently. The peacebuilding community is critical of the wider coordination agenda (as indeed are some humanitarian organisations). Bottom-up peacebuilding practitioners point out how peacebuilding is increasingly conflated with security in Somalia and how donors’ attachment to the statebuilding agenda tends to overlook local clan-based resource conflicts (over land and water, for example). That said, there is diversity in how peacebuilding organisations choose to work in the context of Somalia” (ECDPM, 2019, p. 5).

1.3 The Humanitarian-Development-Peace-Nexus (HDP-N)

Against this backdrop (WHS, NWoW, Grand Bargain, UN Reform, GCR/CRRF), the DAC Recommendation on the HDP-Nexus was adopted in February 2019, based on an inclusive process among stakeholder communities (consultations included NGOs and fragile states’ governments). In the Recommendation, the HDP-N is formulated as *the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actions” and a nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalise on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context – in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict”* (DAC, 2019). The Recommendation is quite comprehensive and accommodating of views and concerns of different stakeholder communities. It notes the Do-No-Harm principles and conflict-sensitive approaches; it calls on peace and development actors to address the structural drivers of crises and conflicts; and it puts crisis-affected people at the centre of decision-making. The Recommendation also places emphasis on the early detection of potential conflicts and engagement in conflict prevention, and attention to the joint crisis prevention agenda of the WB and the UN (World Bank-United Nations, 2018).

The Recommendation also includes good humanitarian donorship principles and the NWO principles, and in this way, it offers overall guidance on operationalisation. Since the adoption of the Recommendation five UN agencies have formally adhered to the Recommendation; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

The Recommendation has been developed in close partnership among OECD DAC members, a point which should not be underestimated, as these account for 80% of development investments in fragile contexts (compared to 89% of ODA for humanitarian action is channelled through the multilateral system) (OECD DAC, 2020). OECD DAC members find the DAC recommendation particularly useful to their engagement in three critical areas – besides the value of a common reference and conceptual understanding of the nexus – the first being to improved multi-stakeholder coordination across the nexus; the second, better programming within the nexus; and the third, better financing across the nexus (OECD, 2018) (OECD DAC, 2020).

The importance of the DAC recommendation has been reaffirmed and facilitated by INCAF a dedicated Round Table by members is planned for 2022, as a steppingstone to the five- year monitoring report required by the DAC Recommendation, supported by the OECD data-driven analysis, policy tools and networks. The monitoring system and High Level Round Tables are important mechanisms to ensure that members and adherents actually implement the Recommendation (OECD DAC, 2020). However, the devil is in the details, in the sense that members’ institutional structures and incentive systems (or lack thereof) will determine the extent to which the common recommendation will be operationalised.

1.4 Views and debates on nexus concepts

The main view among international actors is that the nexus presents a paradigm shift which can achieve better outcomes for populations affected by crises and hold the global architecture and efforts

accountable to this ultimate goal. Nexus discourses are gaining traction, not least because of the appealing logic and sense it makes to break down artificial silos of division of actors and funds that come with current engagements modes. Proponents of the nexus work to deliver more coherent programmes, often bringing their own delivery systems of humanitarian aid and development cooperation to develop joint objectives and be better coordinated (discussed in Chapter 4).

Organisations have different ‘comfort zones’ and risk appetite. With interest in improving the nexus as a common point of departure, there also are considerable degrees of caution within the organisations and communities of humanitarian, development and peace actors. Firstly, some humanitarian actors are concerned with the potential risk of “doing harm” by watering down the neutrality and independence of the humanitarian sector, especially in cases where a government is involved in a conflict. Secondly, because there are situations where obstruction happens, and access can be jeopardised. Thirdly, and as discussed in Section 1.2, peacebuilding is a concern because it may be securitised and/or politicised; such examples are seen in the Sahel countries, Afghanistan and Somalia, where military strategies and interventions seem to lead peacebuilding efforts. Some development actors note that the nexus is used by ‘powerful Western donors [who] are pushing reforms to demonstrate cost-effectiveness’ (and reduce ODA spending)... ‘and to meet security rather than humanitarian or developmental objectives, principally stemming the flow of migration’ (Sultan Barakat, 2020).

Other voices note that most current initiatives are at project level or pilot initiatives and ask if and how nexus approaches are going to be scaled up to become mainstream⁴. ACTED looking at operationalisation notes based on a review of nexus approaches in practice that concepts are associated with complications of implementation, and asks, ‘who will determine what the triple nexus will look like for donors, and who is really making the decisions in relation to its scope and intent? And who is responsible for implementing the nexus and raising the issue of trust between actors noting that ‘humanitarian actors are sceptical of development actors, and vice versa’ and that peace is closely associated with military in many cases. (ACTED, u.d.)

2. Nexus Actors

In this chapter the operationalisation of nexus approaches will be briefly summarised through snapshots of actor types, i.e., multilaterals – focus on the UN, bilaterals and NGOs. FDFA/SDC is discussed in a specific section. This report is a prelude to a more in-depth analysis of the FDFA as part of the LJ. This report summarises recent developments based on a scan of available documentation⁵. The chapter discusses both HD-N and HDP-N⁶.

2.1 Multilateral Actors – focus on the UN

A recent UN-commissioned review measuring progress of the New Way of Working found that humanitarian-development-peacebuilding linkages appear to be moving beyond analysis and planning and into practical, programmatic action building on shared objectives. The study notes that specific country teams have made progress in making development and humanitarian planning more coherent, through different models of combining and linking plans. A growing number of country teams were found to have identified “collective outcomes” – i.e., shared commitments to address, durably, the key causes and consequences of a crisis. Many of the new UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) / UN Cooperation Frameworks (UNCFs) and the 2019 Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) show a clear evolution of thinking, with greater coverage of development-humanitarian-peacebuilding links. The role of RCs and RCs/HCs is crucial in the strategic ambition of collective outcomes, but this only works when they have the capacity in their offices to link development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding issues. The UN Development System reforms (UNDS) and new UNDAF/UNCF guidelines provide opportunities for this, but also carry some risks, for instance of delinking the RC’s office from UNDP’s capacity (New York University/CIC, 2019). The review did not cover peacebuilding.

A study of four UN organisations (WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNDP) found that all promote nexus engagement, however with caveats. Their internal organisational “silos” of development and

⁴ Interviews conducted by the author on other assignments.

⁵ This State of the Art Report has been drafted prior to interviews with PHRD/SDC staff as well as NGOs.

⁶ There are more studies available on nexus approaches of multilaterals and NGOs than on bilaterals. The section on bilaterals is therefore relatively short, as information had to be “fished out” of OECD DAC Peer Reviews. Websites are not particularly informative on the topic and no interviews were conducted.

humanitarian aid are not automatically geared to nexus, and both WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF alluded in interviews to considerable internal processes, and pressure from member states to establish internal coherence. WFP and UNICEF's efforts concentrate on bringing balance into their dual mandates, and to a degree are internally focused for this reason. Concretely this means they are working to strengthen the development mandate and the synergies between the two "silos" of their organisations. WFP, for example, has now coordinated their humanitarian and development engagements at country level in one country strategy; earlier these were separated with less weight on development activities. Organisational set-ups are said to be changing towards "form to follow function", but across the board this does not happen automatically. For UNHCR, the GCR is driving the organisation's strategic and corporate focus and changes to implement nexus principles. UNHCR is proactively seeking out development actors that add a broad development-oriented nexus dimension to refugee responses - first of all the World Bank. UNDP has a broad remit as the primary development arm of the UN system, which in terms of mandate is both a strength (potential flexibility) but also a potential weakness of spreading itself too thin. UNDP has considerable 'peace writ little' post-conflict experience and focus on conflict-sensitivity of aid. The specialised UN agencies link their engagements to 'peace writ little', mainly promoting conflict analysis, conflict-sensitivity of aid, and a focus on refugee host community relations (social cohesion). 'Peace Writ Large' in the form of peacekeeping missions and peace negotiations are closely interlinked with the root causes of refugee crises and therefore with UNHCR's mandate. This inherent closeness to political and security dimensions of the nexus means that UNHCR has to balance impartiality and ensure that refugee support does not become partisan. The humanitarian pillars of UNICEF and WFP face similar challenges, but in their strategies, they are less explicit on links to peacebuilding than UNHCR (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019).

2.2 International NGOs

It is mainly international NGOs (INGOs) that have actively engaged in discourses and operationalisation of nexus approaches so far, although obviously there is a wide range of local civil society actors engaged. In this report the focus is on INGOs⁷. Many organisations engage in the nexus agenda, depending on mandates, aspirations, capacity and business models. Often, NGOs take individuals and crises-affected communities as a point of departure in their work, contra many multilateral and bilateral nexus actors, which have greater emphasis on state-building and working with state actors (Thomas, 2019, p. 14). NGOs have been proactively engaging both in shaping the mutual accountability dimension contained in nexus aspirations. Oxfam formulates a nexus approach including the accountability dimension as follows: "Meeting immediate needs at the same time as ensuring longer-term investment addressing the systemic causes of conflict and vulnerability – *such as poverty, inequality and the lack of functioning accountability systems* – has a better chance of reducing the impact of cyclical or recurrent shocks and stresses, and supporting the peace that is essential for development to be sustainable" (OXFAM, 2019).

Humanitarian NGOs mainly 'subscribe' to HD-nexus, but are more reluctant to include *peace* dimensions, especially the '*P Large Writ*'. A 2019 report produced by VOICE, a network representing 85 European NGOs active in humanitarian assistance globally, provided NGO perspectives on the EU's HDP nexus approach, finding that, "The 'peace' part is [...] more complex. Many members have actively integrated the principle of 'do no harm' into their work and are working towards peace, for instance, by further integrating conflict sensitivity into their approaches. Only a smaller number of them explicitly consider peacebuilding as part of their mandate" (Thomas, 2019, p. 21). Multi-mandated organisations similarly recognise challenges in working with the 'p' part of the triple nexus, considering the different interpretations that exist of 'peace', inextricably linked to respective interests, mandates and agendas. OXFAM's recent discussion paper on the HDP nexus, however, notes that INGOs typically operationalise 'peace' through a stronger integration of conflict sensitivity, support to social cohesion and local peacebuilding.

A recent analysis of NGO roles identifies three main positions:

⁷ In the subsequent part of the Learning Journey local civil society actors will be discussed in connection with localisation aspects. The section builds on publicly available summary assessments. Interviews with Swiss NGOs is included in the next phase of the LJ, but at this point the aim is to present an overview of the State of the Art, to the extent that this is possible for a very wide range of non-governmental actors.

1. ‘One position is to **criticise and distance oneself** from the HDP-Nexus in a principled way because its incorporation is seen as putting humanitarian action at risk given its principles of neutrality and impartiality, independence and humanity in political agendas⁸.
2. A second position is to **criticise specific elements** of the HDP-Nexus, for instance when input of a broader range of stakeholders (e.g., civil society actors) are ignored or principles compromised.
3. A third position includes a pragmatic incorporation and **programmatic operationalisation** of the HDP-Nexus taking a broad interpretation of the peace component (cf. Plan International 2018; Save the Children 2018; Mercy Corps 2016)’ (Hövelmann, 2020).

In addition to the roles identified above local NGOs in particular work as operators/implementers with limited say on how they engage because they are contractors. It is only when there are opportunities in the contracts between them and their donor /international NGO to include multiyear financing and working towards outcomes and greater flexibility in implementation – that these organisations can change their modus operandi. Altogether there seems to be a gap between local organisations and the large international NGOs with regard to role and engagement in any reform agenda including the nexus.

2.3 Bilateral Actors

Bilateral actors have been working on approaches with similarities to HD-N for several decades, and it is also the bilaterals that have been spearheading humanitarian reform (the Grand Bargain). Bilaterals have also and together with key multilaterals with INCAF as the platform worked on the DAC Recommendation on HDP-N. In their own organisational delivery models, many bilaterals have for a number of years promoted ‘Whole of Government Approaches’ can be seen as ways to ensure internal coordination among government departments and agencies that can play roles in international engagement (Council of the European Union, 2017). Bilaterals have also used INCAF as their common voice and platform to engage in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State building, a partnership between fragile countries (the g7+ group), civil society, and donors located at OECD, which aims to support implementation of the New Deal for Fragile States and broaden development engagements to focus on the link between peace and development, and thereby paved the way for the DAC recommendation on HDP-N (Klausen, Bosire, & Nwajiaku, 2021 (forthcoming)).

Overall, looking back over the last decade the bilateral community has shifted their focus towards fragile and conflict affected contexts and they continue to develop approaches and seek to have coherent engagements and use different instruments. They also seek to leverage and amplify policy goals by influencing the UN and the EU through diplomatic and security engagements, which also explains why bilaterals seem inclined to favour a triple nexus approach in their narratives.

However, the devil is in the details. It is not straightforward to align the institutional set-ups, which often have departmental silos⁹ between humanitarian action and development cooperation, these may in many cases work out of separate agencies and in some cases in different ministries. Some organisations have therefore increased institutional coherence by having joint desks at the implementation level (like SDC in Horn of Africa), or established a common funding channel (as done by British Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office former DFID) (see further below). Peacebuilding is not necessarily named as a specific activity, but seen as the role of multilaterals, peacebuilding think tanks and NGOs etc. Yes, it is the view in this report that in spite of inertia, bilaterals work towards establishing internal linkages in order to improve coordination of policy level engagements, instruments and programming across the humanitarian, development and in some cases also include

⁸ Referencing a position by MSF by Pedersen, Jens: The Nexus of Peacebuilding, Development and Humanitarianism in Conflict Affected Contexts: A Respect for Boundaries. <https://msf-analysis.org/nexus-peacebuilding-development-humanitarianism-conflict-affected-contexts-respect-boundaries/>

⁹ When referring to institutional siloes, these can exist either because humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors have different mandates, are placed in different ministries, and/or because different working cultures exist. Beyond working culture, differences may exist at a procedural level, regarding planning and timeframes, or flexibility of funding streams. Another reason that siloes may occur is if different departments are working in different territories. Further, a lack of a mutual understanding of how to approach nexus and see complementarities can promote siloed thinking and workstreams.

aspects of peacebuilding. However, these do not necessarily come at this point with major institutional reforms, but as measures to reduce barriers through directives of how to work together. An example is Germany where the Parliament has directed the development cooperation ministry (BMZ) and the Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt) to work together in fragile and conflict affected situation and laid out the different roles in order to promote coherence (Nothelle, 2017). Sweden and the UK¹⁰ also aim to increase the institutional focus on delivery of triple nexus approaches in-country, nexus expertise that cut across institutional silos, e.g., through multidisciplinary teams (UK) or placing resilience or nexus-focused staff in country or regional offices (Sida) (Development Initiatives, 2019).

Reducing institutional siloes to work with the nexus does not mean erasing all differences between the modalities or departments, but rather creating an environment that enables collaboration and synergies by working to the strengths of each modality. The examples from Sweden, Germany and the UK illustrate that there are many ways to approach the issue, but the common thread across the approaches is a strong emphasis on ensuring that field-level staff have a strong capacity and institutional structures that will allow them to work on nexus approaches. The next phase of the LJ will look more closely at Swiss experiences with the nexus to bring to light some of the structural/institutional factors that have enabled or obstructed these.

The OECD DAC Peer Review function will be used as an instrument to monitor progress towards nexus approaches and implementation of the DAC Recommendation. A scan of the recent peer reviews for the UK shows that the UK aid strategy focuses on crisis response and crisis risks. A set of guidance and instruments has been developed that is underpinned by the Fusion Doctrine (see below) and aligned with the aid strategy. In particular, FCDO (formerly DFID) has clarified its role in accompanying countries out of fragility in a Building Stability framework that carefully links development and peace. DFID has also updated its humanitarian strategy, building on the United Kingdom’s active role in reforming the humanitarian sector well before the World Humanitarian Summit. Developed with the same overarching objective of strengthening global peace, these two documents are complementary. The United Kingdom understands that crises are multidimensional and that expertise from different government departments should therefore be mobilised. Moreover the UK at country level in fragile and conflict affected situations operates with one single budget that allows a flexible approach to support humanitarian, development and peacebuilding based on an analysis of needs (OECD, 2020b).

Swedish Sida “regularly analyses the humanitarian-development nexus, identifying opportunities and challenges for strengthening this nexus in the 16 countries where Sida has ongoing development co-operation and humanitarian work (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018a). Sweden has adopted a broad development strategy in Syria, for example, that enables the humanitarian budget to focus more firmly on its primary life-saving mandate, which is considered good practice (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016a). Sweden is also increasing its development assistance allocated to peace-building objectives in recognition of the need to address root causes of conflict” (OECD, 2019). The Independent evaluation of the Swiss nexus humanitarian-development nexus engagement also in its benchmarking with Sweden found that Sida’s Vision 2019-2023 provides global strategic direction and a growing number of its country strategies include a focus on humanitarian-development linkages. For example, a nexus objective in its Uganda strategy meant that it could adapt its support quickly to respond to a new influx of refugees. Moreover, can staff can move from working on humanitarian assistance to development cooperation, and vice versa, which facilitates in breaking down internal barriers.

2.4 Switzerland/SDC and PHRD

SDC has as other donors engaged in LLRD and nexus type approaches for a number of years. Efforts and to some degree frustrations around an institutional set-up that comes with barriers for nexus approaches led to the commissioning of an *Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation at the SDC*, with a view to assessing whether and how SDC’s institutional and operational approaches to link humanitarian assistance with development cooperation could be strengthened. The evaluation covered the period from 2013 to 2017. The evaluation concluded that Switzerland is seen as a principled donor by partners, and this role can be leveraged. The SDC was advised to enhance a conducive institutional setup at head office in

¹⁰ DFID has been integrated into the Foreign office in 2020, and it is not clear to the author of this report how this affects coherence, but the aim is to establish a more coordinated approach but it is also an exercise to slim the institutional set-up.

order to institutionalise the nexus approach and make it less person and opportunity driven. A number of institutional factors make the nexus approach complicated, such as different framework credits, different accountability mechanisms, different programme and project approval processes and separate reporting processes. The evaluation also pointed towards the need to adopt a definition and noted that peacebuilding was a missing element. (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019).

Box 1 Benchmarking SDC progress on double nexus

In a benchmarking exercise with SIDA, WFP and Caritas on the application of double nexus approaches the Independent evaluation of the Swiss engagement, it was found that SDC works on the elements of the NWO framework. “Its main strength is that unlike most donors (including Sida), SDC has a bottom-up approach to its work. Working in the nexus matters most at field level, in order to deliver better outcomes for affected populations. The examples of nexus programmes presented demonstrate that SDC has the potential to work successfully in the nexus. To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of future nexus programming, SDC could learn from Sida about more joint analyses and flexible funding mechanisms, from WFP about putting in place relevant policies and strategies, and potentially from Caritas on organisation structure although this will be more challenging for SDC as a donor agency”. *Changes are likely to have materialised since data collection for the evaluation in 2018 and the ongoing learning journey will take stock of more recent developments.* (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019)

Since the evaluation, SDC has adopted an HD definition (see Box 3 below) and SDC guidelines for collaboration through Swiss NGOs now include HD-N as one of seven principles for engagement (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019). While SDC has taken a number of initiatives, it is clear that bringing on board close linkages with the Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD) and their peace programmes and expertise is a next step. A considerable number of HD-N projects have been developed and are implemented based on SCO initiatives, and there are also examples of HDP-N initiatives¹¹. Efforts to increase policy coherence through a nexus approach has also been included in the International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24.

Box 2 SDC's current HD-N definition

“The integrated use of instruments (both bilateral and multilateral) of humanitarian aid and development cooperation”. “Integrated” means: “the simultaneous and synergetic application of instruments in the same geographic context in order to augment, effectively intertwine and operate synergistically to enhance joint outcomes for the targeted populations in the short, medium and long term”.

Switzerland has also subsequently played a role in the development of the OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDP-N and promotes nexus approaches at global level. One example is the *Swiss Submission to the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement*, which embodies a strong nexus approach: ‘donors should coordinate amongst each other to adopt a coherent approach to support collective outcomes and create corresponding financial incentives. Donors should also ensure a swift implementation of the recommendations by the OECD DAC regarding the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. At country levels, donors should meet together with the RC Offices and discuss a) best practices on the use of pooled funds; ii) multi-year funding packages for collective outcomes; iii) use of cash grants; iv) support for local authorities and civil society; and v) alternative financing models’ (Swiss Government, u.d.).

3. Nexus thematic areas

Studies informing this report concur that nexus implementation seems to advance within specific thematic areas. It is in particular HD approaches that are being operationalised, while HDP approaches seem more aspirational¹². This report briefly discusses resilience, durable solutions and Women Peace and

¹¹ These initiatives are part of the next phase of the LJ.

¹² Say something about this report being based on international studies and not SDC sectors

Security as examples of nexus areas. The areas often cover more themes or sectors, the point being that these may be too narrow, and programmes include a range of different elements and interlinkages, if they respond to needs in protracted crises. Social sectors, such as health and education have focus on nexus approaches and these are often focus on how to move away from parallel systems of service delivery towards strengthening and inclusion in government systems¹³. Another study has the following examples of themes, including themes where SDC is also engaging, that are advancing as nexus approaches: food security; climate change; migration; and social protection through cash-based programming (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019).

3.1 Resilience

Resilience as an outcome brings together multiple types and levels of sector engagements under one umbrella. A recent UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) mapping and synthesis of evaluations of HD-nexus programs further points out that “resilience thinking – most notably the need to factor in risk and vulnerability, and not assume linear paths to development – can bring an essential contribution for understanding nexus-related processes” (Christoplos, Collinson, Kistic, & Deng, 2018, p. 30). Multilateral organisations, such as WFP, FAO and UNICEF, also use resilience as the organising concept for collaborative efforts noting that resilience is a concept that is common in their strategies and portfolios rather than a sector engagement (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019). WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR work together to strengthen community resilience and food security for example in Southern Iraq and Ethiopia. WFP has an ‘out of the box’ collaboration with local peacebuilding organisations in Iraq, in order to understand the peace and conflict dynamics and ensure conflict sensitivity and observe Do-No-Harm principles in their programmes (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019)

Resilience is also closely associated with Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programmes, which have a history of establishing linkages between humanitarian action and development cooperation. In Switzerland’s HoA programme, support is provided to the Somalia Resilience Consortium (SomRep). Constituted by a group of international NGOs, with support from several donors, the Consortium builds community and institutional resilience to natural disasters and conflicts; supports economic opportunities; and build social cohesion (‘peace writ little’). The main activities are labelled as development and peacebuilding engagements, but in order to address humanitarian needs, SomRep has a crisis modifier fund, which can be activated at short notice and help prevent a humanitarian crisis from going to scale and thereby disrupt development and peace building efforts (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019). Kenya-Rapid is another example of a resilience initiative supported by SDC and USAID in five Northern counties, aiming to reduce humanitarian needs and resource conflicts by building resilience of pastoral communities through the provision of innovative and easily maintained water supply systems (for humans and animals), improvement of pastoral practices, and vegetable farming, as well as capacity building of local counties to manage and sustain the support. This project works with the public-private partnerships and is considered a successful example, together with SomRep, of HDP-nexus engagements (HoA MTR forthcoming). The ‘p’ actions are conflict mitigation and building of social cohesion between communities, which traditionally have conflicts over resources (grazing) and access to water especially in times of drought.

3.2 Durable solutions for displacement affected populations.

Durable solutions for protracted displacement situations are commonly conceptualised as triple nexus engagements. In practice humanitarian actions and humanitarian organisations have traditionally been the main actors in displacement affected situations, but development actors and approaches have become increasingly important players in recognition of the protracted nature of displacement. A key factor here, and one of the pillars of the GCR, is to reduce displaced persons’ needs for humanitarian assistance by increasing self-reliance, e.g., through skills development, livelihoods, and policies that support displacement-affected communities. GCR and the CRRF are examples of global framework and compact embodying a nexus approach in the design.

Durable solutions approaches also include medium to long-term development engagements with host governments at national and local levels that underpin self-reliance and ease pressures on host communities and host governments. One example is the Kakuma/Kalobeyei Refugee Settlement in Northern

¹³ SDC is for example engaging in a Learning Journey on the Education nexus. Sector examples will be included in the next part of this LJ. The subsequent phase of this LJ will look more systematically at nexus engagement across different sectors and themes in Swiss development cooperation, with a view to informing which areas see the greatest added value of a nexus approach, as well as pointing to sector-specific lessons to date.

Kenya, where the international actors seek to align with the County's Integrated Development Plan, and are working with peaceful coexistence ('p little writ') e.g., through the establishment of local peace committees and sporting activities for youth which make up the largest population group (Danida, 2019). In Kakuma/Kalobeyei in Turkana West, SDC, amongst other organisations also support the International Finance Corporation (IFC) efforts to attract the private sector (particularly businesses) and establish local economic development activities both for refugees and host communities through seed funding and technical advisory services¹⁴.

SDC also supports durable solution initiatives with the Governments of Ethiopia, Somalia and Myanmar, in order to institutionalise durable solutions planning as part of government planning processes. Such plans can now be brought to scale by e.g., large-scale development investments through the World Bank's IDA funding (IDA 18 and IDA 19), which aim to improve regular services and development opportunities to affected populations (both hosts and displaced populations). The Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI) in Somalia has recently been evaluated and the findings show it is having a major influence especially in Somalia as a process, where support to longer term policy frameworks are being developed and institutionalised instead of a continuation of considering IDPs as a humanitarian issue. The DSI is a HD-N approach, although the project documentation also aims to engage in peacebuilding through conflict mitigation, and use HDP-N (IDC, 2020) terminology (see Box 4).

The general picture, however, is that nexus approaches in displacement affected situations are changing but slowly. Many humanitarian organisations continue to operate for a long duration (year after year) with short and narrow output contracts. Even when organisations receive multi-year funding, the reality is that programme design frequently requests strict annual and results-based outputs (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019). Without explaining the real dynamics as a result, several donors have reverted to annual funding of NGO projects, when their multi-year funding failed to improve programming. From the perspective of humanitarian donors, another challenge to providing multiyear funding is the perception that it presents a loss of flexibility in responding to contextual changes as funding is locked in (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019).

The peace engagement in durable solutions is broad and spans both political and security actors engaged in stabilisation and peace negotiations i.e., 'P Large Writ', and NGOs that engage in social cohesion initiatives at community level between host communities and displaced populations. Such programmes include, for example, joint income generating activities, grievance mechanisms, and joint planning of local investment priorities between host communities and refugees, which is seen as a way to build social cohesion i.e., 'p little writ'.

Box 3 The Durable Solutions Initiative in Somalia

The Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI) was launched in early 2016 by the Federal Government of Somalia and the Resident Coordinator. It is managed by the Durable Solutions Unit (DSU) located in the Integrated Office (IO) of the UN's Resident Coordinator in Mogadishu. The DSI has been guided by Professor Walter Kaelin, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on the Human Rights of IDPs, and since 2015 the Special Advisor on IDPs to the Resident Coordinator in Somalia – having carried out eight missions to Somalia from 2015 to 2019 funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

The DSI is based on the premise that durable solutions to displacement can be attained only through strong government leadership and by engaging all relevant actors in the process, including both the public and the private sectors, **a nexus of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors**, and the displacement-affected communities themselves. It is funded by the SDC, with an in-kind contribution from UNDP, with a budget of CHF 1,708,000, covering six missions of Walter Kaelin, and the secondment of five durable solutions experts from the Swiss Humanitarian Aid (SHA) expert pool who were deployed between 2016 and 2020, and who formed the DSU within the IO.

The evaluation concluded that the DSI in early 2016 was needed, given the severity of the displacement situation across the country, its protractedness, the importance of making a collective approach to finding durable solutions by the humanitarian and development organisations, the disjointed nature of interventions by UN agencies and NGOs, and the recognition that success in addressing the displacement problems would

¹⁴ The IFC Challenge Fund aims to support both refugees to build their own enterprises and also attract in external private sector businesses, medium size businesses to invest in the area. (Danida, 2019, p. 66).

depend on, not only government ownership, but also government leadership. With regard to influencing and supporting the formulation of durable solutions policies, the key achievements are the adoption in November 2019 of a National Policy on Refugee Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, the National Evictions Guidelines, and an Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and IDPs. And internal displacement issues have been included in Somalia's National development Plan. The DSI has been influential, too, in its emphasis on seeing displacement in Somalia as essentially an urbanisation problem. On the extent to which the DSI has influenced the manner in which the durable solutions programmes have addressed gender, inclusion and conflict sensitivity issues, the general view of the respondents is that the current projects do not effectively address the underlying causes of gender disparities or clan conflicts. The evaluation recommends inter alia to support local area-based durable solutions coordination and programmes and liaising with district-based development programmes.

(IDC, 2020)

3.3 Women, peace and security

An HDP-N approach can strengthen implementation of the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, and the subsequent family of resolutions on WPS, lends itself to humanitarian, development and peacebuilding approaches and interpretations given its four complementary pillars of i) prevention, ii) participation, iii) protection, and iv) peacebuilding and recovery. While the 'peace' aspect is self-evident, the humanitarian side is related to protection aspects, and to the provision of gender-responsive relief and recovery. National Action Plans (NAPs) for implementation of UNSCR 1325 are in many countries seen as the case in point, where a nexus approach can bring together multiple stakeholders, and thereby support women's leadership as peacebuilders and strengthen gender equality. Among IGAD member states in East Africa, stakeholders at country level have started to see NAPs as a core instrument to link peace with a gendered approach for women to take community responsibilities and engage as key development actors in rebuilding societies (Nordic Consulting Group, July 2019). In Myanmar, in Kachin State, UN Women have supported local groups to build a broad coalition of women's organisations, in order take leadership in decision making and planning processes to promote the WPS agenda, which inter alia spans reducing vulnerabilities, promoting women rights and gender equality in conflict prevention and recovery; engaging women as peace makers and economic development (UN Women, 2018). Another example from Myanmar is that the WPS and women's engagement in personal security and trust building is central for peace negotiations to have lasting effects and thereby create the foundation for development activities (Co-creation workshop for the Learning Journey on Nexus, 2020).

4. Nexus Processes

This chapter briefly takes stock of joint process issues – as outlined in the DAC recommendation. The chapter covers institutionalisation (4.1.), joint analysis (4.2.); collective outcomes (4.3.), financing (4.4.), coordination (4.5.) and monitoring and evaluation (4.6.).

4.1 Institutionalisation

There are signs that nexus approaches, in particular HD-N are being institutionalised and leadership is emerging, most significantly witnessed by the adoption of the DAC Recommendation. It is the convincing logic of the recommendation and the HD-N frameworks developed around the WHS that are the drivers expected to be sufficiently convincing to bring change to institutional set-ups that are not conducive to deliver nexus approaches. There are changes on the way. A number of UN Cooperation Frameworks (UNCFs)/UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), and 2019 Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) show greater coverage of development-humanitarian-peacebuilding links (NYU/CIC, 2019) (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019). WFP, UNDP, and UNHCR have assigned a staff function at HQ to work on nexus issues, both at policy and implementation levels. WFP has set up a Programme-Humanitarian Development office in its Programme and Policy Development Department at HQ (author conversation 2019). Multilateral development banks, and the World Bank in particular, also appear as a key actor supporting nexus engagements, for example in Somalia (OECD, 2018) and by adopting, together with the UN a pilot initiative in seven country contexts (World Bank, 2018).

Switzerland is one of the few bilaterals that has evaluated if its institutional set-up is enabling for HD-N engagement. In the Swiss evaluation it was found that nexus implementation mainly relied on leadership and initiatives from the field, while there were limited institutional incentives to engage in the nexus, but it is a step forward to actually commission an evaluation of the institutional set-up (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019). It seems that multilaterals have more focus on the institutional aspects of the nexus, and this is often pushed by their Executive Boards. Countries that have integrated humanitarian action and development engagement and diplomacy in their foreign ministries and at embassy level seem to have more flexible mechanisms for nexus approaches because funding and staffing is less departmentalised (siloed)¹⁵. With regard to institutions for peace building, some countries have limited tradition and expertise in this area (Denmark and the Netherlands for example), while countries such as Norway, Finland and Switzerland have long experience and specific expertise in this field, and therefore dedicated think tanks, foundations and NGOs and they are better positioned. Interpeace is one important organisation that is dedicated to sustaining peace and reaching out to humanitarian and development stakeholders. One core activity is to promote and accompany change processes in the UN system and in other organisations for humanitarian and development actors to strengthen their contributions to sustainable peace, i.e., to become more “peace responsive”. Interpeace is one example of an organisation in the peacebuilding community working on developing linkages that can help raise awareness of “peace responsiveness and institutionalise triple nexus approaches (Interpeace, u.d.).

An assessment of how NGOs are operationalising the HDP-N note that ‘attention remains focused on intra-organisational as opposed to inter-organisational changes that allow for innovation across siloes’. (Hövelmann, 2020). Nevertheless, there are also NGOs that play key roles in nexus approaches, e.g., SomRep was discussed in Section 3.1, and there are likely to be many examples which may not yet be studied at meta level and be available in the public domain.

4.2 Role of Government

Government involvement (and leadership) at different administrative levels is a critical enabler for sustainability, but there are also conflicting interests. For development and peacebuilding stakeholders, working in partnership with government is typically a foundational principle. Although also for these actors, it comes with difficulties, particularly to work with regimes that are authoritarian, corrupt and not adhering to human rights principles. As noted in several studies, the absence of government commitment or capacity, limits aspirations to end needs, because of lack of political engagement in ending conflicts and work with a development trajectory, and therewith stresses humanitarian aid. (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019) (IOM, 2019) (NYU/CIC, 2019) (ECDPM, 2019). It is obviously also difficult for governments with weak capacity and an overwhelming number of international requirements to take both ownership and leadership¹⁶.

Humanitarians traditionally work directly with communities, and some humanitarian organisations take a hard stand against working with governments in order to safeguard their independence and neutrality, even if there are many important linkages with the government for access, coordination and logistics, humanitarians would want to ensure respect for humanitarian principles. This leads to use of parallel systems, managed by humanitarian agencies for years, and there are pertinent questions with regard to if and how other local actors such as community organisations for local private sector may be able to step into this space. SDC now supports private sector health providers in Somalia in order to help build alternative models for service delivery, not only to offset humanitarian delivery but also to see if and how local private health providers can be certified and be supported to meet standards (HoA MTR forthcoming).

There is, however, an increasing claim by Governments’ not only to play a leading and coordinating role with regard to development actors’ activities, but also to track humanitarian activities. Somalia’s National Development Plan, for example, includes a “Resilience Pillar” which sets priorities and provides an overarching framework for both humanitarian and development activities. Governments are also party to international

¹⁵ This statement is based on author’s discussions with both multilaterals in the context of earlier studies and nexus work as World Bank staff. There is no systematic and in-depth analysis available.

¹⁶ One study found that fragile states on average receive more than 750 separate donor interventions per annum, from approximately 65 different donors (Chandy & Linn, 2011).

agreements and resolutions and therefore responsible for their implementation (such as UNSCR 1325, and the GCR for those governments that have signed this). There are also issues to be observed for the international stakeholders with regard to policies, in particular related to democratic rights, rule of law, human rights and legitimacy of governments.

Another issue for a development actor to observe is a potential conflict between a potential development engagement, and overriding political reasons. In Myanmar SDC wants to set up programmes with ethnic stakeholders, but they cannot do so for political reasons until a peace agreement is in place (Co-creation workshop for the Learning Journey on Nexus, 2020). There are also situations where the government is a ‘spoiler’, which for example has led the international community in South Sudan to backtrack on working directly with government, and instead engage on what is called a humanitarian+ agenda, as well as support peace processes (SDC, 2017).

A concrete example of how to involve a Government in nexus engagement comes from the joint UN and World Bank initiative to establish an institutional platform for nexus engagement in Somalia. This initiative has come with difficulties. A lesson learned is that coherent and coordinated systems should be established right from the beginning of humanitarian crises, which can then be transferred to government systems. It is also of great importance for a nexus approach to include joint analysis and establish collective outcomes. In this context, in order a common understanding of appropriate frameworks and leadership, and reduce fragmentation of financing for example through pooled funds (OECD, 2018).

4.3 Coordination

At global level, there are important coordination mechanisms particularly focused on the nexus. The **Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)** is the overall coordinating body of the humanitarian system and one of its five priorities is humanitarian-development collaboration, working closely with INCAF, a learning network under the auspices of the OECD/DAC, which now plays an important role in terms of sharing nexus experiences, as well as following experiences and joint learning of the DAC Recommendation. More recently established, and without the same of gravitas as the IASC, the **UN Joint Steering Committee (JSC)** monitors the UN implementation of the nexus and in particular the NWOW. The JSC includes senior leadership across the UN (and the World Bank), and it meets twice a year to secure coordination between the different UN actors.

Practitioners point towards organisational complexities of coordination and partnerships in implementation being underestimated, but nexus coordination is emerging in a number of contexts. One study found that with regard to peacebuilding, on demand from governments, UN country teams have been asked to bring security and justice actors together with development and humanitarian actors. The availability of expertise, such as Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs) and UNDP-supported country support platforms, was said to be crucial for the RC/HC to play this role effectively (NYU/CIC, 2019). Nevertheless, for peacebuilders the dynamic political context is crucial, and engagements need to be flexible and it can be challenging to link and coordinate with both humanitarian and development programming.

Development actors’ coordination is often seen as additional to their programming resulting in ‘significant antipathy’ toward the added burden of more coordination, and scepticism are often expressed about ‘the return on investment’ of coordination (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019). ‘For development partners and agencies, cultivating close bilateral relationships with government is of greater value in negotiating permission to implement and gaining influence for their respective governments than participating in collective processes’ (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019).

The humanitarian cluster system seems to open up, for example in Mali there are efforts to establish nexus working groups, similar initiatives have been taken in Chad spearheaded by the EU and in Myanmar by the UN. SDC has taken lead on a Nexus Group in Ethiopia in connection with the DSI, this group has however had limited activity so far. Nexus coordination is also reported from Myanmar, although with some difficulties in getting stakeholders to see its value addition (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019). In Somalia and Ethiopia (as examples), Switzerland plays a constructive role in coordination and is considered by others to be a principled and credible partner in the coordination and development of these mechanisms (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019). (Co-creation workshop for the Learning Journey on Nexus, 2020). The CRRF Uganda seemingly has well-developed nexus coordination set-ups (Nordic Consulting Group, 2019). Obviously, there are also examples of coordination being limited. The role of NGOs and the UN system respectively in nexus

coordination in Somalia paints a picture of lack of incentives and possibly willingness and interest in coordination (See Box 5).

Box 4 HDP-N coordination in Somalia

Coordination across sectors – humanitarian, development and peacebuilding – is still limited.

NGOs tend to see the divisions between sectors as resulting from established funding structures and the *modus operandi* of the aid industry, and as running contrary to the actual needs of beneficiaries, whose needs for humanitarian, development and peace and security services are interlinked. While NGOs blame narrow funding windows as obstacles to integrated cross-sectoral programming, donors refute this and blame NGOs for lacking the creativity and incentives needed to design cross-sectoral programmes that transcend their specific specialist fields (ECDPM, 2019, p. 16).

The UN system in particular appears to find it difficult to adapt to changing contexts, due to the incentive structure of separate UN agencies. While working under a single flag, UN agencies tend to operate as fully separate entities with specific mandates. This tends to inspire competition rather than cooperation. The ‘New Way of Working’ has only been semi effective in Somalia. Although promoted by the triple-hatted DSRS/RC/HC and mentioned in most, if not all, UN strategy documents, in practice, cross-agency coordination, let alone cooperation, tends to depend entirely on the interests of individual agencies. For this reason, it is generally confined to joint programmes involving just a few agencies (ECDPM, 2019, p. 30).

4.4 Joint Analysis

Study findings point both to stakeholders conducting joint analysis as well as to the opposite. One study notes that there are a number of good examples of HD-N and that joint analysis increasingly is happening under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator (RC), as also anticipated in the reform of the UN development system. The same study takes quite a positive view on the link between analysis and planning and programming and finds that “joint” analysis has been performed under the leadership of governments (Ethiopia); in other cases that it has been undertaken by the UN and other international partners, but with considerable national involvement (Central African Republic, Nigeria, Somalia) (NYU/CIC, 2019). Another study has found that joint analysis of root causes has not taken place to a significant extent (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019).

There are different understandings of what joint analysis means, and how this is seen to be conducted and how it differs between contexts. Moreover, if and how joint analysis to be conducted at national level and being similar to a political economy analysis or a “fragility and conflict analysis”¹⁷. Questions are also raised if this is a new instrument, and how this fits together with existing analytical and planning instruments used by the international community. Another frequent question is who should be involved and who will take lead (also raised in section 1.4.) The complexity of joint analysis, if it goes beyond being an instrument at the individual organizational level or for example within the UN family, or between the UN and the World Bank, or a small group of organizations joining forces around a specific topic or area based? Some stakeholders seem to be of the view that joint analysis is foundational for a nexus approach but could become a very heavy work load that organisations will find it difficult to find resources to participate in such processes beyond departments in their own organisations. There are more positive views towards institutionalising joint analysis in area based programmes or in sectors between different stakeholders, as well as conducting analysis as close to the level of implementation as possible in order to have very concrete issues to be dealt with than can be anticipated at national level¹⁸. Joint analysis by itself is instrumental, if it is linked to the formulation of collection outcomes, planning and programming and flexible financing.

Practitioners voice that there is a need for analytical frameworks that bring analysis towards an understanding of how and where nexus approaches are appropriate, and in this respect the type of nexus that is appropriate in a given context and theory of change in order to provide better outcomes. On that background a recent article using


¹⁷ Fragility and conflict analysis may be called differently depending on organization and contextual setting.

¹⁸ Author interviews.

the case of Afghanistan has developed a framework to unpack complexities of relationships and show contextual linkages that can help practitioners to see options and gaps for more coherent approaches in the HDP-N nexus (Howe, 2019), this is shown in Box 6 below.

Box 5 An analytical model to unpack nexus relationships

The model shows that there are a web of different nexus relationships and unpacking and aligning these can improve analysis, planning and outcomes. In this regard the model introduces ‘bundles’ and ‘arrays’. A bundle is a set of actions that deliberately target a group of people in order to have a greater impact on improving conditions for them. For instance, a bundle might consist of humanitarian (e.g. food assistance, non-food items) and development (e.g. livelihood training, land allocation) support provided to people when they are internally displaced by conflict. An array is a set of action bundles that represent the larger strategic efforts to achieve outcomes. **This kind of model is proposed to provide a framework to help concept and practice and to help develop robust theories of change and a way to move from pilot initiatives to scale.**



4.5 Collective outcomes

Box 6 NWOW in the DAC recommendation

“Collective outcome refers to a commonly agreed measurable result or impact enhanced by the combined effort of different actors, within their respective mandates, to address and reduce people’s unmet needs, risks and vulnerabilities, increasing their resilience and addressing the root causes of conflict”. “Joined-up refers to the coherent and complementary coordination, programming and financing of humanitarian, development and peace actions that are based on shared risk-informed and gender sensitive analysis; while ensuring that humanitarian action always remains needs-based and principled.” (DAC, 2019)

There is no clear evidence that formulation of collective outcomes is being institutionalised. Some studies see the glass half empty and other see the glass half full. One study has found that ‘Processes for developing Collective Outcomes have demonstrated limited scope to influence existing planning frameworks and funding decisions. There is also limited appetite at the country level for new layers of process. The same study also found

that leadership of the Collective Outcomes process is problematic, citing actors in Ukraine explicitly questioning the legitimacy of the process and planning,' (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019). A recent stock take of UN actors' operationalisation of the NWOW in seven country contexts conducted by the UN Joint Steering Committee, is less pessimistic and found that articulation and operationalisation of collective outcomes seem to be happening in four of the seven cases studied. A point made was that the UN reform and stronger positioning of the RC/HCs is enabling for more and new opportunities to coordinate around collective outcomes. (UN Joint Steering Committee, 2019). Critics of this position note that collective outcomes have become quite UN centric, and it is with that lens that progress is noted. There are also cases of duplication and disconnects between UNDAFs/UNCFs, Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, Peacebuilding Priority Plans, and other mechanisms, which places a capacity burden on national counterparts and fears that collective outcomes will add an additional layer of duplication. (New York University/CIC, 2019, p. 9). Another study points to the generalisability of collective outcomes, which are often found to be so vague that they could apply to all fragile states. This results in donors questioning the quality of multiyear plans and programs, leading to reluctance to provide multi-year funding (New York University/CIC, 2019).

“With respect to Dual and Triple Nexus approaches, BMZ and GFFO are piloting a *Chapeau Approach* where they separately fund different project parts, with a jointly defined collective outcome. This is catering to long-standing critique of the strict budget lines” (Hövelmann, 2020, p. 5).

Box 7 Territorial nexus engagements

Most examples of nexus initiatives appear to be in territorial engagements. This gives options for joint engagement in a complex situation and in a defined geographic area.

One study notes that current ‘examples are not part of a grand national scheme of nexus strategies but are much more rooted in initiatives that build on windows of opportunity and willing consortia and funding instruments that enable implementation’. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, it was found that three provinces are experimenting with HDP-N pilot programmes ‘in which pairs of UN agencies have been selected in specific thematic areas to implement the NWOW, collecting lessons learnt and best practices along the way’. Humanitarian, development and stabilisation actors in DRC, for example, all work at significant scale in the province of North Kivu using community-based approaches; while there is very little overlap, coordination is running well (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019).

Another study found good examples of territorial programming in Nigeria; links between humanitarian assistance and local governance in Somalia; and links between social protection programs and humanitarian assistance in Chad, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen (NYU/CIC, 2019). The latter examples are HD-N programmes.

4.6 Financing

There seems to be an increasing number of flexible and large financing mechanisms that can scale up nexus approaches. DFID, one of the largest bilateral donors operates with a single budget model of financing which breaks down barriers and silos that are/have been common in many organisations. Even with more financing ‘silos’ within organisations, a number of bilateral donors show flexibility in their financing in fragile and conflict affected contexts. BMZ’s Transitional Financing Mechanism includes development and peacebuilding activities, but not humanitarian activities. Denmark has some flexibility between its humanitarian and development funds but has a separate mechanism fund for stabilisation and peacebuilding; SDC has an increasing number of projects that are coordinated as HD-N engagements, although the financing comes from separate votes. Agence Francaise de Developpement has a fund for peace building and resilience (MINKA) and not least the EU TFs in crisis contexts are large and flexible financing instruments. A real game changer is the World Bank’s IDA fund, which has a particular Window for Crisis Prevention, and a funding Window for Host Communities and Refugees (IDA19). Overall, there are noticeable developments in the last couple of years, which mark a change from the conclusions of a High Level Workshop held at the World Bank in 2018, where it was noted that if the HDP-N

should become a primary operational modality and taken to scale - and not only be a UN modality-, it would require that bilateral donors adapt their systems to be more flexible (INCAF, OCHA, UNDP, 2018).

Meanwhile Official Development Assistance (ODA) registered peacebuilding expenditures to be a small and declining proportion of total aid disbursement to all developing countries - stagnated at around 9 per cent of total ODA (UN MPTF, 2019, p. 136). However as noted earlier there is quite a fluid distinction between development and peacebuilding financing in fragile and conflict affected settings. For many bilaterals, peacebuilding engagements with ‘p little writ’ are also included in development programmes. Switzerland finances peacebuilding from its PHRD, but in practice some activities are also financed by SDC.

Pooled funds at country level are important mechanisms, particularly for financing activities related to post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction activities. Such funds play an important role for donor coordination as well, especially among development actors. These funds have for example formed an integral part of programming in Mindanao/Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia and both at national and sub-national levels. The UNs Peace Building Fund (PBF) is the only large-scale peacebuilding funding resource within the UN system, and the only one that focuses on funding peacebuilding initiatives across different UN agencies and other partners. The fund can also finance prevention and it is therefore increasingly considered a potential platform for joint analysis and joint programming, bringing together the different UN agencies. A recent review of PBF evaluations, however, note that currently individual agency needs, mandates, and competition for funding tend to dominate the approach to PBF funding. The same study concludes that if the PBF expands its funding across HDP-N, it will be important to be clear about peacebuilding theories of change and expected peacebuilding impacts (Ernstorfer, 2020).

The ongoing reforms of the humanitarian system call for multi-year financing, which is expected to increase efficiency and sustainability. Yet this is not happening at scale (UN Joint Steering Committee, 2019). Similarly, another study notes that ‘multi-year humanitarian funding has increased but remains insufficient to drive a significant change (FAO, NRC, UNDP, 2019).

4.7 Monitoring and evaluation

Studies point to an urgent need to monitor nexus programmes and to apply indicators that span the nexus. Monitoring and evaluation internally in organisations and shared among stakeholders appear limited. In adopting the OECD DAC Recommendation in 2019, all OECD-DAC Members agreed to disseminate and be monitored under existing OECD mechanisms, where the INCAF has a key role. INCAF will support the implementation of the Recommendation, as well as monitoring thereof through the OECD peer review mechanism, and in collaboration with the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network for multilaterals. While reporting across member states remains emergent, the UN JSC synthesis of nexus implementation in seven country contexts has found that none of the countries ‘have developed a dedicated monitoring and evaluation framework for integrated action yet’ (UN Joint Steering Committee, 2019, s. 4). One positive development is that the IASC Working Group 4 has been tasked with development of indicators which is ongoing and expected to bring forward a menu of indicators as a public good.

5. Take aways for the LJ

The *State of the Art* report has explored key questions, issues and opportunities for nexus approaches in the broader evidence base, setting the scene for the LJ to take a deeper look at the Swiss experience and provide elements for a common way forward. Overall, the studies consulted for this report relate to the gap between ambitions of nexus concepts and practice and how to incentivise nexus implementation. This includes instruments of operationalisation and institutional set-ups that provide incentives and reduce barriers. This issue was at the centre of the Nexus Evaluation (Swiss Development Cooperation, 2019), and some of the recommendations in the evaluation, accepted in the management response to the evaluation, provide opportunities for a degree of institutionalisation. *The LJ collects nexus examples that support to build a body of knowledge that can support further operationalisation and institutionalisation.*

The DAC Recommendation on the HDP-N, also includes the NWOW principles (double nexus) and therefore is a real opportunity for the international community to develop, learn and share as a collective, which practices support a greater impact. Further, the DAC Recommendation is an opportunity to enrich understanding of the peace concept in practice, and explore the extent to which approaches include a stronger focus on conflict prevention, and address root causes of fragility and conflict through early actions. Moreover, monitoring will also provide learning on “red lines” for humanitarian actors, which is of major concern in some contexts, which can contribute to breaking down some of the conceptual siloes that exist. The LJ does for Switzerland collect evidence on how peace actors (PHRD) work with humanitarian and development actors, as well as how institutional partners work with the HDP-N currently, which can also be seen as a baseline for the monitoring of progress as key elements the DAC Recommendation is also being operationalised by Swiss actors.

Internationally practice is evolving around thematic areas, where nexus approaches as a means towards better outcomes seem to gain particular traction. Examples of such areas are flagged in this report, but there are opportunities in the next steps of the LJ to reference these international examples to the Swiss engagement and focus on linking international examples to Swiss priority themes or sectors and Swiss planning tools, instruments, and particular interests.

Where nexus approaches potentially are most challenging, are in finding “their spaces” among existing analyses, planning, coordination and financing instruments. “How to” frameworks are in place, e.g., the NWOW, but there is a need for further work to ensure that processes do not become add-ons to an already overloaded field that practitioners need to do, and this is possibly the most urgent task for the international community, including getting national stakeholders to see the value of “change of behaviour”.

This is linked to both creating adequate incentives for staff, paired with building capacities to work on the nexus. The different organisations that see nexus approaches as opportunities must also reduce institutional barriers (at field level and HQ) for joint analysis, planning, data sharing, formulation of collective outcomes and flexible financing. Personal commitment of field staff is not sufficient. There is a need for leadership and a collective spirit among interested stakeholders to keep nexus approaches on the agenda, the DAC Recommendation is important in this regard, but leadership from individual countries is needed.

The State of the Art has brought to light key questions for the FDF, to with how Switzerland interally is fit for purpose, and how it should approach partners – that is, *where* are nexus approaches appropriate? which *type of nexus*? what is *joint*? and in the jointness, who takes the *lead*? It is worthwhile for the LJ to focus on process issues, noting that the devil is in the details, and it is important for implementers to be able to focus on the benefits and opportunities rather than blockages.

ANNEX 1 Definitions

The major nexus concepts are found in the following agreements:

1. **New Way of Working (NWOW)** (World Humanitarian Summit 2016)
2. **Grand Bargain (GB)** (World Humanitarian Summit 2016)
3. **Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) and the CCRF** (New York Summit 2016)
4. **OECD/DAC recommendation on the triple nexus** (February 2019)

The New Way of Working (NWOW) – at a Glance

The NWOW was summarised in the Commitment to Action at the WHS. The NWOW has three overall principles for engagement, the notion of “collective outcomes” is at the centre of the commitment:

- **Reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems.**
- **Transcend the humanitarian-development divide by working towards collective outcomes, based on comparative advantage and over multiyear timelines.**
- **Anticipate, do not wait, for crises.**

A **collective outcome** is a commonly agreed quantifiable and measurable result or impact in reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities and increasing their resilience, requiring the combined efforts of different actors.

A **comparative advantage** is the capacity and expertise on one individual, group or institution to meet the needs and contribute to the risk and vulnerability reduction, over the capacity of another actor.

A **multi-year timeframe** refers to analysis, strategising, planning and financing operations that build over several years to achieve context-specific and, at time, dynamic targets.

Grand Bargain (GB) - at a Glance

The Grand Bargain agreed at the WHS includes 51 commitments, which initially were categorised within 10 workstreams, and later rationalised and merged into nine workstreams.

One of the most important work streams relate to **localisation**. The target agreed is to achieve by 2020 - a global, aggregated target of at least 25 per cent of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible to improve outcomes for affected people and reduce transactional costs.

<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain>

GCR and CCRF – at a Glance

The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the associated Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing, which recognising that a sustainable solution to refugee situations cannot be achieved without international cooperation (adopted in September 2016). **The GCR and the CRRF represent an operationalisation of a development approach to forced displacement that has become the global norm.**

The CRRF as agreed to by Member States in Annex I of the New York Declaration, September 2016, is a Programme of Action setting out concrete measures to help meet the objectives of the compact, including

working for arrangements to share burdens and responsibilities through a Global Refugee Forum (every four years), national and regional arrangements for specific situations, and tools for funding, partnerships, and data gathering and sharing.

<http://www.globalcrf.org>

The aim of the GCR (adopted in December 2018) is to ease pressure on host communities; enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety.

<https://www.unhcr.org/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html>

The OECD/DAC recommendation (main parts)

The OECD/DAC recommendation spans the triple nexus, which makes it more encompassing than earlier frameworks. The recommendation is both a conceptual understanding as well as it includes specifics on practice in coordination; resourcing and programming and includes NWOW principles.

“Nexus refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actions” and approaches “aim to strengthen collaboration, coherence and complementarity” and capitalise on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context- in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict.

Undertake joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict, as well as positive factors of resilience and the identification of collective outcomes incorporating humanitarian, development and peace actions, by providing:

Supporting the convening of affected populations, local community stakeholders and authorities, multilateral partners, civil society, development finance institutions (DFIs) and bilateral donors;

Identifying country specific collective outcomes to which different stakeholders can contribute, while operating according to their respective mandates and objectives. These collective outcomes should be simple, focused and measurable; and

Respecting humanitarian principles, so that humanitarian action is impartial, neutral, and independent from political, economic, military and other objectives. Ensuring also that humanitarian access to people in need is safe, unhindered and is not compromised.

Provide appropriate resourcing to empower leadership for cost-effective coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture (etc)

Incentivising partnership with multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the World Bank, which plays an increasingly strong role in contexts affected by fragility, conflict and violence; and

Incentivising joined-up approaches and the rational use of resources to gain efficiencies and facilitate informal exchange between actors across the different pillars.

Utilise political engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace.

Striving to ensure that diplomatic, stabilisation and civilian security interventions are joined-up and coherent with humanitarian, development and peace outcomes, while respecting humanitarian principles and ensuring humanitarian access to people in need is protected;

Identifying appropriate opportunities to leverage political influence and strengthen capacity to support conflict prevention, humanitarian access and outcomes, peacebuilding and conflict resolution through the greater use of diplomatic, mediation, and dialogue tools and resources, including at national level and with national governments; and

Recognising that decisions should be grounded in an understanding of how power is distributed and used, as well as legal considerations, including the relevant provisions of international law, noting that all interventions affect political dynamics, and that the political situation will determine both whether interventions can succeed and how these should be tailored for greatest impact.

In programming: Prioritise prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, investing in development whenever possible, while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met.

Put people at the centre, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality.

Ensure that activities do no harm, are conflict sensitive to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximise positive effects across humanitarian, development and peace actions.

Invest in learning and evidence across humanitarian, development and peace actions.

Develop evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies at global, regional, national and local levels, with effective layering and sequencing of the most appropriate financing flows, which may include:

Use predictable, flexible, multi-year financing wherever possible.

<https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf>

ANNEX 2 Overview of HD-N and HDP-N in the UN

UN Peace Building Fund	UNHCR	UNDP	UNICEF	WFP
<p>The <u>UN Secretary-General's</u> Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the organisation's financial instrument of first resort to sustain peace in countries or situations at risk or affected by violent conflict. The PBF may invest with UN entities, governments, regional organisations, multilateral banks, national multi-donor trust funds or civil society organisations. <i>The Fund works across pillars and supports integrated UN responses to fill critical gaps; respond quickly and with flexibility to peacebuilding opportunities; and catalyse processes and resources in a risk-tolerant fashion.</i></p>	<p>UNHCR has an exclusive UN mandate on refugees, asylum seekers, refugees returning to their home countries ('returnees'), and stateless persons. UNHCR is authorised to be involved operationally in assistance to IDPs. (UNHCR, 2013). <i>The mandate is group specific and emphasis has been on humanitarian, but now explicitly includes development through CRRF engagement and approaches.</i></p>	<p>Development is the main thrust of UNDP. The UNDP Administrator coordinates UNSDG operational work; UNSDG Strategic Results Groups, and management of the Resident Coordinator system and therefore has a central role in nexus implementation in the UN. <i>UNDP hosts the Joint Steering Committee secretariat, which coordinates the UN triple nexus engagement.</i></p>	<p>UNICEF has a dual humanitarian and development mandate. UNICEF programmes address urgent needs of children affected by crisis. Development programmes contribute to reducing needs, vulnerabilities and risks in a sustainable and longer-term manner. <i>UNICEF makes considerable efforts to interlink the dual mandates in operations – uses "resilience" as the key terminology.</i></p>	<p>WFP has a dual mandate - saving lives and protecting livelihoods. The humanitarian mandate is dominant. A new organisational structure and one programming stream at country level aims to enable space for the dual mandate. <i>WFP currently develops an operational approach to peacebuilding. WFP has set up a humanitarian-development office at HQ.</i></p>

ANNEX 3 Overview of HD-N and HDP-N in Bilaterals

DFID (2020 OECD DAC Peer Review)	SIDA (2019 OECD DAC Peer Review)	DANIDA (2016 OECD DAC Peer Review)
<p>Demonstrating that crises can affect the United Kingdom’s interests worldwide, the aid strategy focuses on crisis response and crisis risks, bringing added value for taxpayers. A set of guidance and instruments has been developed that is underpinned by the Fusion Doctrine (see below) and aligned with the aid strategy. In particular, DFID has clarified its role in accompanying countries out of fragility in a Building Stability framework that carefully links development and peace. DFID has also updated its humanitarian strategy, building on the United Kingdom’s active role in reforming the humanitarian sector well before the World Humanitarian Summit. Developed with the same overarching objective of strengthening global peace, these two documents are complementary. The United Kingdom understands that crises are multidimensional and that expertise from different government departments should therefore be mobilised. [...]</p> <p>Even before the 2015 Aid Strategy was released, DFID had met its ambitious target to spend at least 50% of its ODA annually in the countries included in DFID’s list of fragile states. This demonstrates the United Kingdom’s significant spending on humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding activities, notably through the CSSF, whose ODA share is increasing. [...]</p> <p>Using the OECD fragility framework for comparability across DAC members, the United Kingdom’s bilateral ODA for fragile states declined by 11% from 2017 to 2018 following several years of steady increase. [...] Reaching a peak in 2017 after several years of growth, the United Kingdom’s humanitarian expenditure also declined in 2018. [...] Building on DFID’s Building Stability Framework that provides an evidence-based assessment of how DFID’s work can address the drivers of conflict and fragility, there is scope for the United Kingdom to continue to increase the level of its development and peace programming by identifying ways to address the structural drivers of humanitarian needs. This would be in line with the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus.</p> <p>”The United Kingdom positions itself as a strong proponent of international peace. As stated in its 2015 Aid Strategy, the United Kingdom uses its development budget to help tackle the causes of the security threats it faces, resulting in an increased focus on stability and crisis prevention. As part of the National Capability Security Review, a new security doctrine, the Fusion Doctrine was developed in 2018 to improve the United Kingdom’s collective approach to national security. The doctrine calls for the United Kingdom to use the full range of its security, economic and influencing capabilities to achieve its strategic priorities. The doctrine now underpins the United Kingdom’s engagement in fragile contexts, including through official development assistance (ODA) expenditure. While the doctrine is primarily about safeguarding the United Kingdom’s own security interest and priorities, the United Kingdom explicitly links poverty reduction goals to its national interest – an approach which is increasingly adopted by DAC members.”</p>	<p>“Sweden is fully aware that humanitarian assistance cannot be a quick fix to crises-induced needs but must be part of a broader global response to fragility. Its policy framework and its humanitarian and sustainable peace strategies all call for greater coherence and a closer interplay among humanitarian assistance, long-term development co-operation, peace building and political dialogue in crisis contexts (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017).</p> <p>Sida’s pioneering work on risk and resilience analysis in countries affected by conflict and fragility is helping staff to deliver on this ambition. For example, Sweden has applied a resilience systems analysis, developed with the OECD, across six crisis countries (MacLeman, Malik-Miller and Marty, 2016). This analysis, along with other work, is enabling Sida staff to seek out synergies between the agency’s humanitarian assistance and development work, elevate its conflict perspective across programming, and focus its development aid on addressing the root causes of crises (Annex C).</p> <p>Sida also regularly analyses the humanitarian-development nexus, identifying opportunities and challenges for strengthening this nexus in the 16 countries where Sida has ongoing development co-operation and humanitarian work (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018a). Sweden has adopted a broad development strategy in Syria, for example, that enables the humanitarian budget to focus more firmly on its primary life-saving mandate, which is good practice (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016a). Sweden is also increasing its development assistance allocated to peace-building objectives in recognition of the need to address root causes of conflict.”</p>	<p>“As noted in the previous peer review (OECD 2011), Denmark prioritises its development assistance on dealing with protracted crises. An explicit goal of its humanitarian strategy is to break the cycle between crises and vulnerability. As a result, Denmark is a pioneer in the “grey zone” between humanitarian assistance and development programming and takes innovative steps in terms of policy work, flexible funding and partnerships in both fields. This innovative approach is applauded by Denmark’s partners. As Denmark increasingly focuses its development co-operation on addressing the root causes of migration in fragile states, it will need to further integrate its humanitarian action with development in order to support a more holistic approach and to help Denmark achieve its objectives.</p> <p>Another objective of the humanitarian strategy is to address vulnerability and support resilience, based on the rationale that humanitarian action is a building block for long-term development. Denmark uses the Sendia Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction as the starting point for its support and to target those most vulnerable to risks, particularly children and women. Building community resilience is also a strong aspect of Denmark’s strategy and a key means of addressing vulnerability, protection and the root causes of migration. [...]</p> <p>Denmark has a good range of tools offering effective support for response, recovery and resilience. It builds flexibility into its grants, allowing both development and humanitarian partners to adapt in response to sudden onset or escalating emergencies. [...] Denmark is also actively involved in global donor co-ordination but, due to a lack of field presence, has limited opportunities for in-country co-ordination. [...]</p> <p>The Danish Peace and Security Fund fosters a whole-of-government approach to protracted crises, but its programming cycle is disconnected from country programmes and humanitarian assistance. The more comprehensive Denmark’s approach becomes, the more important it will be to build in proper safeguards to maintain systematic respect for humanitarian principles.</p>
(OECD, 2020b)	(OECD, 2019)	(OECD, 2016)

ANNEX 4 Glossary of nexus terminology

Grand Bargain	<p>The Grand Bargain is an agreement signed at the World Humanitarian Summit (May 2016) between more than 30 of the biggest donors and aid providers, which aims to get more means into the hands of people in need. It was proposed in January 2016 by the former UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing in its report “Too Important to Fail: addressing the humanitarian financing gap” as one of the solutions to address the humanitarian financing gap. The Grand Bargain is based on the concept of ‘quid pro quo’: if donors and agencies each accept changes, aid delivery will become more efficient, freeing up human and financial resources for the benefit of affected populations. For example, donors should reduce earmarked funds while aid agencies would increase their transparency.</p> <p>https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-hosted-iasc</p>
Localisation	<p>The Grand Bargain commits donors and aid organisations to provide 25 per cent of global humanitarian funding to local and national responders by 2020.</p> <p>https://www.alnap.org/help-library/highlights-and-ways-forward-a-synopsis-of-grand-bargain-signatoriespercentE2percent80percent99-achievements-and</p>
New Way of Working	<p>The New Way of Working (NWoW) is a method of work. It is when a diverse range of humanitarian, development, and – when appropriate – peace actors work towards collective outcomes over multiple years based on their comparative advantage. The approach is context-specific and is meant to reinforce (rather than replace) existing national and local capacities. It is especially relevant in protracted crises. The goal of the NWoW is to reduce need, risk and vulnerability in line with the 2030 Agenda. The NWoW is not a goal in and of itself and should not be confused with other approaches sharing similar aspirations. (ICVA 2017)</p> <p>https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NewWayOfpercent20Working_Explained.pdf</p>
New York Declaration 2016 for Refugees and Migrants	<p>The outcome document of UN Summit on 19 September 2016 is called <i>The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants</i>. It expresses the political will of world leaders to save lives, protect rights and share responsibility on a global scale. It initiates preparatory processes toward two related so-called Global Compacts, international voluntary commitments, one for Migration and one on Refugees. Since the Declaration was adopted, fifteen countries have started to roll-out the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF see below) laid out in Annex I of the text.</p> <p>https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/refugees-compact</p>
Global Compact on Refugees	<p>The UN adopted the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) in December 2018. Its four objectives are to (i) Ease the pressures on host countries; (ii) Enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) Expand access to third-country solutions; and (iv) Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity</p> <p>https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/refugees-compact</p>
CRRF (Global)	<p>The CRRF specifies critical elements for a comprehensive response to any large movement of refugees. These include rapid and well-supported reception and admissions; support for immediate and on-going needs; assistance for local and national institutions and communities receiving refugees; and expanded opportunities for solutions. The CRRF has informed the preparation of the proposed global compact on refugees, which has been included in the High Commissioner’s annual report to the General Assembly in September 2018. The CRRF supports the objectives of the GCR. Since the Declaration was adopted, fifteen countries have started to roll-out the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) laid out in Annex I of the text</p> <p>http://www.globalcrrf.org/faq/</p>

<p>Humanitarian – Development – Peace Nexus</p>	<p>The ‘nexus’ narrative is the most current version on how to achieve coherence between humanitarian, development and security & peace (HDP nexus) support and interventions. The HDP nexus is also referred to as the ‘triple nexus. Different organisations use different emphasis, sometimes deliberately leaving out the more politically sensitive Peace and Security dimension by referring to a Humanitarian -Development (HD nexus.) It is closely related to an earlier conversation on Linking Relief to Reconstruction and Development (LRRD).</p> <p>https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ICVA_Nexus_briefing_paperpercent20percent28Lowpercent20Respercent29.pdf</p> <p>In February 2019 OECD/DAC issued a recommendation for an understanding of the nexus. <i>This report adopts the HDP nexus terminology.</i></p> <p>https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf</p>
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ANNEX 5 Timeline of frameworks & commitments on nexus

2003	Good Humanitarian Donorship: Principles and Good Practice	Principle 9: Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities
2005	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	Point 7: Enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex situations. In such situations, worldwide humanitarian and development assistance must be harmonised within the growth and poverty reduction agendas of partner countries.
2005	Addis Ababa Action Agenda	Point 6: We recognise the need for the coherence of developmental and humanitarian finance to ensure timelier, comprehensive, appropriate and cost-effective approaches to the management and mitigation of natural disasters and complex emergencies.
2007	Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations	FSP 1: Take context as the starting point: Understand the specific context in each country and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. FSP 4: Prioritise prevention – International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is the highest
2008	Accra Agenda for Action	Point 21: Adaptation of aid policies for countries in fragile situations. Including commitments to undertake joint assessments (a), to jointly define realistic objectives to tackle root causes and ensure protection (c), and flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities.
2015	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs)	Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all Goal 17.14: Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development Paragraph 74 (e): They will be people-centred, gender-sensitive, respect human rights and have a focus on the poorest, most vulnerable and those furthest behind.
2015	Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030	Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to ‘Build Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction
2016	Sustaining peace resolutions, (The General Assembly and the Security Council (A/RES/70/262) and S/RES/2282).	The UN defines sustaining peace as including “activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.” It is an inherently political process that spans prevention, mediation, conflict management, and resolution. The resolutions place UN member states and their populations in the lead, putting politics and political solutions front and centre, giving prevention an uncontested home, and leveraging the UN’s three pillars—human

		rights, peace and security, and development—in a mutually reinforcing way.
2016	World Humanitarian Summit: Grand Bargain, New Way of Working (NWOW)	Commitment 10: Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors; NWOW principles focusing on collective outcomes; comparative advantage; jointness analysis and planning; multiyear financing.
2016	New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants	Commitment 38: We will take measures to ... enable host countries and communities to respond both to the immediate humanitarian needs and to [refugees' and migrants'] longer-term development needs.
2018	Global Compact on Refugees	The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) adopted by the UNGA in December 2018 is a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing, recognising that a sustainable solution to refugee situations cannot be achieved without international cooperation. It provides a blueprint for governments, international organisations, and other stakeholders to ensure that host communities get the support they need and that refugees can lead productive lives. It constitutes a unique opportunity to transform the way the world responds to refugee situations, benefiting both refugees and the communities that host them. (UN, 2018d)
2019	OECD/DAC	DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. The recommendation is a framework for more collaborative and complementary humanitarian development and peace actions, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (OECD, 2019)

Adapted and updated from (OECD, 2017)

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